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It [writ of mandamus] was introduced, to prevent disorder from a
failure of justice, and defect of police. Therefore it ought to be used
upon all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy,
and where in justice and good government there ought to be one....
If there be a right, and no other specific remedy, this [writ of
mandamus] should not be denied. 1
I.

INTRODUCrION

The Texas Supreme Court has, until recently, consistently stated2
as a fundamental principle that a writ of mandamus will not issue
* In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d 714, 727 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (Baker,
J., dissenting). Justice Baker used the phrase "road of no return" in four separate
dissenting opinions in cases involving the granting of mandamus relief. See In re Allstate
County Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 200 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (Baker, J.,
dissenting) ("Because the Court continues to lead us down this Road of No Return, I
dissent."); In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d at 727 (Baker, J., dissenting) ("[T]his decision
represents yet another mile marker down the road of no return."); In re EPIC Holdings,
Inc., 985 S.W.2d 41, 61 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (Baker, J., dissenting) ("This
decision is yet another mile marker down the road of no return where the Court ignores its
own rules and precedent."); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 604 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding) (Baker, J., dissenting) ("[T]oday's decision can only lead the Court down a
road of no return."). Justice Baker created the stark visual image of a court replacing the
doctrine of stare decisis with ad hoc decision making whenever it was dissatisfied with the
decision of a trial court and desired to confer immediate relief. CSR Ltd., 925 S.W.2d at
603-04. Once the court cavalierly began the practice of refusing to follow precedent,
Justice Baker apparently was convinced that there would be no easy return to traditional
mandamus jurisprudence. See id. at 603 (pointing out that an issue's resolution can never
be deemed resolved if the court does not adhere to precedent). It is the premise of this
article that he was right.
** Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. B.A., Ph.D., J.D.,
University of Texas at Austin. Editorial assistance was provided by two law students at St.
Mary's University School of Law: Patricia A. Jay and Bobby Jack Rushing.
1. Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 824-25 (K.B. 1762).
2. E.g., Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 & n.8 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)
(citing cases back to 1890). The court adopted the practice over fifty years ago of
"conditionally granting" petitions for mandamus rather than granting the writ, for the
simple reason that the court assumed that the lower court judges or public officials would
comply voluntarily with the court's opinion without the necessity of issuing the writ itself.
Of course, the writ would issue if the court or official refused to do as directed by the
supreme court. See, e.g., Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 684 (Tex. 1956) (orig.
proceeding) (assuming the lower court would "enter proper orders in accordance with this
opinion," otherwise the writ would issue). Apparently the practice began because of the
requirement of then-Rule 475 which was adopted as a new rule effective September 1,
1941. TEX. R. Civ. P. 475 (Vernon 1942, repealed 1955). That rule outlined the procedure
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in cases where the party seeking the writ has another adequate
remedy. 3 Notwithstanding this general principle, the court has
involving an original petition of mandamus to compel a court of civil appeals "to certify a
question on the ground of conflict," and stated that "[i]f the petition be granted the
mandamus will then issue unless the Court of Civil Appeals conform its ruling and
decision to those of the Supreme Court." Id. Although the rule concerning other original
proceedings, including mandamus in other situations, did not contain this language, by the
middle of the 1950s the court began to grant mandamus conditionally in all cases. See, e.g.,
Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 684 (granting petition conditionally); King v. Payne, 156 Tex. 105,
114, 292 S.W.2d 331, 337 (1956) (orig. proceeding) ("Under our established practice, the
writ itself will be withheld pending compliance with our holding by the Clerk and Justices
of the Court of Civil Appeals, which will undoubtedly follow."). Since the rule change
effective on September 1, 1997, a party seeking a writ of mandamus is no longer required
to file a motion for leave along with his petition for writ of mandamus, but instead only
needs to file an original petition for writ of mandamus. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1; TEX. R. APP.
P. 121, 60 TEX. B.J. 876, 930 cmt. (Tex. 1986, repealed 1997).
3. See Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504, 506 (Tex. 1843) (holding that the inadequacy
of a legal remedy as a requirement for the issuance of mandamus was part of the common
law that Texas had embraced). The supreme court has continued to express this
fundamental tenet of mandamus jurisprudence since the time of the Republic. See, e.g., In
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)
(stating that one of the two requirements for relief by mandamus is that a party "has no
adequate remedy by appeal"); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840 (noting that mandamus will not
issue in cases where there is an adequate remedy at law, such as an appeal); Holloway v.
Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding) (noting that
the requirement of establishing a lack of an adequate appellate remedy is a "fundamental
tenet" of mandamus); Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 376-77, 60 S.W. 665, 666 (1901) (orig.
proceeding) ("[I]t is elementary law that a mandamus is never awarded where the law has
provided another plain, adequate, and complete remedy."); Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex.
457, 464 (1851) (orig. proceeding) (stating that mandamus is available when the "law
affords no other adequate means of redress"). In Texas, writs of mandamus were
traditionally issued to compel a government official to perform some duty that was
considered purely ministerial; that is, "when the duty to do the act commanded [was] clear
and definite and involve[d] the exercise of no discretion." Turner v. Pruitt, 161 Tex. 532,
534, 342 S.W.2d 422, 423 (1961) (orig. proceeding); Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1, 10 (1871)
(orig. proceeding) (stating that the writ of mandamus will issue to compel an inferior court
to perform a duty that is "simply ministerial and involves no judicial discretion").
Although mandamus is still available to command the performance of ministerial duties,
the authority of the court to issue mandamus has been enlarged to include the power to
correct a trial court's clear abuse of discretion, in proper cases. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839
(noting that the writ has been used to remedy a trial court's clear abuse of discretion since
the 1950s); Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 682 (stating that "the writ may issue in a proper case to
correct a clear abuse of discretion"). The ultimate legal basis for the issuance of writs of
mandamus is found in the Texas Constitution. The Texas Constitution provides that the
supreme court "may issue writs of mandamus ...as may be necessary to enforce its
jurisdiction" and authorizes the legislature to "confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court to issue writs ... in such cases as may be specified." TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3(a).
The legislature has responded and conferred original jurisdiction on the supreme court to
issue writs of mandamus against judges and justices of the State of Texas as well as against
all governmental officials, with a few exceptions, "agreeable to the principles of law."
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recognized over its history that in certain cases of extraordinary
circumstances the remedy by appeal will be deemed inadequate.4
Furthermore, from time to time the court, although mentioning
the principle, has taken a more lenient approach to its application
and granted mandamus relief in spite of the availability of other
legal remedies.5 In addition, in other cases the court has wholly
failed to mention this basic principle. 6 But in 1992, in Walker v.
Packer,7 the court made a Herculean effort to place mandamus
jurisprudence in Texas on a clear and predictable8 course
consistent with its historical roots. 9 In Walker, the Texas Supreme
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a) (Vernon 2004). The sole focus of this article is
mandamus proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court that are directed toward an inferior
court or judge.
4. See, e.g., Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding)
(holding that in child support mandatory venue issues, justice demands a quicker
resolution than can be had by appeal).
5. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 14, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (1926) (orig.
proceeding), overruled by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (articulating a
more lenient standard where mandamus relief would be available if the available remedy
was not as "convenient, beneficial, and effective as mandamus"). As a matter of common
law history, the inadequate remedy that must exist before relief to mandamus can be had
was a legal remedy, not an equitable one. See, e.g., Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 175, 184, 268
S.W. 715, 718-19 (1925) (orig. proceeding) (stating that the writ of mandamus under Texas
law is "to be construed in light of the common law"); Tex. Mexican Ry. Co. v. Locke, 63
Tex. 623, 628 (1885) (orig. proceeding) (noting that under English law, mandamus issued
only when there was no other adequate legal remedy); see also JAMES L. HIGH, A
TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES § 15 (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1874)

("[F]rom the very nature and essence of the remedy.., the writ never lies where the party
aggrieved has another adequate remedy at law."). However, even though mandamus is a
legal remedy, "its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles." Rivercenter
Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus
relief to one who was not diligent in exercising his legal rights); see also Westerman v.
Mims, 111 Tex. 29, 39, 227 S.W. 178, 181-82 (1921) (orig. proceeding) (remarking that the
one seeking mandamus relief must come before the court with "clean hands").
6. See, e.g., Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 42, 46 (Tex. 1977) (orig. proceeding)
(granting conditionally a writ of mandamus in a discovery context without discussing the
requirement of inadequate remedy).
7. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
8. Id. at 842 (disapproving prior cases where the court relaxed the requirement of a
legal remedy's inadequacy, and other authorities that implied that a remedy would be
inadequate merely because it might involve more delay or cost than mandamus); see also
In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d 714, 723 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (Enoch, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Walker was our laudable effort to set
mandamus proceedings in Texas on a predictable course."); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes,
Demystifying the Extraordinary Writ: Substantive and Procedural Requirements for the
Issuance of Mandamus, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 525, 526 (1998) (stating that, in Walker, the
court attempted to harmonize mandamus jurisprudence).
9. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840 n.8 (citing over twenty cases from 1890-1991 in support
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Court asserted that one of the two fundamental, historical, and
traditional tenets necessary for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
was the lack of an adequate remedy.' 0 Notwithstanding Walker's
unequivocal pronouncement, 1 the court began a twelve year
venture of slowly chipping away at the firm foundation that was
mandamus jurisprudence in Texas. By conditionally granting
mandamus in case after case where the trial court's incidental
rulings were clearly erroneous, and in spite of a clear remedy by
2
appeal, the court simply chose to provide a "quick fix.'
However, on September 3, 2004, the Texas Supreme Court,
deciding In re PrudentialInsurance Co. of America,1 3 abandoned

of the well-settled requirement that mandamus will not issue where there is an adequate
remedy by appeal).
10. Id. at 842 (asserting that "[t]he requirement that mandamus issue only where
there is no adequate remedy by appeal is sound" and a "fundamental tenet" of mandamus
law): see also Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. 1989) (orig.
proceeding) (characterizing the requirement of an inadequate remedy by appeal as "a
fundamental tenet of writ practice"). Several opinions of the Texas Supreme Court prior
to In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding), cited Walker for this very proposition. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109,
116 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); In re State Bar of Tex., 113 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. 2003)
(orig. proceeding): In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. 2002)
(orig. proceeding). Since the Prudentialdecision on September 3, 2004, the supreme court
has not again referred to this requirement as a fundamental tenet of mandamus law.
11. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 ("The requirement that mandamus issue only
where there is no adequate remedy by appeal is sound.").
12. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding) (Baker, J., dissenting): see also In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 124 (Phillips,
C.J., dissenting) ("The writ of mandamus should not be an alternative to appeal, available
whenever an appellate court decides that trial court errors demanded swift correction.");
In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d at 198-99 (Baker, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the court ignores the requirement that a relator establish an inadequate remedy to
obtain mandamus relief); In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 201 (Tex. 1999) (orig.
proceeding) (Baker, J., dissenting) (pointing out that granting of mandamus relief when an
appeal is an available remedy provides no "guidance on this issue for future cases"): In re
Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d at 723 (Enoch, J., dissenting) (lamenting that Walker's
teachings are in doubt); In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding)
(Baker, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court is only giving "lip service [to] the lack of an
adequate appellate remedy"): Elaine A. Carlson & Karlene S. Dunn, Navigating
ProceduralMinefields: Nuances in Determining Finality of Judgments, Plenary Power, and
Appealability, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 953, 1029 (2000) (noting that the application of the
Walker test has not always been straightforward or consistent). But see Charles W.
"Rocky" Rhodes, Demystifying the Extraordinary Writ: Substantive and Procedural
Requirements for the Issuance of Mandamus, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 525, 527-28 (1998)
(asserting that "much of the ... court's post-Walker [mandamus] case law can be
harmonized").
13. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
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any pretext of paying lip service to Walker and attempted to
replace this fundamental tenet of mandamus jurisprudence with a
new, ad hoc balancing test. 4 In Prudential,the court stated that
the word "adequate" had no comprehensive definition, but was
"simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential
considerations that determine when appellate courts will use
original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower
courts."' 5 The court then pronounced that an appellate remedy
was "adequate" if the detriments to mandamus review outweighed
the benefits; however, if the detriments to such review were
outweighed by the benefits, the "courts must consider whether the
appellate remedy is adequate."' 6 Although the court did not
apply this balancing test to the case at hand, 17 this new test could
portend a radical shift in mandamus jurisprudence in Texas, as
well as expand the jurisdictional reach of the Texas Supreme
Court over trial court interlocutory orders.
This Article will examine whether these possible ramifications
of the Prudentialcase are in the best interest of Texas mandamus
jurisprudence. Part II will briefly review the historical development of the remedy of mandamus from its inception and
14. Id. at 135-36.

The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Phillips chastised the

majority opinion for retreating from the tenets of mandamus jurisprudence and
establishing a new balancing test. Id. at 141-43 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting).
The court noted that these jurisprudential
15. Id. at 136 (majority opinion).
considerations included both public and private concerns. In trying to give insight into
what these considerations might be, the court drew a distinction between incidental and

significant rulings in exceptional cases. In the case of incidental interlocutory trial court
rulings the court noted that mandamus relief interfered with the proceedings, tied up
appellate courts, and increased costs and delays at the trial court level. However,

mandamus review of significant rulings in exceptional cases may be essential to
preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow
the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would
otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare private parties and

the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring eventual reversal of
improperly conducted proceedings.

Id.
16. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136. The court was quick to note that this
balancing test was "practical and prudential," not "abstract or formulaic," noting that

flexibility was the principal virtue of the writ of mandamus. Id.
17. Id. at 138-39 (holding that there was no remedy for the trial court's refusal to

apply the contractual jury waiver). The court's opinion never addressed the question of
the remedy's adequacy, for in the mind of the majority there was simply no remedy by way
of appeal. Id. at 138. The dissent strongly disagreed. Id. at 141 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting)

(arguing that an appeal could correct the trial court's error).
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refinement in English common law, to its use and application by
the United States Supreme Court prior to the inception of the
Republic of Texas. This part of the article will focus primarily on
uncovering and unpacking the historical, philosophical, and legal
justifications for the requirement of an inadequate remedy at law
as a prerequisite for the issuance of a writ of mandamus. I Part III
will trace the development of mandamus jurisprudence at the
Texas Supreme Court from the time of the Republic until the
controversial Prudentialdecision. This section will focus primarily
upon the development of a more lenient standard for the
application of the fundamental principle, culminating in the
Walker decision, and will analyze and evaluate the historical,
philosophical, and legal justifications for the expansion and
subsequent limitations on mandamus relief. Part IV will examine
and analyze the Prudentialdecision in light of then-existing Texas
mandamus jurisprudence and discuss the practical impact of the
Prudentialdecision upon mandamus jurisprudence in Texas. The
impact of the case upon the authority of the court to undertake
supervision of trial courts' interlocutory rulings will be discussed as
well. Part V will suggest that the court reject the Prudential
balancing test as an improper expansion of the court's mandamus
authority, and that mandamus relief should return to its historical
role-one of extraordinary relief in extraordinary circumstances1 9 -and not the quick-fix remedy available in the ordinary
more time consuming,
case to avoid availing oneself of 2 existing,
0
remedies.
conventional
and costly
18. This reflects the classical legal approach as noted by Mr. Justice Holmes: "The
history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of what the law is."
OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 37 (1881).

19. See, e.g., Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)
(explaining that because of the extraordinary nature of mandamus relief its issuance is
limited to those "situations involving manifest and urgent necessity and not for grievances
that may be addressed by other remedies" (quoting Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals,
767 S.W.2d 680, 684 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding))).
20. The court had consistently held that economics and time delays should generally
play no role in the determination of whether mandamus relief should be granted. See, e.g.,
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 (disapproving prior supreme court decisions "to the extent that
they imply that a remedy by appeal is inadequate merely because it might involve more
delay or cost than mandamus"); Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 368, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652
(1958) (orig. proceeding) (observing that delay through the appellate process is not
enough to justify mandamus relief).

But see In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136-37

("Walker [did] not require [the court] to turn a blind eye .... [to an] irreversible waste of
judicial and public resources." (quoting In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex.
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HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS

English Common Law

Long before any Texas court contemplated the remedy of
mandamus, English common law courts had developed a
significant body of law on the subject.2 1 Most academics 2 2 trace
the birth of mandamus to the year 1615 in the opinion by Lord
Coke, Chief Justice of King's Bench, 23 in Bagg's Case.2 4 That
1999) (orig. proceeding))).
21. For two detailed treatises on the law of mandamus in England, see generally
THOMAS TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH PREROGATIVE WRIT OF
MANDAMUS (London, Win. Benning & Co. 1848), and JOHN SHORTT, INFORMATIONS,
MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION (Phila., Blackstone Publ'g Co. 1888). Both works give
not only a brief history of the writ as developed in England, but also examples of when
and how the writ had been used in England. One commentator labeled Tapping's work an
"exhaustive and unreadable treatise on the writ," noting that it contained 252 pages of
"analysis of all [English and Irish] cases, arranged alphabetically according to subject
matter." STANLEY A. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 539
(J.M. Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980).
22. See EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
72 (1963) (asserting that the origins of modern mandamus came from Lord Coke's
expansive declaration in Bagg's Case); STANLEY A. DE SMITH, The Prerogative Writs:
Historical Origins, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS app. 1, at 591
(J.M. Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980) (declaring that the modern writ of mandamus had its
beginnings in 1615 with Bagg's Case); see also Louis L. Jaffee & Edith G. Henderson,
JudicialReview and the Rule of Law: HistoricalOrigins, 72 L.Q.R. 345, 359 (1956) (U.K.)
(asserting that Lord Coke stated in Bagg's Case a notion of supervision of errors judicial
and extra-judicial); Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J.
523, 530 (1923) (regarding Bagg's Case "as the well-head of Mandamus"). However,
Thomas Tapping postulates that mandamus had its initial origins in the Magna Charta and
that Bagg's Case was merely "the first writ, in its judicial form, which had reference to
municipal corporations." THOMAS TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH
PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS 2 (London, Wm. Benning & Co. 1848).
23. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *41 (relating that the court of
King's Bench got its name from the fact that the King himself used to sit in person).
However, by the close of the medieval period the King ceased to be personally present
and had entrusted his judicial power to his judges. Id. By the time Lord Coke was Chief
Justice of the King's Bench in the seventeen century, the jurisdiction of the court was
extensive. See generally 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 21231 (7th ed., rev. 1956) (concluding that the judges of King's Bench had general jurisdiction
throughout England); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *41-43 (calling the
court of King's Bench "the supreme court of common law"). Blackstone described the
King's Bench as both a court of original jurisdiction in many cases but "likewise a court of
appeal, into which may be removed by writ of error all determinations of the court of
common pleas, and of all inferior courts of record in England." Id. at 42-43. He noted
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case involved one of twelve chief burgesses, or magistrates, of the
borough of Plymouth, who alleged that he had been wrongly
removed from his office by the mayor and the commonalty of
Plymouth (i.e., his fellow burgesses). Bagg sued out a writ of
restitution 2 5 in the court of King's Bench, and the court entered a
rule requiring the mayor and the commonalty to show cause for
Bagg's removal.2 6 In effect, Bagg questioned whether the action
that the King's Bench was the supreme common law court with the power to "command[]
magistrates and others to do what their duty requires, in every case where there is no
other specific remedy." Id. at 42. Finally, Blackstone noted that it was the business of
King's Bench to supervise the inferior courts "not only by restraining their excesses, but
also by quickening their negligence, and obviating their denial of justice." Id. at 110-11.
24. Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (K.B. 1615).
25. Id. Prior to Bagg's Case there had been some earlier proceedings in which the
writ of restitution had been used as a remedial action to restore property or office that had
been lost as a result of erroneous judicial or official action. See, e.g., Harold Weintraub,
English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and Mandamus, 9
N.Y.L.F. 478, 487-88 (1963) (believing the importance of these earlier decisions was to
establish the authority of the King's Bench to review and reverse alleged improper actions
of extra-judicial officials). For some time after Bagg's Case, this new writ was often
referred to as a writ of restitution for the simple reason that it was issued to compel
restitution to offices. See STANLEY A. DE SMITH, The Prerogative Writs: Historical
Origins, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS app. 1, at 592 & n.96 (J.M.
Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980) (citing a number of seventeenth century cases which referred to
this new writ as a writ of restitution). Shortly after Bagg's Case the court used this "new
writ" for purposes other than merely restoring one to office, and with this expanded use
emerged "[a] more comprehensive theory of mandamus." See EDITH G. HENDERSON,
FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 80-82 (1963) (tracing the
development of mandamus jurisprudence beyond the simple restoration to office
following Bagg's Case); Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by
Prerogative Writ: Certiorariand Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478, 487-88 (1963) (noting how
Lord Coke was able to transform such meager precedents into "powerful pronouncements").
26. Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1272 (K.B. 1615). The general procedure for
obtaining the writ of mandamus in England began with filing an application for a rule for a
writ of mandamus. See JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES §§ 500-02, 529-33 (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1874) (distinguishing between the
alternative writ of mandamus and the peremptory or absolute writ of mandamus). The
application, generally supported by an affidavit, would outline the right of the party to the
relief sought, mentioning the duty that had been neglected or omitted by the defendant
and praying that the defendant show cause why the writ should not be issued absolute. Id.
The court then would issue a rule to show cause directed to the judge or official, ordering
that he perform the official duty or act demanded (sometimes referred to as the
alternative writ), or show cause why mandamus should not issue. Id. After notice, the
defendant was required to file a verified return or answer. Failure to file a return could
lead to contempt proceedings. Id. If the answer was deemed insufficient by the court, in
that it legally failed to justify the actions of the defendant, the peremptory mandamus
would issue compelling absolute performance of the duty. Id. If the return showed a
sufficient cause, even if false, there were no further proceedings on the mandamus,
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of the municipal corporation, professing to act under a Crown
charter, was lawful. The return of the writ told of a vicious
campaign by Bagg to impair the authority of the various lord
mayors of Plymouth, using a dedicated plan of outright contempt
and vilification.2 7 Lord Coke judged their response insufficient as
it gave no legal basis to justify Bagg's removal, 28 and thus, the
29
court issued a writ of restitution to restore him to office.
Although there was limited precedent for Lord Coke's actions in
restoring Bagg to office, 30 there was no authority for his sweeping
although the applicant would have a cause of action for false answer. See WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *111 (outlining briefly the procedures for obtaining a
writ of mandamus); see generally THOMAS TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE
HIGH PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS 282-339 (London, Wm. Benning & Co. 1848)

(detailing the procedures for issuance of the writ of mandamus by King's Bench).
27. Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1273-77.
28. Id. at 1277, 1281. The return, or answer, to the alternative writ of restitution in
this case was in the form of a lengthy affidavit containing a recitation of facts that
responded to the writ's demand that the respondents show cause for Bagg's
disenfranchisement. Id. at 1272-77. The problem, according to Lord Coke, was that the
answer did not allege any acts committed by Bagg that would provide a legal reason to
remove him from office, although there might have been a basis for punishment for
contempt. Id. at 1281. It should be pointed out that, at common law, the judges were
bound by the sworn facts as set out in the return in the case of the prerogative writs of
habeas corpus and mandamus. See Opinion on the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 97 Eng. Rep.
29, 42-44 (H.L. 1758) (stating the rule for both mandamus and habeas corpus that the facts
recited in the return are taken as true, subject to an action for damages in a subsequent
action); Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1280 (observing that if the facts recited in the return
were sufficient to justify the action to disenfranchise Bagg, the peremptory writ would not
issue, even if such factual recital were false); see also THOMAS TAPPING, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF THE HIGH PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS 6-7 (London, Wm.
Benning & Co. 1848) (noting the refusal of the judges of King's Bench to inquire into the
factual assertions of the return). In the case of mandamus, this problem was cured by a
statute that permitted the applicant to controvert the return in the summary mandamus
proceeding itself. See 9 Ann., c. 20, § 4 (1710) (noting in the introduction of the statute
that it was "[a]n Act for rendering the Proceedings upon Writs of Mandamus, and
Informations in the nature of a Quo Warranto, more speedy and effectual; and for the
more easy trying and determining the Rights of Offices and Franchises in Corporations
and Boroughs").
29. Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1277 (stating that "a writ was directed to the mayor
and commonalty to restore him").
30. See, e.g., EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 72 (1963) (asserting that the case was "singularly unsupported by authority" other
than Lord Coke's vague reference to the Magna Charta's provision that "No free man
shall be disseised ... of his liberties or customs ...

unless by the judgment of his peers or

the law"); Louis L. Jaffe & Edith G. Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law:
HistoricalOrigins,72 L.Q.R. 345, 359 (1956) (U.K.) (observing that, prior to Bagg's Case,
King's Bench had been restoring individuals to municipal offices when they had been
unjustly removed, "but the origin of this rather surprising activity is not at all clear"):
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Edward Jenks, The Prerogative Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 529 & n.31, 530
(1923) (noting that earlier uses of mandamus had not involved the ordering of a public
official "to perform a public duty" on the application of an aggrieved individual). Shortly
after Bagg's Case this "new writ" was used for purposes beyond that of merely restoring
one to office; thus began the development of "[a] more comprehensive theory of
mandamus." See EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 80-82 (tracing the development of mandamus jurisprudence beyond the simple
restoration to office following Bagg's Case); Harold Weintraub, English Originsof Judicial
Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F 478, 487-88 (1963)
(lauding Lord Coke for transforming such meager precedents into "powerful
pronouncements"). Mandamus, along with prohibition, quo warranto, habeas corpus, and
certiorari, were usually lumped together under the classification of prerogative writs. See
1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 226-30 (7th ed., rev. 1956). A
prerogative writ was a form of command that came in the name of the Crown and was
originally one which issued only at the request of the King himself. See JOHN SHORTT,
INFORMATIONS, MANDAMUS

AND PROHIBITION 243-44 (Phila., Blackstone Publ'g Co.

1888) (stating that a prerogative writ was "a writ issuing, not as ordinary writs, or strict
right, but at the discretion of the Sovereign acting through that Court, in which the
Sovereign is supposed to be personally present"); see also STANLEY A. DE SMITH, The
Prerogative Writs: Historical Origins,in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

593-95 (J.M. Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980) (portraying the roles of Lord Mansfield and
Blackstone in making the use of the term prerogative writs commonplace in reference to
mandamus, habeas corpus, certiorari, and prohibition). Stanley de Smith points out that
the first time these extraordinary writs were designated together as prerogative writs was
by Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 599 (K.B. 1759). STANLEY A. DE
SMITH, The Prerogative Writs: Historical Origins, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 594 (J.M. Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980).
The common

characteristics of these prerogative writs during Lord Mansfield's tenure on King's Bench
have been summarized as follows:
First, the writs were closely associated with the exercise of royal authority and with
King's Bench, having long been used by the Crown in the administration of the state.
Second, prerogative writs were issued by the court, after reviewing the sufficiency of
the petition and supporting affidavits; in contrast to such "extraordinary" writs, most
common law writs issued as a matter of course without any required showing of cause.
Third, the prerogative writs were seen as the "suppletory means of substantial
justice"-the remedial mode to which the subject turned whenever remedies at law
were unavailable. Fourth, the writs sought an adjudication by way of summary
proceedings; the writs were enforceable through contempt sanctions and were not
subject to appeal.
James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First
Amendment Right to PursueJudicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
899, 919-20 (1997) (citations omitted). Lord Coke would have never asserted that this
new writ he was developing was a prerogative writ.
But for Coke to have designated them [prerogative writs] would have been wholly
inconsistent with his views upon the relationship between the royal prerogative and
the common law; for had not the King "committed ... his whole power of judicature
to several courts of justice," and was not the greatest of these the Court of King's
Bench? These writs, then, were writs that issued pre-eminently out of the King's
Bench; they were not the King's prerogative writs.
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assertion of jurisdiction by the court of King's Bench in the
following obiter dicta 3 1 to the case:
And in this case, first, it was resolved, that to this Court of King's
Bench belongs authority, not only to correct errors in judicial
proceedings, but other errors and misdemeanors extra-judicial,
tending to the breach of peace, or oppression of the subjects, or to
the raising of faction, controversy, debate, or to any manner of
misgovernment; so that no wrong or injury, either public or private,
can be done but that it shall be (here) reformed or punished by due

STANLEY A. DE SMITH, The Prerogative Writs: Historical Origins, in JUDICIAL REVIEW

OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 592-93 (J.M. Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980); see also EDITH G.

70-71 (1963) (arguing
that Lord Coke took the position that "the King had delegated all of his judicial power to
the courts"); see generally James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1529 n.53 (2001)
(observing that common law mandamus developed from "a simple directive from the king
to an inferior officer, and only later evolved into a freestanding proceeding to secure
relief" where there were no adequate remedies); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity
and the Right to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims
Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899, 917-20 (1997) (discussing the
development of the prerogative writs and the expansion of King's Bench jurisdiction in
England).
31. Leading jurists of the common law were well known for inserting significant legal
propositions into their opinions that were not necessary and sometimes not even relevant
to the issues in the case before them. Sometimes this obiter dictum became so engrained
in the law that it was regarded as part of the legal principles of the common law itself. The
dicta in Bagg's Case influenced the common law for centuries. See, e.g., STANLEY A. DE
SMITH, The Prerogative Writs: Historical Origins, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 595 (J.M. Evans ed., 4th ed. 1980) (stating that the writ of
mandamus historically became the "remedy of last resort for the subject"). Another
example is Lord Coke's dictum in Dr. Bonham's Case:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will controul Acts
of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an Act of
Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be void.
HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Dr. Bonham's Case. 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610) (citations omitted). Lord Coke
was attempting to place in the hands of the King's Bench the ultimate authority for
determining the validity of any law passed by Parliament. Although this doctrine was
rejected in England and replaced with parliamentary supremacy, William Michael
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 468-69 (2005), it has
been argued to be the basis of judicial review assessing the constitutionality of statutes
passed by legislative bodies. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of JudicialReview,
116 YALE L.J. 502, 505 (2006) (stating that in the traditional accounts "judicial review is
legitimized by English constitutional and common law, often Dr. Bonham's Case in
particular"). But see William Michael Treanor, JudicialReview Before Marbury, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 455, 468-69 (2005) (arguing that pre-revolutionary precedents do not really
explain the development of the principles of judicial review in America).
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course of law. 3 2

From this humble beginning-of restoring to municipal office an
individual who had been unjustly removed-the writ of mandamus
sprang forth and was given life.3 3
Over the next 150 years, the writ's use was expanded beyond
merely restoring one to public office and was used to compel
32. Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1277-78 (citations omitted). In his classic work,
Lord Coke modified the last clause to read: "[B]ut that this shall be reformed or punished
in one court or other by due course of law." 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 71 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1644). Apparently Lord Coke, as Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, was asserting the right of King's Bench to exercise the
prerogative of the King and correct errors made by local administrative officials that
adversely impacted ordinary citizens. See Edward Jenks, The PrerogativeWrits in English
Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 530 (1923) ("[Tlhe unpopular Chief Justice simply takes the King's
prerogative into his own hand, and uses it against a recalcitrant body professing to act
under a Crown charter."). Louis Jaffe and Edith Henderson commented on the broad and
sweeping language of Lord Coke:
From this meagre beginning Coke conceived the notion of a sweeping jurisdiction
over all errors judicial and extra-judicial ....
This asserted jurisdiction bears, perhaps, some resemblance to the jurisdiction of the
Council and the prerogative courts. Coke's opinion in Bagg's Case may have been
part of his war on the prerogative ... and to this end he may have been staking a
claim by the common law courts to the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber or even of the
Council itself.
Louis L. Jaffe & Edith G. Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical
Origins, 72 L.Q.R. 345, 359-60 (1956) (U.K.). The expansion of the jurisdiction of the
court of King's Bench was in direct opposition to the absolutist position of King James I;
perhaps as a result of his opposition to the King, Lord Coke, a firm believer in the
supremacy of the common law, was shortly deposed of his office as Chief Justice of King's
Bench. See, e.g., EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 69-70 (1963) (asserting that in some way Bagg's Case contributed to Lord Coke's
downfall); 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 459-65 (7th ed., rev.
1956) (tracing the conflict between Lord Coke, who was trying to assert independence for
the common law courts, and Jacobean absolutism); Harold Weintraub, English Origins of
JudicialReview by PrerogativeWrit: Certiorariand Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478, 489 (1963)
(stating that Lord Coke's assertion of power was in direct conflict with the Star Chamber,
which had been operating in this jurisdictional area at the wishes of King James). Lord
Coke firmly believed that the King's Bench not only was a court to hear the pleas of the
Crown and to correct errors of other courts, but its jurisdiction was plenary and extended
to correct any other manner of misgovernment. 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 71 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797) (1644).
33. One hundred and fifty years later, Lord Mansfield, then Chief Justice of King's
Bench, noted that Bagg's Case was "the first instance of a mandamus in the case of a
corporator." The King v. Barker, 96 Eng. Rep. 196, 196 (K.B. 1761). Louis Jaffe has
boldly asserted that "Lord Coke ...appears to have invented mandamus, if not out of
whole cloth then at least out of a few rags and tatters." Louis Jaffe, Standing to Secure
JudicialReview: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (1961).
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performance of a wide array of public or quasi-public duties which
had been wrongly refused. 3 4 During this developmental period,
two Chief Justices of the King's Bench played significant roles in
the expansion of the uses for the writ, thus propelling King's
Bench into Lord Coke's image of having a general supervisory role
Although
over all lower courts and administrative officials. 35

34. See

generally

EDITH

G.

HENDERSON,

FOUNDATIONS

OF

ENGLISH

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 127-42 (1963); STANLEY A. DE SMITH, The Prerogative Writs:
Historical Origins, in JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 592 (J.M. Evans
ed., 4th ed. 1980); THOMAS TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH

PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS 29-281 (London, Wm. Benning & Co. 1848) (listing
all cases involving the writ of mandamus in England and Ireland from Bagg's Case to
1848). In 1646, the new writ was given the name mandamus for the first time in Luskins v.
Carver, 82 Eng. Rep. 488, 488 (K.B. 1682). EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 129 (1963). Louis Jaffe and Edith Henderson wrote
that for the first fifty years following Lord Coke's sweeping language, the writ was used
primarily to restore individuals to office. But then they observed:

Very gradually the new remedy was extended to other fact situations; it issued in 1649
to the prerogative courts, requiring them to grant administration of a descendant's
estate according to statute; in 1661 to a town officer who had been removed,
commanding him to deliver the records of his office to his successor; in 1672 to the
Mayor's Court of London. requiring it to give judgment for the relator when a verdict
had gone in his favour; in 1699 to certain justices of the peace, to require them to

make a rate for the poor.
Louis L. Jaffe & Edith G. Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical
Origins, 72 L.Q.R. 345, 360 (1956) (U.K.) (citations omitted).
35. This development coincided with the demise of conciliar jurisdiction during the
The Tudors and the Stuarts had maintained
seventeenth century in England.
administrative control over local authorities through their various councils, especially the
Star Chamber which had become a court of substantial power and jurisdiction. The socalled Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Act of Settlement, filed in 1700 and passed in
1701, in large part abolished this conciliar jurisdiction, leaving King's Bench and its
developing prerogative jurisdiction as the only surviving method of centralized control
over local government administration. See 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 492-516 (5th ed. 1942) (tracing conciliar jurisdiction during the Tudor and
Stuart periods). In discussing the development of mandamus as a general supervisory writ
under the leadership of Lord Holt and Lord Mansfield during this troubled period in
English history, Harold Weintraub has the following insightful observation:
This judicial leadership came about quite naturally through the collapse of the
Stuarts, the impetus to judicial independence gained from the Act of Settlement of
1700, and the absence, from the onset of the struggle with the Stuarts, of a central,
supervisory authority over local activities. The revitalized role of the writ of
mandamus ... is therefore the offspring of accidents of English constitutional history.
As Holdsworth points out, the system we inherited from England could easily have
come under full executive control, if Stuarts had prevailed, rather than under judicial

surveillance.
Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorariand
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Lord Coke had pronounced the lofty concepts governing the
issuance of the writ by King's Bench, he left it to his successors to
articulate clearly the fundamental principles of mandamus
jurisprudence and make it a coherent body of common law.3 6 In
Knipe v. Edwin,3 7 King's Bench, under the leadership of Chief
Justice Holt,3 8 granted a writ of mandamus to place a person in a
public office despite the fact that an action on the case would have
fully compensated the individual in damages. 3 9 In that case,
Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478,493 (1963) (citations omitted).
36. It should be noted that, at common law, the King's Bench's award of peremptory
(absolute) mandamus was not an appealable order. Dublin v. Rex, 1 Eng. Rep. 425, 427
(K.B. 1724); see also Rt. Hon. Lord Goddard, A Note on Habeas Corpus, 65 L.Q.R. 30,
34-35 (1949) (U.K.) (explaining why there was no appeal from mandamus at common
law). See generally ROBERT J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 194-95 (1976)

(stating that, at common law, appeals lay only from a formal judgment, and as prerogative
writs were summary, no formal judgment was entered).
37. Knipe v. Edwin, 87 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B. 1695).
38. Lord Holt's contribution to the growth and development of the English common
law in general, and prerogative writs in particular, was remarkable. In fact, the authors of
one of the leading property casebooks have this to say of Lord Holt:
After the flight of James II to France, abandoning the throne, Holt, as a member of
the House of Commons, played a leading role in establishing a constitutional
monarchy under William and Mary, a system that survives today. Subsequently he
was appointed chief justice, which office he held from 1689 to 1710. He was noted for
his integrity and independence and for his common sense as well as his deep learning
in the law.... Chief Justice Holt was the first of a line of enlightened judges who, in
the eighteenth century, shaped English law to accommodate the needs of a mercantile
society that would dominate world trading. Lord Mansfield, who served as chief
justice from 1756 to 1788, was perhaps the most notable of these.
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 23 n.4 (2d ed. 1988).

During his

tenure as Chief Justice of King's Bench, 1689-1710, in addition to the Knipe decision,
Lord Holt wrote a large number of other mandamus opinions. E.g., Rex v. Mayor of
Oxford, 91 Eng. Rep. 372, 372-73 (K.B. 1697) (holding that mandamus would lie to return
to office an official removed without legal justification); Regina v. Bailiffs of Ipswich, 91
Eng. Rep. 378, 378 (Q.B. 1706) (holding that mandamus would lie to reinstate a public
official illegally removed from office); The King v. St. John's College, 90 Eng. Rep. 245,
247 (K.B. 1695) (denying mandamus on procedural grounds but boldly stating that it was
the duty of King's Bench to see that the laws of the realm are followed). In the general
area of prerogative writs, Lord Holt expanded the supervisory jurisdiction of King's Bench
to all inferior courts. See, e.g., Groenvelt v. Burwell, 91 Eng. Rep. 134, 134 (K.B. 1701)
(holding that no lower court is exempt from supervision by King's Bench to insure that
they are acting within their respective jurisdictions); Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126,
136 (Q.B. 1703) (observing that when a party has a right he must have the legal remedy to
vindicate or maintain it, for "it is a vain thing to imagine a right without a remedy").
39. Knipe, 87 Eng. Rep. at 395. Frederic Maitland, a leading English authority on the
forms of action at common law, explained the action of case in the following terms:
The title of Case covers very miscellaneous wrongs-specially we may notice slander
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Edwin sought a writ of mandamus to compel his admission as
bailiff following his appointment by the high steward. Knipe, who
had already been admitted to the office by others, responded to
the suit by asserting that Edwin's remedy, if any, lay in a suit on
the case for damages and not in mandamus. The court held that
although a successful action on the case would have led to a
recovery of damages for the lost office, such action would not put
Edwin in possession of the office of bailiff to which the court
determined he was legally entitled. Thus, the court granted the
mandamus commanding Edwin's admission to office.40
Like many of the cases of the early common law, no precedent
or other authority was given by the court to explain or justify the
court's holding. But clearly, the court perceived that the wrong
that had occurred was the deprivation of office, and King's Bench
had the authority to reform that wrong and to place the individual
where he had a right to be but for the breach of duty toward him
by public officials. As in Bagg's Case, mandamus was available to
compel public officials to perform their legal duties toward others;
but unlike Bagg's Case, where no alternative remedy had been
tendered, for the first time the court held that even if there were a
possible damage remedy, such was not sufficient to negate the
availability of mandamus relief. 41 In effect, King's Bench would
grant this extraordinary remedy even in the face of other remedies,
if such other remedies could not provide the relief available from
mandamus.

and libel (for which, however, there are but few precedents during the middle ages,
since bad words are dealt with by the local courts, and defamation by the
ecclesiastical courts), also damage caused by negligence, also deceit.
F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 360-61 (7th
prtg. 1929) (1909). Maitland noted that although case began as an offshoot of trespass, the
actions of assumption and trover became its greatest independent branches. Id. at 360,
362.
40. Knipe, 87 Eng. Rep. at 394-95. Harold Weintraub calls this a "far-reaching
decision" as it had the effect of altering the long-standing rule that monetary damages
were the sole remedy against public officials. Harold Weintraub, English Origins of
Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorariand Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478, 495 (1963)
(comparing the result to the issuance of injunction decrees on grounds that there was "no
amount of monetary damages [that] could compensate" for the legal interest that stood to
be lost).
41. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *116 (observing that as
all wrongs are nothing but a deprivation of a right, one "natural remedy" for every wrong
is putting the individual "in possession of that right").
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This nascent principle of mandamus jurisprudence was given
additional impetus in the case of The Queen v. Heathcote.4 2
Heathcote involved a simple election controversy between the
Lord Mayor of London and the residents of one of the wards of
London.43 The residents had selected four individuals to be
returned to the Court of Aldermen which was to select one of the
four to serve as alderman for the ward. The lord mayor had
rejected three of those selected by the residents and substituted
A writ of
three other individuals that he had selected.4 4
mandamus to compel the lord mayor to return the four names
elected by the ward residents to the Court of Aldermen was
The primary reason for
refused for a number of reasons. 45
refusing to issue the writ was that two of the three judges were of
the opinion that mandamus would not be effective in resolving the
dispute and that other remedies would be more effectual and less

expensive. 46 The two justices in the majority were clearly
convinced that other remedies were available in this casemandamus to the Court of Aldermen or a complaint brought by
42. The Queen v. Heathcote, 88 Eng. Rep. 620, 622-24 (Q.B. 1712) (stating that this
decision is for the purpose of pronouncing "what remedy the inhabitants of a ward have"
when their elected officials are wrongly removed from office).
43. Id. at 620.
44. Id.
45. Heathcote, 88 Eng. Rep. at 621. Two of the justices opposing the issuance of
mandamus were of the opinion that granting the writ to compel the lord mayor to return
to the Court of Aldermen the correct names would place him in a predicament. If he
answered the writ that the names that he had already returned to the court were the ones
selected by the ward members, he faced possible action for wrongful return. If he were to
answer the writ claiming the four elected by the ward members were the correct ones, he
would subject himself to an action for false return in delivering the initial return to the
court. Id. at 623 (Eyre, J.); id. at 625 (Parker, C.J.). Furthermore, Chief Justice Parker
was of the opinion that the mandamus was unnecessary and should not issue because there
was another remedy for those not returned by the lord mayor-an action on the case for
false return. Id. at 626. All three judges were of the opinion that the court had
jurisdiction to issue the writ even though the case was not a normal case for the issuance"to restore persons turned out, or to admit those refused." Id. at 623 (Eyre, J.).
46. The Queen v. Heathcote, 88 Eng. Rep. 620, 623 (Q.B. 1712) (Eyre, J.); id. at 62526 (Parker, C.J.). Justice Eyre asserted that mandamus should not be granted against the
lord mayor, but that the court would be willing to entertain a mandamus against the Court
of Aldermen, suggesting the four to be chosen and compelling them to choose one. He
stated that the mandamus to the lord mayor would not be effective to resolve the matter.
Id. (Eyre, J.). Chief Justice Parker was against any mandamus in this case. The
mandamus against the lord mayor was, in his opinion, "unnecessary" and "ineffectual."
Id. at 625 (Parker, C.J.).
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those selected by the residents of the ward who were not on the
lord mayor's return to the Court of Aldermen. 47 Justice Eyre,
echoing Lord Holt's earlier opinion in Knipe, stated what was
becoming a fundamental tenet of common law mandamus
jurisprudence: "Iagree, therefore, that unless some mandamus, I
say some mandamus, will lie in this case, there is no remedy; for as
for actions upon the case for false returns, they lie only in
damages, but can never restore the persons wronged to the
possession of their right. ' ' 48 Given the length of discussion
engaged in by two of the three justices on alternative remedies, it
is apparent that the King's Bench was grappling with the understanding that there were certain limitations on the super-visory
writ known as mandamus. Clearly, in Heathcote the court realized
that mandamus had certain limitations and was not always
effective in achieving justice for the parties.4 9
Following in the footsteps of Lord Coke and Lord Holt, Lord
Mansfield, during his tenure as Chief Justice of King's Bench from
1756 to 1788, painted in broad strokes, putting the finishing
touches on the new implement of the King's Bench's supervisory
authority by greatly seeking to increase the wrongs that would fit
under its umbrella. More importantly, he stated succinctly what
have become the two fundamental tenets of mandamus law. First,
mandamus would issue for the improper or capricious exercise of
discretion.50 Second, in the landmark mandamus case of Rex v.
47. Heathcote, 88 Eng. Rep. at 624 (Eyre, J.); id. at 625 (Parker, C.J.) (noting that the
complaint would be "more compendious and less expensive" than the mandamus).
48. Id. at 623 (Eyre, J.) (emphasis omitted). Chief Justice Parker's suggested
alternative remedy was not for damages, but a complaint brought by the injured parties to
"bring the persons chosen before the Court of Aldermen." Id. at 625 (Parker, C.J.).
49. The Queen v. Heathcote, 88 Eng. Rep. 620, 626 (Q.B. 1712) (Parker, C.J.). Chief
Justice Parker remarked on the ineffectiveness of mandamus to solve the problem in this
case:
[M]andamus will not lie, in the first place, to the Court of Aldermen [as the writ
sought was directed to the lord mayor]; that the alderman have no authority but upon
the return of the lord mayor, and consequently that a mandamus to the Court of
Aldermen can be of no use, unless it be subsequent to the mandamus to Sir Gilbert
Heathcote: this objection supposes the Court of Aldermen concluded by the return of
the lord mayor; and if this be so, then there is no way to let these persons into their
right, but by setting aside the return already made; which cannot be done by
mandamus, but by action of deceit only.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
50. Rex v. Askew, 98 Eng. Rep. 139, 141 (K.B. 1768) (viewing such to be a failure to
exercise discretion as required by law). In Askew, a doctor sought a writ of mandamus to
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Barker, 51 Lord Mansfield held that mandamus would issue only
where the aggrieved party had no other specific remedy.5 2 The
compel the College of Physicians to induct him as a member after his admission to the
college had been denied by the governing board of physicians. Id. at 140. While noting
that mandamus would be the proper remedy if the doctor had been denied a right-and
had no other remedy been available to obtain that right-Lord Mansfield stated:
[T]hat the judgment and discretion of determining upon this skill, ability, learning,
and sufficiency to exercise and practise this profession is trusted to the College of
Physicians: and this Court will not take it from them, nor interrupt them in the due
and proper exercise of it. But their conduct in the exercise of this trust thus
committed to them ought to be fair, candid, and unprejudiced; not arbitrary,
capricious, or biassed; much less, warped by resentment, or personal dislike.
Id. at 141. In reaching this result Lord Mansfield was following earlier precedent that
distinguished between ministerial and judicial (discretionary) functions. Although the
distinctions were not fully established, it was clear that lower courts and officials had some
discretion in reaching their decisions that involved fact finding, and when they were
correctly performing that task, they were free from the supervision of King's Bench. But,
if the law when applied to the facts gave rise to a duty that they had to perform, their
discretion vanished, and they had a purely non-discretionary (ministerial) duty to comply
with the law. Furthermore, if in their fact finding they acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, they were acting outside of their area of discretion and could be compelled to
comply with the law. See generally Louis L. Jaffee and Edith G. Henderson, Judicial
Review and the Rule of Law: HistoricalOrigins,72 L.Q.R. 345, 360 (1956) (U.K.) (noting a
series of cases which stated that the basis for mandamus was a "ministerial" duty). In this
case the mandamus was not issued because the reasons given by the defendants, in
response to the rule to show cause, established valid and sufficient bases for denying the
doctor membership. Askew, 98 Eng. Rep. at 144.
51. Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823 (K.B. 1762). Barker has remained a recognized
landmark case in the area of mandamus jurisprudence. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168-69 (1803) (discussing the legal justification of when mandamus
may issue); Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504, 507 (Tex. 1843) (orig. proceeding)
(discussing the principle that mandamus will issue when "the other modes of redress are
inadequate or tedious").
52. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. at 824-25 (stating that the writ of mandamus "ought to be
used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in
justice and good government there ought to be one"). In the earlier case of Rex v. Blooer,
97 Eng. Rep. 697 (K.B. 1760), Lord Mansfield laid the groundwork for his significant
pronouncement in Barker. Blooer involved a dispute between parishioners and a vicar
over who had the right to make the appointment of a curate of a local chapel. The curate
appointed by the vicar had been forcibly removed from the chapel by the parishioners who
desired to appoint their own curate. The curate sought a writ of mandamus to recover his
right to preach in the chapel. The parishioners asserted that the writ should not issue
because the curate had other remedies in ejectment and trespass. Id. at 699. Although
Lord Mansfield did not cite any of Lord Holt's opinions, his response to these assertions
sounds familiar. He noted that "[n]either of these actions, if he could bring them, would
be a specific remedy. In the one, he might recover damages; in the other, he might recover
the land; but by neither would he be restored to his pulpit, and quieted in the exercise of
his function and office." Id. at 699. In stating this basic principle of current mandamus
practice, Lord Mansfield pulled together vague references in earlier cases in an attempt to
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Barker case involved the typical situation in which mandamus
relief was sought during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries-an individual seeking an office from which he had been
denied. In Barker, Mr. Norton sought a writ of mandamus to
compel certain trustees to permit Christopher Mends, a duly
elected minister, to use a meeting house that certain trustees held
in trust for public worship of Protestant dissenters. The trustees
supported the election of another to the office, while the majority
of the congregation seemed to side with Mends. Lord Mansfield,
observing that mandamus had been granted to admit a vast array
of individuals to public office, saw no reason that mandamus
should not be extended to protect this minister. 53 However,
because it was unclear as to the validity of either individual to hold
the position as minister, Lord Mansfield suggested a new election
or a trial to determine the present status of the parties. 54 The

articulate the beginnings of a comprehensive theory of mandamus. Edith Henderson
postulated that the simple idea of mandamus as a general cure-all for enforcing legal rights
was much too broad and indefinite, and Mansfield felt the need to place a certain
limitation upon its exercise. That limit, according to Henderson, was that King's Bench
would refuse to exercise mandamus in cases where the applicant had another specific
remedy.

EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

140-41 (1963); see also Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by
Prerogative Writ: Certiorariand Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478, 498 (1963) (noting that in the
Barker case Lord Mansfield "fully invigorate[d] the tentative searchings of" Blooer).
Following Barker, Lord Mansfield often referred to the lack of a specific remedy as a
condition for the issuance of mandamus. See, e.g., The King v. Bank of Eng., 99 Eng. Rep.
334, 335 (K.B. 1780) ("When there is no specific remedy, the Court will grant a mandamus
that justice may be done."); Rex v. Univ. of Cambridge, 96 Eng. Rep. 316, 319 (K.B. 1765)
(referring to the Barker case and noting that mandamus will lie when there is a right being
deprived and no other remedy).
This statement of the principle is slightly different from the generalized manner in
which the Texas courts refer to this principle today. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,
840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (stating that mandamus will not issue where there is "a
clear and adequate remedy at law" (citing State v. Walker, 679 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.
1984) (orig. proceeding))). The emphasis on a specific remedy was important given the
English history before Barker. It is apparent that the remedy suggested as the alternative
to mandamus must be such as to deliver to the applicant the very relief that mandamus
would provide. Blooer, 97 Eng. Rep. at 699 (holding that the alternative remedies had to
achieve the same result as mandamus). Early Texas cases followed this principle and held
that the alternative remedy had to be specific such that it gave the relator the right he had
been deprived of or displaced from. See, e.g., Tex. Mexican Ry. Co. v. Locke, 63 Tex. 623,
628-29 (1885) (orig. proceeding) (stating that a suit for damages would not provide the
same remedy as the performance of the duty obtained through mandamus).
53. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. at 825.
54. Id.
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trustees refused.5 5 Thus, the court issued the mandamus,5 6 as
there was no other remedy that could achieve the specific relief of
giving Mr. Mends the right to use the meeting house. 57 Lord
Mansfield put his holding in the following words:
To deny this writ, would be putting Protestant Dissenters and their
religious worship, out of the protection of the law. This case is
intitled to that protection; and can not have it in any other mode,
than by granting this writ. The defendants have
refused either to go
58
to a new election, or to try it in a feigned issue.

55. Id. at 826.
56. Id. After the mandamus was granted, Mends (referred to in the later case as
Mence)-not being sure of the validity of his election-moved the congregation for a new
election which he again won. However, the trustees still refused him admission and he
applied for another mandamus. The King v. Barker, 96 Eng. Rep. 196, 196 (K.B. 1762).
Finally, a peremptory mandamus was issued by consent ending the controversy. Barker,
97 Eng. Rep. at 826.
57. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. at 826. In addition to the new election option, the trial of
the validity of the elections, the court also rejected the common law remedy of ejectment.
The King v. Barker, 96 Eng. Rep. 169, 169 (K.B. 1761) (noting that a clergyman was not to
be driven to ejectment). The common law remedy of ejectment was an action to regain
possession of land from which one had been ousted. See, e.g., F.W. MAITLAND, EouITY
AND THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 352-53 (1929 ed.) (discussing the
common law action of ejectment); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES
*200-01 (describing the elements of the common law cause of action of ejectment).
58. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. at 826. In effect, mandamus was the only remedy given the
fact that the trustees refused, and could not be compelled to accept, other possible
avenues to solve this problem. One of the justices also noted that the action by way of
assize did not lie in this case either. Id. at 825 (Wilmot, J.). At one time in the long history
of the common law, an assize of darrein presentment was a remedy for one claiming an
advowson, or a right to present someone to the bishop for clergy in a vacant church. See
Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2078-79
(1985) (explaining that the assize of darrein presentment involved an action challenging an
appointment to an ecclesiastical office brought by one claiming the superior right of
appointment). By the time of the Barker case this remedy had become obsolete, being
replaced by the action quare impedit. See 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 24-25 (5th ed. 1942) (stating that the writ's name came from its command
that the defendant show why he hindered the plaintiff from his possession of the
advowson). Holdsworth notes that the advowson was closely related to the title to land
and both fell within the jurisdiction of the royal courts. Id. at 138; see also id. at 138-43
(discussing briefly the history of advowson at common law). Holdsworth additionally
notes that the assize of darrein presentment was falling out of use by the sixteenth century.
1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 276 (7th ed. 1956). Even
before becoming obsolete, the remedy by way of assize was never a specific legal remedy
in cases where the party did not have a seisin of the office; "it was always, therefore, an
incompetent remedy, in cases where a party requires to be admitted to an office, to which
his title has not been perfected by a seisin." Dew v. Sweet Springs Dist. Ct. Judges, 13 Va.
(3 Hen. & M.) 1, 23 (1808) (emphasis deleted).
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Mandamus issued in this case not so much because there were no
other remedies, but because the other remedies were ineffective in
achieving the relief to which the court determined Mr. Mends was
entitled.
Shortly thereafter, in The King v. Bank of England,5 9 Lord
Mansfield further amplified what he meant by asserting that
mandamus would issue only in those cases where there was no
other specific remedy.60 In Bank of England, mandamus was
sought by the executors of an estate to compel a bank to transfer
bank stock to them that had belonged to their testator. The bank
had refused to transfer the stock to the executors because its
banking practices required that certain documentation be presented before it would authorize the stock transfer; the executors
had failed to provide the required documentation. 61 Lord
Mansfield, holding that the executors had a remedy that would "lie
for complete satisfaction equivalent to [the] specific relief" that
would have been achieved through mandamus, denied the issuance
of the extraordinary remedy. 62 Although neither the court nor
any of the counsel whose arguments are reported mentioned this
other "specific remedy," a reporter's note following the published
decision finished the story by stating that the executors subsequently brought an action in assumpsit to recover the stock.6 3
Thus, another legal remedy existed that provided the very same
relief that could have been achieved through mandamus, and
therefore the writ did not issue.
Over the next decade the court continued to explain the types of
remedies which would be "specific" or adequate enough to lead to
59. The King v. Bank of Eng., 99 Eng. Rep. 334 (K.B. 1780).
60. Id. at 335.
61. Id. at 334 n.1 (stating that, as a matter of practice, the bank required "the
production either of a probate of the will of the person last intitled, or a certificate of the
actual death of such person").
62. Id. at 335.
63. Id. at 335 n.1. Although the early history of the action of assumpsit is vague and
obscure, by the sixteenth century the action had been rather well established as a form of
recovery in contract or quasi-contract. Although not fully explained in the reporter's note
to the case, in the action of assumpsit on the case they brought against the bank, the
executors probably alleged that the bank possessed the stock which it was obligated under
the law to pay over to the executors. This was an early form of indebitatusassumpsit based
upon the legal fiction that the bank, being indebted to the executors, promised to pay or
deliver the stock. See generally Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of Law: A
Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2082-83 (1985) (giving a brief "taxonomy" of the common

law form of the action referred to as "assumpsit").
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a denial of mandamus relief. In The King v. Bishop of Chester,6 4
King's Bench denied a writ of mandamus to compel a bishop to
license a curate to preach in a chapel. 6 5 The court noted that
there was a clear and well understood remedy by way of quare
impedit for a complete resolution of this matter, and thus
mandamus would not issue. 6 6 Justice Buller, a member of the
court that included Justice Mansfield, explained the principle that
mandamus would not lie if there were another specific remedy:
In ancient cases the grounds on which this Court has granted or
refused a mandamus are not explicitly stated; but during the time
Lord Mansfield has presided here, he has taken great pains to state
particularly the grounds on which this Court will either grant or
refuse such writs. He has always said, this Court will not interpose
by granting a mandamus, unless the party making the application
has no other specific legal remedy. It must be a legal and a specific
remedy. Some cases have been mentioned at the Bar, where the
Court granted a mandamus even though the party had another
special legal remedy, such as an assize for office. But those offices
have generally been such as are created by letters patent; and it is
peculiarly the duty of this Court to see that the powers created by
the King's charters are properly exercised. Besides the Court have
said, in answer to those particular cases, that though the party had a
and therefore they have
remedy by assize, yet it is now obsolete,
67
made an exception in those instances.
64. The King v. Bishop of Chester, 99 Eng. Rep. 1158 (K.B. 1786).
65. Id. at 1164.
66. See id. at 1164 (Buller, J.) (noting that mandamus would not lie in this case
because the party had another specific remedy). Lord Mansfield stated during arguments
in an earlier case that "[i]f a quare impedit does lie, a mandamus does not." Powell v.
Milbank, 96 Eng. Rep. 502, 503 (K.B. 1771), reprintedas note (d) to Bishop of Chester, 99
Eng. Rep. at 1160, 1162. Thus, the court clearly recognized the remedy of quare impeditthat is, actions to settle controversies over an advowson, i.e., the right to fill a vacancy in a
church position-would be a specific remedy that would achieve the same result as
mandamus and therefore its availability in the proper case would prevent the issuance of
mandamus. Holdsworth notes that actions in quare impedit might require a jury to
examine documentary evidence stretching back over several centuries. However, since
each case would involve only a single advowson, the task for a jury was not substantially
more difficult than that of tracing the chain of title to an individual piece of real property.
See 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 24-25 (5th ed. 1942).
67. Bishop of Chester, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1164. Holdsworth stated that the "possessory
assizes (cause of action to recover possession) were falling out of use by the sixteenth
century." 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 275-76 (7th ed.
1956). Blackstone defined a letter patent in the following words:
The king's grants .... whether of lands, honours, liberties, franchises, or ought

ST MARY'S LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 39:3

In The King v. Marquis of Stafford,6 8 the court-in 1790, shortly

after Lord Mansfield's tenure as Chief Justice of King's Benchonce again was faced with the issue of what kind of remedy it
would take to prevent the issuance of mandamus relief. Marquis
of Stafford involved the appointment of an individual to be the
curate of a chapel. The inhabitants had nominated an individual,
but the lord of the manor had refused to present his name to the
bishop for a license to become curate. 69 The court initially
thought that mandamus ought to lie because it was of the opinion
that the remedy of quare impedit did not lie.70 In the arguments of
counsel on this issue the parties debated whether the other remedy
besides, are contained in charters, or letters patent, that is, open letters, literae
patentes: so called, because they are not sealed up, but exposed to open view, with the
great seal pendant at the bottom; and are usually directed or addressed by the king to
all his subjects at large.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *346. The English courts were clear that the

other remedy that would prevent the issuance of mandamus had to be a legal remedy, not
a remedy in equity. Chief Justice Ellenborough put it in these words:
[T]his court [King's Bench], in the exercise of this authority to grant the writ of
mandamus, will render it as far as it can the suppletary means of substantial justice in
every case where there is no other specific legal remedy for a legal right; and will
provide as effectually as it can that others exercise their duty wherever the subject
matter is properly within its control.
The King v. Archbishop of Canterbury, 104 Eng. Rep. 789, 796 (K.B. 1812) (emphasis
added); see also THOMAS TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH
PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS 22 & n.(k) (London, Wm. Benning & Co. 1848)

(reiterating that the specific remedy needed to refuse a writ of mandamus must be a legal
remedy).
68. The King v. Marquis of Stafford, 100 Eng. Rep. 782 (K.B. 1790).
69. Id. at 782-83 (claiming the man to be of "indecent and immoral life").
70. Id. at 783. Although the writ of mandamus might lie in some cases involving
disputes over vacancies in various church positions, it was not available in most cases by
this time because of the availability of the writ of quare impedir. Historically, there had
been some argument that mandamus as opposed to quare impedit would lie if the lands
upon which the chapel occupied were "donative" and held in trust for church purposes, or
in cases where it was a mere chapel of ease where sacraments could not be observed as
opposed to a parochial chapel where all the sacraments could be performed. Id. at 783-84.
However, once the court was reminded of the decision in Bishop of Chester, 99 Eng. Rep.
at 1164, where the court held that quare impedit was the proper remedy even in cases of
donative lands, and advised that certain sacraments were performed at this chapel, it was
clear that the action of quare impedit was available in this case. Holdsworth pointed out
that the mere gift of the land for the church did not convey away the advowson, "the right
to present a clerk to the bishop." 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH

LAW 138, 140-43 (5th ed. 1942) (noting that a lord could convey away the manor and keep
the advowson or convey the advowson and retain the manor).
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needed to be as convenient as mandamus. 7 1 Although the court
did not address these arguments, it decided not to grant the writ
because the applicants had not established that they possessed a
legal right that could be the subject of mandamus.7 2
King's Bench subsequently addressed the issue of whether the
alternative remedy had to be as convenient as mandamus in The
King v. Severn & Wye Railway Co. 73 In Severn & Wye, a railroad
company had been granted a public charter pursuant to acts of
Parliament to build a line between two cities and to charge certain
rates for passage. A short time after the completion of the track,
the railway owners took up several hundred yards of track on a
branch road to prevent competing railroads from using it. 7 4 A
writ of mandamus was sought to compel the corporation to
reinstate the tracks it had taken up. All of the judges on the court
writing opinions confessed that there was a remedy by way of
indictment for damages in this case.7 5 Under that remedy the
corporation could be fined for its non-repair of the track. Chief
Justice Abbott stated, however, that the indictment was not
"equally convenient, beneficial, and effectual" as mandamus in
that the corporation could not be required to reinstate the track,
71. The applicant asserted that the writ of mandamus was the "most convenient"
because under the action of quare impedit there would be over one hundred parties to the
litigation. Marquis of Stafford, 100 Eng. Rep. at 784. The defendants responded as
follows:
If it be objected that there may be some difficulty and inconvenience in bringing a
quare impedit in this case, on account of the number of persons who must be parties
to the suit, it may be answered that that (if true) is no reason why a mandamus should
be granted; for a mandamus is not to give a more easy and expeditious remedy, but it
is only granted in cases where there is no other remedy.
Id. at 783.
72. See id. at 785 (showing that the case was discharged without issuing mandamus).
Chief Justice Kenyon, joined by two other justices, observed that if the inhabitants seeking
the mandamus had only an equitable interest in the selection under the trust instrument
creating the chapel, then they would not be entitled to the mandamus as they had no legal
right to be enforced; however, if they had a legal right that needed to be enforced, they
had the remedy of quare impedit. Id. at 784-85 (Ashhurst, J. and Grose, J., concurring).
Justice Buller was also of the opinion that mandamus should not issue, but solely on the
grounds that the only right the applicants had was an equitable one which was insufficient
for the issuance of mandamus. Id. at 785 (Buller, J.).
73. The King v. Severn & Wye Ry. Co., 106 Eng. Rep. 501 (K.B. 1819).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 502-03 (noting that Chief Justice Abbott-along with Justices Bayley,
Best, and Holroyd-recognized the possibility of issuing an indictment for damages
against the railway).
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which was the relief that mandamus offered. 76 In fact, he
observed that upon conviction for indictment only a fine would be
imposed, and the corporation could pay the fine and still refuse to
reinstate the road and "at all events a considerable delay may take
place."'7 7

Justice Best, also rejecting the argument that an

indictment was a specific remedy that should bar mandamus relief,
noted: "[A]n indictment does not afford a remedy equally
effectual to compel the reinstating of the road, which is the
78
purpose to be answered by the granting of this writ."
Given the opinion in Severn & Wye, one would assume that in
order to satisfy Lord Mansfield's specific remedy test, the
alternative remedy must first be a legal one, and second, it must
achieve the very thing that mandamus could compel. Later cases
cast some doubt upon this observation. In 1839, in The Queen v.
Gamble & Bird,7 9 Chief Justice Denman stated during arguments
that the Severn & Wye case "went quite far enough."" 0 In Gamble
& Bird, public officials sought mandamus relief against landowners
to require them to repair and heighten the banks on their land that
adjoined a river within the public officials' jurisdiction. The
officials had another legal remedy by statute that authorized them
to take all actions necessary within their jurisdiction to protect the
76. Id. at 502.
77. Id. at 503; see also The King v. Comm'rs for Inclosing Lands, 105 Eng. Rep. 311
(K.B. 1813) (holding that an indictment against commissioners and the accompanying fine
for failing to set aside a certain road as a public road "would not afford that convenient
mode of remedy which might be attained by mandamus"). In a later case Chief Justice
Denman had the following response to the argument that a party might not comply with
the mandamus:
It was urged that, our mandamus to compel obedience to an Act of Parliament
implying a disobedience at present, the prosecutor may indict, and, having that
remedy, does not require the extraordinary process of mandamus. This argument
appears to prove too much; as it would prevent the Court from acting in all cases
where an Act of Parliament is contravened. Besides, the indictment does not compel
the performance, but only punishes the neglect of duty; though it was thought proper
to remind us that mandamus might do no more, for that disobedience would only
bring the party into contempt, and expose them to attachment, which would but end
in individual suffering, and leave the required act still undone. Yet we are not in the
habit of supposing that persons required to obey the Queen's writs issuing from this
Court will incur the penalty of contempt for contumacy, or be advised to evade the
known and ancient process of the law.
The Queen v. E.Counties Ry. Co., 113 Eng. Rep. 201, 215 (Q.B. 1839).
78. Severn & Wye, 106 Eng. Rep. at 503.
79. The Queen v. Gamble & Bird, 113 Eng. Rep. 339 (Q.B. 1839).
80. Id. at 340.
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fens called Bedford Level. 8 The arguments of counsel showed a
dispute as to whether this statute could be used to compel the
landowners to complete the repairs.8 2 Chief Justice Denman's
brief, two sentence opinion denied the mandamus on grounds that
"the parties have another remedy" but did not clarify what that
remedy was. 8 3
Two years later Chief Justice Denman further elaborated on the
limits of Severn & Wye in The Queen v. Victoria Park Co. 8 4 In
Victoria Park, a corporation had been established with the ability
to make cash calls upon its members for additional funds. The
corporation had a judgment entered against it, but did not have
sufficient assets to pay the judgment. In order to pay the
judgment, the corporation had made calls upon its shareholders,
who had refused to respond. The applicants requested a writ of
mandamus to compel the corporation to make another call on its
shareholders. Although noting that the corporation no longer had
the proper officer to make calls upon shareholders, the basis for
the court's decision denying the mandamus was the existence of
another adequate legal remedy. The court explained that since the
purpose of the mandamus was to seek funds from the corporation,
the applicants had the ordinary legal remedy of an execution that
The court
would achieve the same result as mandamus. 85
81. Id. at 339-40.
82. Gamble & Bird, 113 Eng. Rep. at 340. The landowners argued that mandamus
should not be issued in this case because the public officials had "remedies in their own
hands." Id. The public officials argued that the only remedy provided by the statute was
presentment under which they might be awarded process to seize his property and hold it
to compel performance. Id. According to the public officials this remedy was clearly not
as beneficial as mandamus. Id.
83. See Gamble & Bird, 113 Eng. Rep. at 340 ("The parties have another remedy.").
The reporter noted, however, that during arguments in another case, Chief Justice
Denman, referring to the Gamble & Bird case, stated that "[w]e thought there that the
parties applying for a mandamus might, as commissioners of sewers, or as conservators of
the level, enforce the doing of the repairs, and, therefore, that they had the remedy in their
own hands." Id. at 340 n.(c).
84. The Queen v. Victoria Park, 113 Eng. Rep. 1142, 1143 (Q.B. 1841) (noting that
Severn & Wye applies when the remedy at law is "not in its nature so complete").
85. See id. (holding that the court would not issue the mandamus just because the
alternative remedy by execution would produce "no fruits"). Chief Justice Denman left
open the question of whether mandamus would lie if the evidence clearly showed that the
corporation had been evading paying debts and had not exercised the power given by
Parliament to make calls upon its shareholders. The evidence before the court was that
the corporation had made a call, but that its shareholders were not responding. Id. at
1143-44.
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addressed its opinion of Severn & Wye in the following terms:
It was argued that we have issued the writ, even where there was a
legal remedy, in cases where that remedy was not so complete and
beneficial as the writ would enforce. But that has been where the
remedy at law was not in its nature so complete,... for [in The King
v. Severn & Wye] the only direct effect of the indictment would have
been the punishment of the defendants by fine, and not procuring
for the prosecutors the benefit which they sought and were entitled
to. But here the plaintiff seeks only the payment of the debt and
costs: for this an execution.., is a perfect remedy ... .86
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Denman's comment made during
argument in the Gamble & Bird decision, the English King's
Bench decisions have been consistent: Mandamus would issue to
command the performance of a legal duty or to correct an
arbitrary action of an inferior court or public official unless an
"equally convenient, beneficial, and effectual" alternative remedy
was available. In effect, the alternative remedy would have to
achieve the very same relief as mandamus would achieve. In
attempting to summarize the extensive body of English mandamus
law as it stood shortly before the American Revolution,
Blackstone noted:
A writ of mandamus is, in general, a command issuing in the king's
name from the court of king's bench, and directed to any person,
corporation, or inferior court of judicature, within the king's
dominions; requiring them to do some particular thing therein
specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and which the
court of king's bench has previously determined, or at least
supposes, to be consonant to right and justice. It is a high
prerogative writ, of a most extensively remedial nature: and may be
issued in some cases where the injured party has also another more
tedious method of redress, as in the case of admission or restitution
to an office; but it issues in all cases where the party hath a right to
have any thing done, and hath no other specific means of compelling
[its] performance.8 7
Thus, at the time of the revolution, mandamus was regarded as
an extraordinary remedy, to be granted only when justice could be
obtained in no other manner. Yet the writ was clearly understood
86. Id. at 1143.
87. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,

3 COMMENTARIES

*110 (third

emphasis added).

Blackstone then listed numerous examples of when mandamus would lie. Id. at *110-11.
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in England to be a freestanding writ giving King's Bench general
supervisory authority over all lower courts and officials and had
ceased in large part to be a mere common law remedy. 8 8
Following the lead of Chief Justice Coke, the English courts were
almost unanimous in their holdings that the existence of a right to
appeal was a near fatal impediment to an application for
mandamus. 8 9 However, they had also held that the availability of
a specific legal remedy that would prevent the issuance of
mandamus had to be one which was complete; that is, a remedy
that would achieve as closely as possible the same result as the
mandamus.
B.

The Early American Tradition9 °

88. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1529 (2001) (stating that
mandamus developed slowly over time to become the substantial prerogative writ by the
late eighteenth century).
89. See, e.g., THOMAS TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH
PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS 21 (London, Wm. Benning & Co. 1848) (citing a
series of cases for this proposition).
90. This article will focus only briefly on the mandamus jurisprudence of the United
States Supreme Court and the various states of the United States from their respective
inception until approximately 1840. This focus is limited in time for the reason that once
Texas became a Republic in 1836, its Congress shortly thereafter enacted the common law
of England as it existed in 1840. In describing what the Republic Congress meant by the
common law of England, the Texas Supreme Court explained as follows:
Texas was never a British colony nor an American territory and the common law
comes to us by adoption rather than by inheritance, so to speak. The Congressional
Act of January 20, 1840, 2 Gammel's Laws, p. 177, Article 1, Vernon's Ann. Tex. Civ.
Stats., simply makes the common law of England, so far as it is consistent with our
constitutional and legislative enactments the rule of decision in Texas. No English
statutes were adopted. Paul v. Ball, 31 Tex. 10, 15 [(1868)], and although Texas was
an independent republic in 1840, the Act of the Congress of that year was not
construed as referring to the common law as applied in England in 1840, but rather to
the English common law as declared by the courts of the various states of the United
The common law of Texas is somewhat unique in origin and its
States....
development has not in all respects coincided with the general course of evolution
discernable throughout the other American states.
S. Pac. Co. v. Porter, 160 Tex. 329, 334-35, 331 S.W.2d 42, 45 (1960) (orig. proceeding)
(citations omitted); see also Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 601, 153 S.W. 1124, 1125 (1913)
(orig. proceeding) ("[Tihe effect of the act of 1840 ... was not to introduce and put into
effect the body of the common law, but to make effective the provisions of the common
law, so far as they are not inconsistent with the conditions and circumstances of our
people."). Of course, the common law as declared by the various states was highly
influenced by its English history. For a discussion of the development of the supervisory
role of mandamus in the American colonies, see the three articles by Leonard S.
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On February 24, 1803, the United States Supreme Court
announced its decision in the case of Marbury v. Madison.9 1 In
Marbury, the Court held that the statutory grant of mandamus
authority in section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 178992 was
unconstitutional. 93 Thus, the Court refused to issue a writ of
mandamus that had been requested by William Marbury to
command the Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver

Marbury's commission as a justice of the peace for the District of
Goodman: Mandamus in the Colonies-The Rise of the Superintending Power ofAmerican
Courts, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 308 (1958); 2 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1957); 2 AM. J. LEGAL

HIST. 129 (1958) (exploring the growth and use of mandamus in colonial Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island).
91. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 137 (1803).
92. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (1789) (authorizing the Supreme
Court to issue "writs of mandamus ... in cases warranted by the principles and usages of
law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United
States") (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) (authorizing the Supreme Court to
"issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law")).
93. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 ("[A] law repugnant to the constitution is
void."). Prior to reaching this significant holding, Marshall had determined that the
Supreme Court clearly had the authority under section 13 of the Judiciary Act to issue a
writ of mandamus to compel the secretary of state to perform his legal duty, "and if this
court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because
the law is unconstitutional." Id. at 173. The Constitution grants the Supreme Court
original jurisdiction "in all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The
mandamus proceeding brought by Marbury was an originalaction, but it was not brought
against a foreign diplomat or a state. Marshall noted that Marbury was not asking the
Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 175-76. The
Court concluded that section 13 of the Judiciary Act enlarged the Court's original
jurisdiction beyond the limits prescribed by Article III by authorizing it to issue
mandamus to "persons holding office under the authority of the United States." Id. at
173. It is apparent that under Marshall's understanding of the constitutional framework of
the United States there was no authority for a freestanding grant of original mandamus
However, before Marbury the Court heard original
jurisdiction as in England.
applications for mandamus against executive branch officials and concluded in each case
that mandamus would not issue without addressing the constitutional issue. For accounts
of these cases, see 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

UNITED STATES, 1789-1800: Cases 1790-1795, at 33-72, 284-95, 356-69 (Maeva Marcus
ed., 1998) (containing, among others, United States v. Hopkins, Ex parte Chandler, and
the reported decision in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409-10 (1792) ("[N]o decision
was ever pronounced.")); see also James E. Pfander, Marbury, OriginalJurisdiction, and
the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1573-74 (2001)

(postulating that the entertaining of these earlier mandamus proceedings may have
reflected the then position of the Court that its supervisory power under section 13 of the
Judiciary Act was not subject to the constitutional limitations on its original jurisdiction).
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Columbia.9 4
However, before specifically addressing the
constitutionality of the jurisdictional grant, Chief Justice Marshall
addressed the issue of whether mandamus was the proper remedy
in this case. Marshall, after quoting from both Blackstone 95 and
Lord Mansfield, 9 6 concluded as follows: "[T]o render the
94. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180. Marbury was only the second case that had
come before the Court involving a writ of mandamus and which resulted in a written
opinion. The first case was United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42 (1795). In
Lawrence, the Minister of the French Republic had requested a district judge to issue a
warrant of arrest for a French citizen who had deserted from French military service and
was then residing in the United States. The district court had refused to issue the warrant
in spite of a consular agreement between the two countries authorizing such action in the
proper case. Id. at 43. Following the minister's complaint to the executive branch of the
government, the attorney general sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court to
compel the district judge to issue the arrest warrant. Id. at 42. In a short per curiam
opinion, the Court denied the writ of mandamus:
We are clearly and unanimously of opinion, that a mandamus ought not to issue. It is
evident, that the District Judge was acting in a judicial capacity, when he determined,
that the evidence was not sufficient to authorize his issuing a warrant for
apprehending Captain Barre: and (whatever might be the difference of sentiment
entertained by this Court) we have no power to compel a Judge to decide according
to the dictates of any judgment, but his own.
Id. at 53. Although not citing any authority, it is clear that the Court was following
English common law that mandamus lay only to compel a ministerial duty, that is, one that
did not involve the exercise of discretion on the part of the judge. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 172-73 (observing that Marbury had a "vested legal right, of which the
executive cannot deprive him").
95. Marshall quoted from the third volume of Blackstone's Commentaries:
[A writ of mandamus is] a command issuing in the king's name from the court of
king's bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature,
within the king's dominions requiring them to do some particular thing therein
specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and which the court of king's
bench has previously determined, or at least supposes, to be consonant to right and
justice.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 168 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES

*110).
96. Immediately after quoting from Blackstone, Marshall quoted from Lord
Mansfield's opinion in Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 824-25 (1762):
Whenever ...there is a right to execute an office, perform a service, or exercise a
franchise (more especially, if it be in a matter of public concern, or attended with
profit) and a person is kept out of possession, or dispossessed of such right, and has
no other specific legal remedy this court ought to assist by mandamus, upon reasons
of justice, as the writ expresses, and upon reasons of public policy, to preserve peace,
order and good government ...this writ ought to be used upon all occasions where
the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government
there ought to be one.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 168-69 (declaring that Lord Mansfield, in Rex v. Barker,
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mandamus a proper remedy, the officer to who it is to be directed,
must be one to whom, on legal principles, such writ may be
directed; and the person applying for it must be without any other
specific and legal remedy." 9 7 Marshall determined that the
suggested specific legal remedy available was clearly inadequate
under the circumstances. In reaching this conclusion he reasoned:
It was at first doubted whether the action of detinue was not a
specific legal remedy for the commission which has been withheld
from Mr. Marbury; in which case a mandamus would be improper.
But this doubt has yielded to the consideration that the judgment in
detinue is for the thing itself, or its value. The value of a public
office not to be sold, is incapable of being ascertained; and the
applicant has a right to the office itself, or to nothing. He will obtain
the office by obtaining the commission, or a copy of it from the
record. 98
Although the Court determined the case was ripe for the
issuance of a writ of mandamus, 99 the Court eventually held that
the legislation that authorized the Court to issue mandamus in this
case "appears not to be warranted by the constitution." 1 0
"states with much precision and explicitness the cases in which this writ may be used").
97. Id. at 169.
98. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803). Marshall cited no cases
or authority for this proposition. However, there was clearly English precedent for this
position. See generally Knipe v. Edwin, 87 Eng. Rep. 394, 395 (K.B. 1695) (stating that a
recovery of damages was not a sufficient remedy to prevent mandamus to compel
admission to office). Detinue was the common law remedy for recovery of specific
identifiable personal property from a person who had possession of the property and to
recover damages for its detention. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *15152 (noting that the remedy had a major disadvantage in that the recovery could be
defeated by the defendant's sworn oath that he had proper possession of the property).
99. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173 (holding that this was a "plain case for
mandamus" leaving only the question of whether such a writ could issue from the Court).
100. Id. at 176. Several commentators have debated whether Congress might have
viewed the Judiciary Act's grant of mandamus jurisdiction as a type of general supervisory
power that was outside the scope of the Court's constitutionally granted original or
appellate jurisdiction. See Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall, The Mandamus Case, and
the Judiciary Crisis, 1801-1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 306 (2003) (arguing that, in
Marbury, Marshall held that "the prerogative, superintending power of mandamus was
incompatible with the Constitution's grant of limited original jurisdiction"); James E.
Pfander, Marbury, OriginalJurisdiction,and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1568-74 (2001) (opining that Marshall simply declined to interpret
Article III of the Constitution in such a way as to preserve a freestanding conception of
mandamus power). Hobson and Pfander asserted that as Marshall was clearly cognizant
of the supervisory powers of King's Bench, he took a politically expedient course in
declaring unconstitutional such a grant in section 13 of the Judiciary Act in order to
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Although the Court did not issue mandamus in Marbury,
Marshall clearly observed that the withholding of the commission
was "violative of a vested legal right." 10 1 Furthermore, Marbury
did not question the Court's authority to issue writs of mandamus
to revise and correct decisions of lower courts as an exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.' 0 2 But the authority of the Court to issue
preserve such supervisory power within the confines of the Court's original and appellate
jurisdiction. Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall, The Mandamus Case and the Judiciary
Crisis, 1801-1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 306-07 (2003) (arguing that Marshall's
Marbury decision can be seen as an attempt to avoid complete repeal of section 13 of the
Judiciary Act thus preserving certain supervisory powers for the Court); James E. Pfander,
Marbury, OriginalJurisdiction,and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1515, 1582-88 (2001) (reassessing Marbury as a skillful effort to preserve
jurisdiction for the Court).
101. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 162.
102. Id. at 175 ("[I]t is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises
and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that
cause."). While the Marshall Court struggled to find the proper jurisdictional basis for its
authority to issue mandamus, it substantially limited the ability of lower federal courts to
issue writs of mandamus. In a series of three cases interpreting sections 11 and 14 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, the Marshall Court effectively stripped the ability of lower federal
courts to issue original writs of mandamus. McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 506
(1813); M'Cluny v. Silliman, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 369, 369-70 (1817); M'Clung v. Silliman,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 604-05 (1821). Note that the official reporter contains an error in
the name of the party "M'Cluny," referring to him as "M'Clung;" this article will refer to
the party by the name as reported. Section 11 conferred original diversity jurisdiction (i.e.,
the United States or an alien is a party, or the matter is between citizens of different
states) upon the various circuit courts (at this time these courts were composed of two
Supreme Court Justices and one district judge) of the United States when the amount in
controversy was more than $500. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789)
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)) (conferring diversity jurisdiction upon the
district courts). Section 14 provided that circuit courts had the power to issue all writs
necessary for the exercise of their jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 14, 1 Stat.
73, 81-82 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006)) (authorizing the Supreme
Court and all courts established by Congress to "issue all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law"). In
Mclntire, a writ of mandamus was sought in a federal circuit court against a federal official
to compel him to grant certificates for the purchase of lands to which the applicant
claimed he was entitled under federal law. Mclntire, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 505. The Court
held that the circuit court did not have the jurisdiction to issue the mandamus because
section 14 of the Judiciary Act conferred no jurisdiction in addition to that conferred in
Section 11. Id. at 505-06. As this suit was not by or among one of the three specified
bases for jurisdiction under Section 11, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to issue the
mandamus. Id. at 506. In effect, based upon its reading of Section 11, the Court
determined that the circuit courts did not possess federal question jurisdiction beyond the
three bases for jurisdiction found in Section 11. Id. The Court did not issue an opinion,
but merely denied a motion for mandamus. M'Cluny, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 370. In
M'Cluny, the Ohio Supreme Court had refused to issue a writ of mandamus to compel the
federal land registrar to file an application of one claiming to be entitled to land under
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mandamus under its original jurisdiction was severely limited by
the decision for the simple reason that mandamus was viewed as
being initiated with an original application or petition. However,
in Ex parte Bollmanj 0 3 the Court treated an original petition for
habeas relief-another supervisory writ-as an action lying on the
appellate side of its jurisdiction.1 0 4 Chief Justice Marshall stated it
succinctly:
In the mandamus case, (ante, vol. 1. p. 175. Marbury v. Madison,) it
was decided that this court would not exercise original jurisdiction
except so far as that jurisdiction was given by the constitution. But
so far as that case has distinguished between original and appellate
jurisdiction, that which the court is now asked to exercise is clearly
appellate.... The decision that the individual shall be imprisoned
must always precede the application for a writ of habeas corpus, and
this writ must always be for the purpose of revising that decision,
and therefore appellate in its nature. 10 5
By classifying the original petition or application for habeas

corpus as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, Marshall regained

the Court's supervisory power over the lower courts. 1 0 6 However,
federal law. Id. at 369. In M'Clung the Court held that state courts were not authorized to
issue mandamus to command any duties by federal officials. M'Clung, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
at 604-05. The Court, by way of obiter dictum and relying on Mclntire, noted that the
federal circuit courts also had no authority to issue any such mandamus. Id. at 601. For a
critique of the M'Clung case, see Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section 13, and the Original
Jurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 458-459 (1989) (noting that the
"Court offers no logical rationale for the extension" given the fact that the parties were
diverse and satisfied the Section 11 jurisdictional basis) (citing DAVID P. CURRIE,
FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. IV, § 3 at 510-11 (West, 3d ed 1982)).

But see James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court's
Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1595-96 (2001) (defending the opinions
that restricted mandamus jurisdiction of the lower federal courts).
103. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
104. Id. at 101.
105. Id. at 100-01.
106. Thus, while the application for a writ of habeas corpus may be called an
"original" application, the writ was in fact issued by the Court under its constitutional
grant of appellate jurisdiction, not its original jurisdiction. See, e.g., James E. Pfander,
Marbury, OriginalJurisdiction,and the Supreme Court's Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 1515, 1591-92 (2001) ("The gradual acceptance that the Court may exercise wide
ranging appellate jurisdiction through the issuance of original writs of habeas and
mandamus has done much to restore the supervisory powers that Marbury put at risk.");
see also Charles Hobson, John Marshall, the Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary Crisis,
1801-1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 306 (2003) (arguing that Marshall avoided a
"political backlash" by not defending mandamus authority as an inherent supervisory
power of the Court, but rather placing the Court's "supervisory authority within the safer
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although asserting that the exercise of its habeas jurisdiction was
an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, Marshall rejected the
argument that the Court had the authority to exercise such
King's Bench without
jurisdiction in a freestanding manner like
10 7
constitutional or statutory authorization.
In Ex parte Crane,10 8 Marshall extended the Court's ability to
supervise lower courts by way of writs of mandamus as an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction." 9 In Crane, following the trial of the
case, the attorney for the defendants prepared bills of exception
including not only points of law made during the course of the trial
but also the complete jury charge. The federal trial judge
corrected the bills by striking the jury charge from them. The
defendants moved for a writ of mandamus to compel the court to
reinsert the charge in the bills in order to assist the appellate court
Marshall concluded that a writ of
in reviewing the case.
"mandamus to an inferior court of the United States, is in the
nature of appellate jurisdiction," and that the Court's power to
supervise the conduct of all inferior tribunals included the power
to issue a writ of mandamus to sign a bill of exception. 110
Marshall, having established the authority of the Court to issue
confines of the Constitution's distribution of original and appellate jurisdiction").
107. Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 93-94 (stating that while the Court might resort to
the common law in determining the meaning of habeas corpus, the authority to exercise it
"must be given by written law"). See generally Dallin H. Oaks, The "Original" Writ of
Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 153, 159-73 (1962) (tracing the
development of the Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction in the case of habeas corpus).
108. Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190 (1831).
109. Id. at 193 (asserting that the issuance of a writ of mandamus by the Supreme
Court to an inferior court was an exercise of appellate jurisdiction).
110. Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 193-94 (1831). Marshall stated that the
issuance of a writ of mandamus would be "warranted by the principles and usages of law"
as authorized by the Judiciary Act. Id. at 194. Marshall wrote that the phrase "usages of
law" referred not merely to the common law, but all other usages. Id. Marshall observed
that statutes in both England and New York authorized superior courts to issue
mandamus to compel lower courts to amend or make bills of exception. Id. Thus, he
concluded that the Judiciary Act expressly conferred similar power upon the Supreme
Court. Id. Justice Baldwin dissented from what he perceived as an expansion of the
judicial power of the Court. Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 201 (Baldwin, J., dissenting). First,
he asserted that an issuance of a writ of mandamus in this case would be an impermissible
exercise of original jurisdiction. Id. at 207-08. Secondly, Baldwin viewed the potential
exercise of mandamus authority in this case to be an attempt by the Court to become a
supervisor of the lower courts. Id. at 210. He noted that, unlike the statutory authority
given to the King's Bench or the New York Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court did not have general superintending jurisdiction. Id. at 210-11.
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writs by way of obiter dictum, then concluded that in this case the
writ should not issue. 1 1 '
The Supreme Court during the Marshall period never
questioned the strong position taken in Marbury that the party
applying for a writ of mandamus must be without any legal
remedy. 1 2 Nevertheless, following Marbury, the Supreme Court
111. Exparte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 200 (1831). Although asserting jurisdiction
to grant the writ, the Court denied the motion for writ of mandamus. The denial was
premised upon a finding that the bills of exception, prepared and submitted by the
applicants in the trial court, stated more than a simple point of law and thus were
procedurally improper. Id. at 198-99. Specifically the Court said:
If an exception may be taken in such form as to bring the whole charge of the judge
before the court, a charge in which he not only states the results of law from the facts,
but sums up all the evidence, the exception will not be on a single point; it will not
brink up some matter of law arising upon a fact not denied: it will draw the whole
matter into examination again.
Id.
112. During the Marshall years, the Court granted mandamus relief only four times.
United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 141 (1809) (compelling a lower federal
court to enter a judgment in an admiralty case); Livingston v. Dorgenois, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 577, 589 (1813) (compelling a trial court to proceed to judgment); Ex parte
Bradstreet, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 634, 648-50 (1833) (compelling a trial court to reinstate a cause
that it had dismissed and enter a final judgment); Life & Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Wilson, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 291, 304-05 (1834) (directing a trial judge to enter a judgment). In none of
these cases was Marbury mentioned, and only once, in the Wilson case, did the Court
address the adequacy of the legal remedy:
By the law of Louisiana, and the rule adopted by the district court, the judgment,
without the signature of the judge, cannot be enforced. It is not a final judgment, on
which a writ of error may issue, for its reversal. Without the action of the judge the
plaintiffs can take no step, unless it be the one they have taken, in this case. They can
neither issue execution on the judgment, nor reverse the proceedings by writ of error.
And if the reasons assigned by the judge shall be deemed a sufficient answer to the
rule, the plaintiffs are without remedy on their judgment.
Wilson, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 303. In the cases before the Court where mandamus was
denied, Marbury was one of the few where the adequacy of the legal remedy was
addressed. However, in the large majority of cases, mandamus was denied because the
particular act or duty sought to be compelled fell within the realm of discretion, and was
not a ministerial action. Thus, there was no valid reason to discuss the adequacy of an
alternative remedy. See, e.g., Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824) (refusing
to grant mandamus relief to disturb a discretionary action of the trial judge in suspending
an attorney from practice); Bank of Columbia v. Sweeny, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 567, 569 (1828)
(refusing to issue mandamus to revise a trial court's interlocutory ruling that could be
addressed later on appeal); Ex parte Roberts, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 216, 217 (1832) (refusing to
enter mandamus to compel a trial judge to set aside the entry of a default judgment); Ex
parte Davenport, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 661, 664-65 (1832) (refusing to issue mandamus to
compel a trial court to change an interlocutory ruling concerning the pleadings in the
case); Bradstreet, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 590 (refusing to issue mandamus to compel a trial
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rarely addressed the issue of the availability of a legal remedy.
However, the Court took the rare opportunity to revisit this
fundamental principal of mandamus in Kendall v. United States ex
rel. Stokes. 1 1 3 In that case, the petitioners had duly executed
contracts with a former Postmaster General of the United States
under which they were entitled to certain credits and allowances
for the transportation of the government's mail.' 14 A subsequent
Postmaster General undertook an audit of those contracts and
determined that certain credits and allowances should be
withdrawn and that some of the payments made should be
returned.' 1 5 Being unable to reconcile their differences with the
new Postmaster General, the contract holders sought relief from
Congress. Congress enacted a private bill directing the solicitor of
the Department of the Treasury to conduct a full audit of the
dispute according to equitable principles.' 1 6 The legislation
further directed the Postmaster General to comply with the
However, the Postmaster General
findings of the audit.1 1 7
refused to pay the full amount awarded to the contract holders by
the solicitor following the audit, and they sought a writ of
mandamus from the circuit court in Washington, D.C., which
granted a writ of mandamus to compel the Postmaster General to
comply with the results of the audit.1 1 8 An appeal to the Supreme
Court followed. The Court affirmed the authority of the circuit
judge to change a discretionary ruling); Life & Fire Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Adams, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 573, 605 (refusing to issue a writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to enter a
particular judgment). Following Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice, the Taney Court
continued to follow the English and American precedents that mandamus would not lie to
compel a trial court or public official to correct or perform an act or decision that involved
matters of discretion. See, e.g., Postmaster Gen. v. Trigg, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 173, 174 (1837)
(refusing to issue mandamus to compel the trial court to enter execution on judgment as
such decision was within the discretion of the trial judge); Ex parte Story, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
339, 344 (1838) (refusing to issue mandamus to compel judge to change interlocutory
rulings concerning matters within his discretion); Poultney v. City of Lafayette, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 472, 475 (1838) (denying mandamus to compel a trial court to remand a matter to
chancery court). See generally Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 15 (1856) ("[W]e
are not aware of any case where a mandamus has issued to an inferior tribunal,
commanding it to reverse or annul its decision, where the decision was in its nature a
judicial act, and within the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion.").
113. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
114. Id. at 527.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 528.
117. Id.
118. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 609.
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court to issue the mandamus because the majority 1 9 was of the
clear opinion that the duty to be performed by the Postmaster
General was purely ministerial,1 2 0 and that there was no other
specific means provided by law for compelling the performance of
this duty. 2 '
The Postmaster General had suggested three
alternative remedies for the petitioners other than mandamus:
application to Congress, removal of the Postmaster General from
office, or a suit for damages.1 2 2 The Court addressed these three
suggestions in turn:
The first has been tried and failed. The second might not afford any
certain relief, for his successors might withhold the credit in the
same manner; and besides, such extraordinary measures are not the
remedies spoken of in the law which will supersede the right of
resorting to a mandamus; and it is seldom that a private action at law
will afford an adequate remedy. If the denial of the right be
considered as a continuing injury, to be redressed by a series of
successive actions, as long as the right is denied; it would avail
nothing, and never furnish a complete remedy. Or if the whole
amount of the award claimed should be considered the measure of

119. Three of the nine justices on the court dissented on jurisdictional grounds.
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 626-41 (1838) (Taney, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 641-53 (Barbour, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Taney observed that this
was clearly a case where King's Bench would have exercised its general supervisory
powers to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the officer to comply with the act of
Congress. Id. at 627 (Taney, C.J., dissenting). However, he felt compelled to follow the
precedents of M'Intyre (referring to McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504, 506 (1813))
and M'Clung (referring to M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598, 603 (1821)), where
the Court held that "the circuit courts of the United States, out of this district
[Washington, D.C.] have not the power to issue the writ of mandamus to an officer of the
general government, commanding him to do a ministerial act." Id. He could see no
reason why the same rule should not apply to the circuit courts of Washington, D.C. Id. at
641. Justice Barbour agreed with the Chief Justice, that if jurisdiction lay, this was a clear
case for the issuance of mandamus. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 642 (Barbour, J.,
dissenting). However, relying on precedent, he also found no jurisdiction. Id. Justice
Catron joined with each of the dissenting opinions. Id. at 653. The majority of the Court
distinguished M'Intyre and M'Clung by noting that the act of Congress creating the federal
district, and by which the circuit court in the district was organized, declared that the law
of Maryland was to apply to that portion of the district that lay on the south side of the
Potomac River. Id. at 619-21. It just so happened that the circuit court was sitting on the
south side of the Potomac when it issued the mandamus. The common law in Maryland,
at the time of this congressional action, authorized the issuance of mandamus in a manner
similar to King's Bench. Id. at 621.
120. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614 (1838).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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damages, it might, and generally would be an inadequate remedy,
where the damages were large. The language of this Court, in the
case of Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 844, is, that the
remedy by action in such cases would have nothing real in it. It
would be a remedy in name only, and not in substance; especially
where 3the amount of damages is beyond the capacity of a party to
2
pay.

1

It is clear that the Court viewed none of the suggested remedies
as effective to give the applicants the specific relief they were
entitled to and which they would receive through the issuance of a
writ of mandamus. In effect, the Supreme Court, like King's
Bench, would issue mandamus in the proper case if the available
alternative remedy was not as "equally convenient, beneficial, and
effectual" as mandamus.
By 1840 the Supreme Court, following the lead of Lord
Mansfield, had refined the first prong of mandamus jurisdiction to
extend beyond compelling trial courts and officials to perform
ministerial acts. First, the Court recognized that mandamus could
issue in certain cases where the lower court or official had
improperly exercised its discretion.
Second, the Court
acknowledged that it had the power to issue mandamus relief
when the court or official undertook some action that was beyond
its authority. Both of these expansions were identified by Chief
Justice Marshall, who spoke for the Court in Ex parte Burr. 1 2 4 In
Burr, Marshall recognized that inferior courts had a great deal of
discretion in dealing with lawyer discipline. But he stated that the
Supreme Court would intervene when a lower court's actions in
suspending an attorney were "irregular"
or "flagrantly

123. Id. at 614-15. In Osborn, the Court addressed whether a court of equity could
issue an injunction in the face of assertions of other supposed remedies:
We think the reason for an injunction is much stronger in the actual, than it would be
in the supposed case. In the regular course of things, the agent would pay over the
money immediately to his principal, and would thus place it beyond the reach of the
injured party, since his principal is not amenable to the law. The remedy for the
injury, would be against the agent only; and what agent could make compensation for
such an injury? The remedy would have nothing real in it. It would be a remedy in
name only, not in substance. This alone would, in our opinion, be a sufficient reason

for a Court of equity. The injury would, in fact, be irreparable; and the cases are
innumerable, in which injunctions are awarded on this ground.
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 844 (1824).
124. Exparte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824).
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improper."' 12 5 Marshall held that the exercise of discretion by
lower courts was not unlimited and at some point a court might
exceed the proper use of its discretion and mandamus might lie. 12 6
Marshall recognized that when a lawyer was suspended by a trial
court's clear abuse of discretion, there were no recognized
remedies for the attorney other than mandamus. 127 Marshall also
recognized that mandamus would issue if the lower court exceeded
its powers. 12 8 Thus, if the lower court acted without jurisdiction,
mandamus would lie. 129 Several years later and after Texas
statehood, in Ex parte Bradley,1 3 ° the Court expounded upon
Marshall's incipient principle and fully explained the reasoning
behind the determination that mandamus would lie when a lower

125. Id. at 530. In a later case the Court held that the power of a federal judge to
remove an attorney from practice before it is not "an arbitrary and despotic one, to be
exercised at the pleasure of the court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility."
Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856). This position was consonant with the
English common law. See Rex v. Askew, 98 Eng. Rep. 139, 141 (K.B. 1768) (holding that
the exercise of discretion could not be arbitrary, capricious, or biased); see also THOMAS
TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS

13-14 (London, Wm. Benning & Co. 1848) (noting that at common law if discretion was
not exercised in accordance with reasonable rules or practice, mandamus could command
due exercise of that discretion).
126. Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 531.
127. See, e.g., Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364, 376 (1868) (holding that when
the decision to suspend an attorney from practice before a federal court was the result of
"caprice, prejudice, or passion" mandamus would lie as no remedy by appeal was
available). The Bradley decision was in accord with the English precedents. See, e.g.,
White's Case, 87 Eng. Rep. 782, 782 (Q.B. 1703) (stating that there was no remedy for an
attorney to regain admission to a court other than mandamus).
128. Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 531.
129. See Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 364 (citing Burr for the principle that
mandamus would lie when a lower court exceeds its jurisdictional power). This principle
was part of the common law and was discussed by Blackstone as follows:
For it is the peculiar business of the court of king's bench, to superintend all other
inferior tribunals, and therein to inforce the due exercise of those judicial or
ministerial powers, with which the crown or legislature have invested them and this,
not only by restraining their excesses, but also by quickening their negligence, and
obviating their denial of justice.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *110-11; see also THOMAS TAPPING, THE
LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS 105 (London,

Wm. Benning & Co. 1848) (stating that part of King's Bench's superintendency over
inferior courts was the ability to "command them to execute faithfully all powers with
which they are clothed, whenever the same are either denied, or delayed, and to restrain
them from intermeddling where they have no jurisdiction").
130. Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364 (1868).
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court exceeded its jurisdictional power. 131 In that case the Court
issued a writ of mandamus to an inferior federal court, directing it
to restore a disbarred attorney to its rolls because the court had no
jurisdiction to disbar him. 13 2 The explanation given for the
issuance of mandamus was stated in the following language:
The ground of our decision ... is, that the court below had no
jurisdiction to disbar the relator ....
No amount of judicial
discretion of a court can supply a defect or want of jurisdiction in the
case. The subject-matter
is not before it; the proceeding is coram
133
non judice and void.

In Bradley, the Court stated that the mandamus would issue only
where there was no other specific remedy, and observed that in the
case of disbarment there
was no right to appeal; thus, mandamus
1 34
was the only remedy.
From this brief review of Supreme Court mandamus jurisprudence, it is seen that, on the eve of Texas's independence and
subsequent statehood, the law of mandamus at the federal level
was well established and had in large part remained true to the
English common law. First, the Court viewed itself as having the
power of superintendence over lower courts through the Judiciary
Act. 135 Further, the Court acknowledged that mandamus was an
131. Id. at 377-78.
132. Id. at 379.
133. Id. at 377. The Court stated that the alleged contempt that gave rise to the
disbarment of the attorney occurred before another court, and therefore the court that
issued the disbarment had no jurisdiction. Id.; see also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313,
323-24 (1879) (observing that mandamus "is a remedy when the case is outside ... the
jurisdiction of the court or officer to which or to whom the writ is addressed"); Ex parte
Robinson, 86 U.S. (10 Wall.) 513 (1873) (holding that mandamus was a proper remedy
where an inferior court entered an order in a matter in which it had no jurisdiction).
134. Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 376.
135. See Ex parte Crane, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 190, 194 (1831) (noting that the Supreme
Court "exercises extensive control over all the courts of the United States"). This
supervisory power, however, differed from that exercised by King's Bench. First, as
explained in Marbury, constitutional limitations restricted the Court's supervisory power.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (recognizing that the Constitution
circumscribed the Court's ability "to issue writs of mandamus"). Second, the writ of
mandamus was not merely a prerogative writ as in England. As Justice Thompson noted
for the Court in Kendall, the writ of mandamus as used by the federal courts (other than
the District of Columbia circuit court) was not a prerogative writ under the principles of
common law. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 620-21 (1838).
If mandamus were a prerogative writ, Justice Thompson reasoned, only the Supreme
Court could issue it. Id. at 621. He further explained the difference between the English
prerogative writ and the power of federal courts to issue mandamus:
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extraordinary remedy that was not available to correct every error
of law or fact made by inferior courts. 1 36 Finally, the Court
emphasized that the petitioner
must establish the absence of an
137
adequate legal remedy.

While this development was occurring at the federal level,
various states were concurrently developing their respective laws
of mandamus. As a general rule, the states followed the lead of
Marbury and held that mandamus would not issue if there was a
specific legal remedy available. 138 Like their federal counterpart,
But this power [granted by the Judiciary Act to issue mandamus agreeable to

principles and usages of law] is not exercised, as in England, by the king's bench, as
having a general supervising power over inferior courts; but only for the purpose of
bringing the case to a final judgment or decree, so that it may be reviewed.
Id. at, 622. In addition, Justice Thompson observed that several states, including
Maryland, had modified English common law by expanding the usage of the writ to "other
judicial tribunals than the highest court of original jurisdiction." Id. at 621.
136. See United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 53 (1795) (holding that
mandamus did not lie in cases involving an exercise of discretion).
137. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 169 (stating that the applicant for mandamus
must be without a specific legal remedy). Subsequently, the Court often cited Marbury for
this very proposition. See, e.g., Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291-92 (1851)
(citing Marbury); see also Kendall v. United States, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 100 (1845)
("Whenever, therefore, a mandamus is applied for, it is upon the ground that he cannot
obtain redress in any other form of proceeding.").
138. See generally State ex rel. Mead v. Dunn, Minor 46, 47 (Ala. 1821) (stating that
the availability of another specific remedy generally provided a sufficient reason for
refusing to grant a writ of mandamus); Taylor v. Governor, 1 Ark. 21, 23 (1837) (observing
"[t]hat a party applying for the writ must show ...no other adequate specific legal
remedy" was a universally established principle); Am. Asylum v. Phoenix Bank, 4 Conn.
172, 178 (1822) (referring to the general rule that "mandamus is never granted[] when a
person has another specific remedy"); Ex parte Gowen, 4 Me. 58, 59 (1826) (indicating
that the Supreme Court of Maine lacked authority to issue mandamus where another
adequate remedy existed); In re Strong, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 484, 495 (1838) (stating that
mandamus would generally not lie if there were another adequate specific remedy);
County of Boone v. Todd, 3 Mo. 140, 140 (1832) (stating that as a general rule, mandamus
would not issue when another specific remedy existed); Hull v. Supervisors of Oneida, 19
Johns. 259, 262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (holding that mandamus would issue to compel
performance of a ministerial duty when "no other legal remedy exists"); Richards,
Truesdell & Co. v. Wheeler, 2 Aik. 369, 370 (Vt. 1827) (holding that mandamus would lie
"where a party has ...no other specifick remedy to compel the performance"). In
discussing the adequacy of other available remedies, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2 Binn. 275 (Pa. 1810), stated:
[Mandamus is called for] because the supervisors are public officers, directed by the
act of assembly to pay such orders as are legally drawn by the justices, and because
the surveyors have no other specific remedy. It is said that the supervisors may be
indicted for neglect of duty. But if they were indicted and convicted, the orders might
still be unpaid. It is said also that if they withhold payment without just cause, they
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are liable to an action. Granting that they are, it must be brought against them in
their private capacity; and there is no form of action against them, which, being
carried to judgment, will authorize an execution to be levied on the treasury of the
Northern Liberties. Now it was to this treasury that the surveyors had a right to look,
when they acted under their commission from the governor. It may be said, that in
truth their contract was with the township, and from the township they have a right to
expect payment.
Id. at 279. The Virginia Supreme Court also had the opportunity to determine whether a
particular remedy provided by statute was sufficient to prevent the issuance of mandamus
in King William Justices v. Munday, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) 165 (1830):
[I]t is laid down, that it is, in general, sufficient reason with the court to refuse a
mandamus, that the party applying for it has another specific remedy; and many cases
are quoted in support. It seems an exception to this general rule, that the remedy is
obsolete, or inconvenient, or incomplete: in such cases, the court exercises sound
discretion in granting or refusing the writ. In our legislation, I find nothing to change
this settled course of the law.... The law being thus settled, we are only to inquire,
whether the petitioner for this mandamus, had a specific legal remedy? And this is
answered by the passage cited from the 9th section of the statute, 2 Rev. Code, ch.
236, [land all such contracts made by county courts, or others appointed by them,
shall be available and binding upon the justices and their successors, so as to entitle
the undertaker to his stipulated reward in the county levy, or to a recovery thereof
with costs, by action of debt against the justices refusing to levy the same.
...

[Therefore,] the mandamus is dismissed.

Id. at 169-70.
Although many state courts often referred to the writ of mandamus as a prerogative
writ, they were not referring to the same concept that prevailed in England-issuance
solely by one court (the King's Bench) in the name of the King or Queen. In large part,
these state courts were simply referring to the fact that the writ was issued by a superior
court directing a person or lower court to perform a legal duty that was required of them
on account of the office or position that was held. See generally Dunn, Minor at 46
(explaining that in Alabama "[t]he writ of Mandamus is said to be a high prerogative writ"
issuing from a superior court to compel the performance of a ministerial duty); Taylor, 1
Ark. at 23 (distinguishing Arkansas's mandamus from the prerogative writ of England as a
"constitutional writ secured to the citizen[s]"); Am. Asylum, 4 Conn. at 178 (stating that
the writ of mandamus in Connecticut was referred to as a prerogative writ as it "lies to
enforce the execution of an act, when otherwise justice would be obstructed; and,
regularly, issues only in cases, relating to the public and the government"); Runkel v.
Winemiller, 4 H. & McH. 429, 449 (Md. 1799) (observing that the Maryland Supreme
Court had similar authority to that of the King's Bench to issue writs of mandamus to
supervise inferior courts); State ex rel. Atkins v. Todd, 4 Ohio 351, 351-52 (1831) (stating
that the Supreme Court of Ohio had the authority, as in England, to supervise lower
courts to enforce ministerial duties); King William Justices, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) at 169
(explaining that there was nothing in the laws of Virginia that distinguished its superior
courts from those of England in the issuance of prerogative writs). In discussing
prerogative writs, the Massachusetts Supreme Court said:
Now it seems to us that this law ought to be executed in every county, and the only
question is, whether this Court can enforce it, by virtue of their general
superintending power over all courts of inferior jurisdiction. And of this we entertain
no doubt; for besides the general authority given by St. 1782, c. 9, the second section
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state courts noted that in special circumstances mandamus would
issue even in the face of another specific legal remedy if such
remedy was not "equally convenient, beneficial, and effectual" as
mandamus. 139 In such cases, the state courts followed the English
expressly provides, that it "shall have power to issue all writs of prohibition and
mandamus, according to the law of the land, to all courts of inferior judiciary powers,
and all processes necessary to the furtherance of justice, and the regular execution of
the laws." The common law, in regard to this subject, is the law of the land, and it is
very clear that the Court of King's Bench might by mandamus compel the
performance of duty by all inferior tribunals, whether that duty be of a judicial or
ministerial nature.
Mandamus is a prerogative writ introduced to prevent disorder from a failure of
justice and defect of police; and therefore ought to be used on all occasions where the
law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government
there ought to be one.
Commonwealth v. Justices of the Court of Sessions, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 414, 418-19 (1824)
(citation and footnote omitted).
139. The King v. Severn & Wye Ry. Co., 106 Eng. Rep. 501, 502 (K.B. 1819); see, e.g.,
Etheridge v. Hall, 7 Port. 47, 54 (Ala. 1838) (citing English and New York authority for
the proposition that "[t]he general rule ... must be understood to relate to a specific
remedy, which will place the party in the same situation as he was before the act
complained of"); Am. Asylum, 4 Conn. at 178 (citing English precedent for the
proposition that "an action on the casen which affords satisfaction equivalent to specific
relief" would preclude the issuance of mandamus): State v. Bruce, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 264,
271-72 (1812) (holding that quo warranto was not a sufficient alternative remedy for an
elected official who had been replaced by another, as the successful result of quo warranto
would be merely to oust the replacement and not reinstate the elected official); King
William Justices, 29 Va. (2 Leigh) at 169 (accepting the English rule that mandamus may
lie if the specific remedy available to the party applying is obsolete, inconvenient, or
incomplete); Dew v. Judges of the Sweet Springs Dist. Court, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 1, 23
(1808) (relying on Blackstone's Commentaries for the proposition that when the
alternative specific remedy is tedious, such as requiring multiple actions to achieve the
result, mandamus may lie). It is clear that the various states understood that the general
rule that a writ would not lie if the party had another remedy meant another specific legal
remedy that would place the party in the same position as the relief accorded by
mandamus. The New York Supreme Court articulated the rule in these terms:
The proposition is, I believe, universally true, that the writ of mandamus will not lie in
any case where another legal remedy exists, and it is used only to prevent a failure of
justice. By legal remedy is meant a remedy at law, and though the party might seek
redress in chancery, that of itself is not a conclusive objection to the application; that
may and should influence the court in the exercise of the discretion which they
possess in granting the writ under the facts and circumstances of the particular case,
but does not affect its right or jurisdiction. Nor does the fact that the party is liable to
indictment and punishment for his omission to do the act, to compel a performance of
which this writ is sought, constitute any objection to the granting of the writ. The
principle which seems to lie at the foundation of applications for this writ and the use
of it is, that whenever a legal right exists, the party is entitled to a legal remedy, and
when all others fail, the aid of this may be invoked.
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common law and permitted mandamus in those exceptional
situations where the other remedy was not truly a specific remedy
in affording the aggrieved party the right to which he was entitled
under the law. 1 4 ° In many of these early state opinions, the word
"adequate" became synonymous with "specific," such that the
principle was stated that the alternative remedy must be one which
141
would lead to adequate relief.
People ex rel. Moulton v. Mayor of New-York, 10 Wend. 393, 396-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
140. See generally JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES § 17 (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1874) (stating that the remedy must be adequate
not only in the general sense, but also "must be specific and appropriate to the particular
circumstances of the case"). After surveying the law on the subject of the nature of the
alternative remedy in State v. Holliday, 8 N.J.L. 205 (1825), the New Jersey Supreme
Court issued a writ of mandamus, in spite of the fact that other remedies existed, to an
overseer to open and clear a road in his district as assigned to him by the township
committee. Id. at 205-08. In discussing the nature of the other remedies, the court stated:
The remedy then, the right of resort to which shall deny the use of the writ of
mandamus ... must ... be specific, by which I understand a remedy framed to effect
directly the desired end. A mandamus has been refused where a quare impedit would
lie ....
A mandamus was also refused because there was another remedy by
information in nature of a quo warranto. In such case if the defendant be convicted,
judgment of ouster as well as a fine is given against him ....
In [several English
cases,] applications for mandamus to compel the transfer of bank shares were refused,
for by action against the bank a recovery of the value of the shares might be had, and
Complete satisfaction, entirely
the purchase of other shares thereby enabled.
equivalent to specific relief, might thus be obtained, as no possible difference could
exist between the shares sought and the shares to be purchased. Let us now examine
whether there is, beside the mandamus, a ... specific method of compelling the
overseer to open and make the road in question. By the 18th section of the act
concerning roads an overseer may be presented by the grand jury or informed against
by the attorney-general for not opening and clearing out an highway and on
conviction may be fined. By the 37th section, the overseer on conviction, before a
magistrate, of neglect or refusal to perform any of the duties enjoined on him by the
said act, may be subjected to a penalty not exceeding twenty dollars nor under five
dollars, with costs. But it is manifest that the penalty may be paid or the fine satisfied,
and yet the road may not be opened and cleared out nor the public be enabled to
enjoy the use of it. These remedies then cannot be denominated specific. It is no
objection to say that the mandamus may be disobeyed and the court can then only
fine and imprison him to whom it is directed. For the law presumes the officer will
yield obedience to the writ unless he shew sufficient cause on which the court, not he,
is to decide.
Id. at 206-07 (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., Taylor, 1 Ark. at 23 (observing that the principle that a party applying
for the writ must show "no other adequate specific legal remedy" was a universally
established principle); Bruce, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) at 271 (stating that if the applicant had no
other legal remedy "whereby he can obtain adequate relief," he would be entitled to the
writ). The South Carolina court cited no precedent for the principle, while the Arkansas
court cited The King v. Marquis of Stafford, 100 Eng. Rep. 782 (K.B. 1790). In Marquis,
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14 2
TEXAS MANDAMUS TRADITION PRIOR TO PRUDENTIAL

The Republic of Texas: The Inception of Mandamus

Jurisprudence
It was into this body of well-established law of mandamus that
Texas was thrown when it declared and won its independence
from Mexico in 1836. The Constitution of the Republic of Texas
provided that the Supreme Court of the Republic would have only
appellate jurisdiction. 1 43 In addition, the constitution authorized
the congress to "introduce, by statute, the common law of
England, with such modifications as our circumstances, in their
judgment, may require.' 4 4 With respect to the power to issue
the court refused to issue mandamus because of the existence of another legal remedy and
rejected an argument that mandamus had to be issued because of the inconvenience of the
alternative remedy. Id. at 783-84.
142. As the courts of appeal in Texas are obligated to follow the decisions of the
Texas Supreme Court on matters of law, I am limiting the inquiry in this article to
decisions of the Texas Supreme Court. See generally Lubbock County v. Trammel's
Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) (stating that the function of
abrogating or modifying established precedent lay with the supreme court, not the courts
of appeals); Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964) (observing that the
supreme court's decisions were binding on lower courts).
143. REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 8, reprintedin 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE
LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1069, 1074 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). However,
the court's civil appellate jurisdiction was unlimited by the constitution. See TEX. CONST.
of 1845, art. IV, § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which
shall be co-extensive with the limits of the State; but in criminal cases, and in appeals from
interlocutory judgments, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the
Legislature shall make.").
144. REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 13, reprintedin 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE
LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1069, 1074 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). The
Congress of the Republic of Texas responded by enacting the common law of England "so
far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution or the Acts of Congress now in force,"
and noted that the common law "together with such acts [constitute] the rule of decision in
this Republic, and shall continue in full force until altered or repealed by Congress." Act
approved Jan. 20, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., § 1, 1840 Repub. Tex. Laws 3, 3-4, reprintedin 2
H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 177, 177-78 (Austin, Gammel Book
Co. 1898). On the other hand, the congress rejected the common law system of pleading
and instead adopted the petition and answer form. See Act approved Feb. 5, 1840, 4th
Cong., R.S., § 1, 1840 Repub. Tex. Laws 88, 88, reprintedin 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS
OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 262, 262 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) ("[T]he adoption of
the common law shall not be construed [as an] adopt[ion of] the common law system of
pleading .... "). Nevertheless, the common law of England was to be "followed and
practiced by the courts" so far as not inconsistent with laws passed by congress. Act
approved Dec. 20, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., § 41, 1836 Repub. Tex. Laws 148, 156-57,
reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1208, 1216-17
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writs, the first Congress of the Republic of Texas authorized the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas to "grant writs of habeas
corpus, and all other remedial writs and process granted by said
judges, by virtue of their office, agreeably to the principles and
usages of law."' 4 5 All but one of the supreme court cases during
the republican period mentioning mandamus 1 46 involved appeals
from writs of mandamus issued by the district courts of the State of
Texas. 1 47 The most significant case of this era was Bradley v.
(Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). See generally James W. Paulsen, A Short History of the
Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas, 65 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1986) (giving a descriptive
history of the Texas Supreme Court during the republican period).
145. Act approved Dec. 15, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., § 8, 1836 Repub. Tex. Laws 79, 80,
reprinted in 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1139, 1140 (Austin,
Gammel Book Co. 1898). The authority to issue such writs "agreeabl[e] to the principles
and usages of law" was strikingly similar to that of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 13, 1 Stat. 73, 81 (authorizing the Supreme Court of the Republic to
issue writs of mandamus in cases "warranted by the principles and usages of law").
Although the justices of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas were elected in
December of 1836, the court did not meet for the first time until 1840. See James W.
Paulsen, A Short History of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas, 65 TEX. L. REV.
237, 248-53 (1986) (tracing the political intrigue behind this seeming mystery). After
convening, the supreme court established certain rules to govern practice in Texas courts;
District Court Rule 31 permitted the issuance of the writ of mandamus following an ex
parte hearing. TEX. DIST. CT. R. 31, 1 Tex. 852 (1840, superseded by statute 1841).
Obviously dissatisfied with the rule, the republican congress enacted legislation
prohibiting judges of the state from issuing ex parte writs of mandamus and requiring all
judges of the state, in issuing mandamus, to observe the rules of common law as modified
by acts of the republic. Act approved Jan. 25, 1841, 5th Cong., R.S., § 9, 1841 Repub. Tex.
Laws 82, 84, reprinted in 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 546, 548
(Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). See generally Robert W. Stayton, The General Issue in
Texas, 9 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1930) (tracing various procedural issues that faced
mandamus practice during the republic and into early statehood). This aversion to
granting mandamus ex parte continued into statehood. See Act approved May 11, 1846,
1st Leg., R.S., § 4, 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws 200, 201, reprinted in 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE
LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1506, 1507 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (conferring
on district courts the power to grant mandamus "provided, [t]hat no mandamus shall be
granted on an [ex parte] hearing, and any peremptory mandamus granted without notice,
shall be deemed void"); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 694 (mandating that district and county
courts shall not grant mandamus ex parte and "any peremptory mandamus granted
without notice shall be abated on motion").
146. The only case decided by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas that did
not involve an appeal from a writ of mandamus issued by a district court was Dangerfield
v. Secretary of State, Dallam 358 (Tex. 1840) (orig. proceeding). In Dangerfield, the court
issued mandamus, pro forma, directing the President of the Republic of Texas to permit
election of the chief justices of the counties. Dangerfield,Dallam at 358-59.
147. See, e.g., Kent v. Kelso, Dallam 523 (Tex. 1843) (reversing the district court's
grant of mandamus to compel the sale of property); Taylor v. Duncan, Dallam 514 (Tex.
1843) (examining the district court's authorization to grant various writs); Roman v.
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Bradley v. McCrabb involved the granting of

mandamus by a district court to restore the plaintiff to the office of
district clerk from which he had been removed. 14 9 The plaintiff
had been properly elected to that office and had been holding the
office as the duly qualified clerk.1 50 At the request of the district
judge, the plaintiff relinquished his office to the defendant, who
claimed the office under a "pretended election. '1 5 1 The trial
court entered a mandamus commanding the defendant to yield his
office back to the plaintiff until the end of his elected term. 15 2

Moody, Dallam 512 (Tex. 1843) (affirming mandamus issued by a district court in an
election case); Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504 (Tex. 1843) (analyzing a district court's
mandamus order in an election case); Allen v. Ward, Dallam 371 (Tex. 1840) (affirming
the judgment of the district court); Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. Bell, Dallam 366 (Tex. 1840)
(comparing procedurally the issuance of mandamus and peremptory mandamus). The
Constitution of the Republic of Texas, as well as the laws of the republic, authorized
district courts to grant mandamus relief. See REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 3,
reprintedin 1 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1069, 1073 (Austin,
Gammel Book Co. 1898) (establishing the jurisdiction of district courts); Act approved
Dec. 20, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., § 41, 1836 Repub. Tex. Laws 148, 156, reprinted in 1 H.P.N.
GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1208, 1216 (Austin, Gammel Book Co.
1898) (directing courts of the Republic of Texas to apply English common law when not
inconsistent with republican law). Even today, trial courts hold the authority to issue writs
of mandamus. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 24.011 (Vernon 2004) (providing that district
judges "may ...grant writs of mandamus ... necessary [for] the enforcement of [their]

jurisdiction"). However, "an appeal from an original proceeding for a writ of mandamus
initiated in the trial court ...is [treated] different[ly] from an original proceeding for a
writ of mandamus [initiated] in an appellate court." Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806
S.W.2d 791, 792 n.1 (Tex. 1991). The trial and appeal of a writ of mandamus proceeding
initiated at the district court level are treated in the same manner as any other civil action.
Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wakelee, 42 Tex. 513, 516 (1874)). In contrast, the grant of a writ of
mandamus by a court of appeals is not appealable to the Texas Supreme Court; such
ruling is only reviewable through another original petition for writ of mandamus filed in
the Texas Supreme Court. Id.; see also Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d
916, 917-18 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that the issue in a new proceeding
for mandamus before the supreme court did not involve a determination of whether the
court of appeals abused its discretion in granting the mandamus, but "whether the trial
court's order is so arbitrary, unreasonable, or based upon so gross and prejudicial an error
of law as to establish abuse of discretion").
148. Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504 (Tex. 1843). None of the other supreme court
cases dealing with the issue of mandamus during the republican era analyzed as
thoroughly or evaluated as completely the aspects of mandamus jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Roman, Dallam at 514 (stating that the issues of the propriety of granting mandamus were
discussed at length in Bradley v. McCrabb and did not require repetition).
149. Bradley, Dallam at 504-06.
150. Id. at 504-05.
151. Id,at 505.
152. Id. at 505-06.
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The defendant appealed.' 5 3 The supreme court, acknowledging
that it was statutorily required to observe the rules which governed
the issuance of such writs at common law, began a detailed
1 54
discussion of the use of the writ of mandamus at common law.
The court noted that, at common law, the writ was uniformly used
to compel the restoration to office of one who had been
improperly removed from that office. 15 5
Summarizing the
common law on mandamus, the court stated: "It [mandamus] will
not only issue in cases where the party having a specific legal right
has no other legal operative remedy, but where the other modes of
'3' 5 6
redress are inadequate or tedious the writ will be awarded.

153. Id. at 506.
154. Bradley, Dallam at 506-08.
155. Id. at 506 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *110).
156. Id. (citing as support for this statement Blackstone's Commentaries, a South
Carolina case, State v. Bruce, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 264, 270 (1812), and two English cases,
Wright v. Fawcett, 98 Eng. Rep. 63, 65-66 (K.B. 1767), and Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep.
823, 824 (K.B. 1762)). Interestingly, the Wright case did not even address the issue in
Bradley v. McCrabb, as Wright involved procedural issues concerning the validity of the
return. Wright, 98 Eng. Rep. at 65-66. Blackstone, the Bruce case, and the Barker case
supported the limited proposition that mandamus would issue if there were no other legal
operative remedy. Bruce, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) at 270; Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. at 824; WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *110.
Only Blackstone, however, recited that
mandamus would issue if the other remedy were tedious. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3

COMMENTARIES *110 (stating that the writ may issue in some cases where the applicant
has a "more tedious method of redress, as in the case of admission or restitution to an
office"). The example of tedium given by Blackstone referred to the problems of title to
and possession of public offices. Id.
Since the time of Barker, mandamus had been the remedy of choice in the proper
case to obtain restoration or admission to office. A problem arose, however, if the office
was already being held by one under color of title. Generally, the common law remedy of
quo warranto or "information in nature of a quo warranto" was available to determine
disputed questions concerning title to public office. Bruce, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) at 270-71.
The general rule under the English common law was that mandamus would not lie to
compel the admission of another person to the office when the office was already filled by
one holding under color of title, nor could mandamus determine the dispute over the title
to the office. This was because there was another specific remedy available by way of quo
warranto. See The Queen v. Councillors of Derby, 112 Eng. Rep. 528, 528-29 (Q.B.1837)
(holding that the proper remedy was quo warranto because the office was filled); The
King v. Mayor of Colchester, 100 Eng. Rep. 141, 141-42 (K.B. 1788) (denying mandamus
and granting quo warranto because the office was in possession by another); see also
People ex rel. Arcularius v. Mayor of New-York, 3 Johns. Cas. 79, 79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802)
(per curiam) (stating that mandamus would not lie because the determination of disputed
title to office could not be validly undertaken without the person in office being a party);
Bruce, 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) at 270-71 (stating that quo warranto was the specific remedy to
remove an unlawful office holder). However, although quo warranto could determine
disputed title to the office, it could not be used to compel admission to the office by the
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The court noted that, in its opinion, the reason for the restriction

in exercise of mandamus jurisdiction at common law to "cases
where there was no other legal, specific ... remedy" was that the

judgment awarding a writ of mandamus in an inferior court was
not subject to appeal. 1 5 7 However, the court reasoned that under
the republic's laws, final decisions of the district court were subject
to appeal, and as such, the restriction applicable at common law

"can have no foundation or support in the structure of our judicial

system."' 1 5 8 The court then noted that at the trial court level, the
remedy of quo warranto would have been available to force the
defendant "to show by what warrant or title [he] claim[ed] [the
office]."'1 5 9
Nonetheless, the court observed that mandamus
"operates a more complete and effectual remedy" because the

successful quo warranto applicant; thus, resort to mandamus is necessary. See, e.g., Bruce,
5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) at 270 (stating that mandamus lies to restore one to the office to which
he is legally entitled); Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823, 826 (K.B. 1762) (issuing a writ of
mandamus to compel trustees to grant a duly elected minister access to a meeting house).
More importantly, however, in cases where the existing office holder was improperly
holding office (not under color of title), and the title of the applicant was clear, mandamus
would issue even though quo warranto was an available remedy. In these cases, it would
be tedious to first file the quo warranto proceeding to determine title and then file the
mandamus to compel admission to office, because mandamus could achieve both the
ouster and the restoration. See Dew v. Judges of the Sweet Springs Dist. Court, 13 Va. (3
Hen. & M.) 1, 20-47 (1808) (reviewing the common law in detail as it related to
restoration

and admission

to office).

See generally WILLIAM

BLACKSTONE,

3

COMMENTARIES *262-63 (noting that in cases involving private offices, quo warranto
would lead to merely a judgment of ouster); JAMES L. HIGH, A TREATISE ON
EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES, EMBRACING MANDAMUS,

QUO WARRANTO,

AND PROHIBITION §§ 49-72 (Chi., Callaghan & Co. 1874) (summarizing the availability of
quo warranto and mandamus in cases of admission and restoration to office). It should be
noted that a later Supreme Court of the Republic of Texas stated the rule in its traditional
form. See Bd. of Land Comm'rs of Milam County v. Bell, Dallam 366, 366 (Tex. 1840)
(stating without citation to any support or authority that "[it is clear that a mandamus will
not issue where the party has another legal and specific remedy").
157. See Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504, 506-07 (Tex. 1843) (noting that no writ of
error laid from the granting of the mandamus at common law, and therefore the decision
of the inferior court was not subject to review by a superior court). The court concluded
that under Texas law a writ of mandamus issued by a district court was a final judgment
and subject to appellate review. Id. at 507; see Estate of Soy v. McMullen, Dallam 363, 363
(Tex. 1840) (holding that under its organizational statute, the supreme court could only
hear a case after a final judgment except as provided by law); see also Act approved Dec.
15, 1836, 1st Cong., R.S., § 3, 1836 Repub. Tex. Laws 79, 79, reprinted in 1 H.P.N.
GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1139, 1139 (Austin, Gammel Book Co.
1898) (authorizing the supreme court to hear appeals from final judgments).
158. Bradley, Dallam at 507.
159. Id.
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successful party would not only recover his office, but could
require all the documents of his office be turned over. 1 60 Thus,
one observes that in the only case during the Republic of Texas
that discussed in any detail the writ of mandamus, the Texas
Supreme Court had, as directed by the legislature, adopted the
mandamus jurisprudence of the common law.
B.

The Early Statehood Years, 1845-1910: The FormativePeriod

During the first sixty to seventy years following statehood, the
Texas Supreme Court's opinions in the area of mandamus
jurisdiction continued to reflect the influence of the English
common law and remained faithful to those teachings. It was also
during this era that the court began to develop its own precedents,
and by the end of this initial period, it became rare indeed for the
court to cite English precedent which so frequently dominated the
early decisions.
Nevertheless, the court's own precedents
remained firmly based upon this earlier common law experience.
The first constitution of the State of Texas authorized the
Supreme Court of Texas to "issue writs of mandamus... as shall
be necessary to enforce its own jurisdiction, and also compel a
Judge of the District Court to proceed to trial and judgment in a
cause.-' 1 6 1 The legislature of the state quickly implemented a
statute concerning the organization of the supreme court and its
jurisdiction, including
implementation of this constitutional grant
1 62
of authority.
160. Id.
161. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. IV, § 3. Similarly, the constitutions of 1861, 1866,
1869, and the current constitution-originally enacted in 1876-provided that the supreme
court would have original jurisdiction to issue mandamus. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3
(providing that the court may issue writs of mandamus under regulations prescribed by
law to enforce its jurisdiction); TEX. CONST. of 1869, art. V, § 3 (providing that the court

could issue mandamus "under such regulations as may be [permitted] by law.., to enforce
its own jurisdiction"); TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. IV, § 3 (providing that the court could
issue writs of mandamus to enforce its jurisdiction); TEX. CONST. of 1861, art. IV, § 3
(providing that the court could issue writs of mandamus to enforce its jurisdiction and to
compel a district judge to proceed to trial or judgment).
162. Act approved May 12, 1846, 1st Leg., R.S., § 3, 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws 249, 249,
reprinted in 2 H.P.N. GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1555, 1555-56
(Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898). Although the statute authorizing the exercise of
original mandamus jurisdiction has been amended from time to time throughout the
history of Texas to specify against whom the court could issue mandamus, the provision
that the court was authorized to issue writs of mandamus "agreeable to the principles of
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The first significant case involving mandamus following statehood was Arberry v. Beavers.1 6 3 Arberry involved a contested
election in which it was alleged that the chief justice of the county
had failed to count and record all the votes cast. 1 6 4 The trial court
issued a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to perform his duty
in accordance with the law of the state on the regulation of
elections.1 65 Following the issuance of the writ by the district
court, an appeal was taken to the supreme court. 1 66 The court
took the opportunity to summarize its understanding of common
law principles of mandamus and to incorporate those principles
into Texas precedent with these words:
This process [the writ of mandamus], in modern practice, is
regarded as an action, by the party on whose relation it is granted, to
law regulating those writs" has been a mainstay of the legislation. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 22.002(a) (Vernon 2004) (authorizing the supreme court to issue writs of
mandamus "agreeable to the principles of law regulating those writs, against a statutory
county court judge, a statutory probate court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or a
justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state government except the governor, the
court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the court of criminal appeals"). Similarly, the
thirty-third Texas legislature provided:
The Supreme Court, or any justice thereof, shall have power to issue ... writs of
mandamus ...agreeable to the principles of law regulating such writs against any
district judge, or Court of Civil Appeals or judge of a Court of Civil Appeals, or
officer of the State government, except the Governor ....
Act of Mar. 26, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 55, § 1, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 107, 108, repealed by
Act of May 17, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 480, § 26, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1720, 2048. The
issuance of these writs was regulated by common law principles to the extent that the
common law had not been modified by the constitution or statute. See, e.g., Terrell v.
Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 545, 31 S.W. 631, 634 (1895) (orig. proceeding) (stating that the
legislature had conferred power upon the supreme court to issue writs of mandamus "in all
...cases as are allowable at common law").
163. Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457 (1851). Although several other cases involving
mandamus had reached the court prior to Arberry, for the most part those cases dealt only
with procedural matters and did not involve any discussion of mandamus jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Bracken v. Wells, 3 Tex. 88, 92 (1848) (stating that the application to the court for
issuance of a writ of mandamus did not need to be sworn); Smith v. Power, 2 Tex. 57, 6768 (1847) (discussing issues of notice and return following service of the writ); see also
Comm'r of the Gen. Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471, 479 (1849) (discussing the
distinction between ministerial and discretionary duties under Texas law); Glasscock v.
Comm'r of the Gen. Land Office, 3 Tex. 51, 53 (1848) (acknowledging as a general
principle that mandamus would not issue to compel performance of an act involving
discretion or an alternative).
164. Arberry, 6 Tex. at 458.
165. Id. at 459.
166. Id.
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enforce a private right, when the law affords no other adequate
means of redress.
It lies to compel public officers and courts of inferior
jurisdiction, to proceed to do those acts which clearly appertain to
their duty. But it does not lie to instruct them as to the manner in
which they shall discharge a duty, which involves the exercise of
discretion or judgment. The distinction seems to be, that, if the
inferior tribunal has jurisdiction, and refuses to act, or to entertain
the question for its decision, in cases where the law enjoins upon it
to do the act required, or if the act be merely ministerial in its
character, obedience to the law will be enforced by mandamus,
where no other legal remedy exists. But, if the act to be performed
involves the exercise of judgment, or if the subordinate public agent
has a discretion in regard to the matter within his cognizance, and
proceeds to exercise it according to the authority conferred by law,
the superior Court cannot lawfully interfere
to control or govern
16 7
that judgment or discretion, by mandamus.
The court then explained the legal principles governing the
determination of whether a specific duty was a discretionary or
ministerial action, evaluated the duty of the chief justice in this
case, and determined that his action lay in the area of
discretion. 1 6 8 Accordingly, the court held that the granting of the
mandamus was erroneous on procedural grounds. 1 6 9 However,
the court did state in obiter dictum that a gross abuse of discretion
or complete refusal to act on a duty could lead to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus "where there was no other adequate remedy
' 1 70
provided by law.
167. Id. at 464-65. The court cited two cases from other states in support of the
position that it had taken. See Rice v. Comm'rs of Highways of Middlesex, 30 Mass. (13
Pick.) 225, 227-28 (1832) (stating that mandamus did not lie to correct a public official in
the exercise of discretion); Hull v. Supervisors of Oneida, 19 Johns. 259, 262-63 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. 1821) (stating that a public official's discretionary actions were not subject to
mandamus).
168. Arberry, 6 Tex. at 469-74.
169. Id. at 474-75.

170. Id. at 472. Justice Wheeler, the author of the Arberry opinion, articulated the
same concern in a later case:
[A] public officer, [performing a required] duty which involves the exercise of
discretion, may be guilty of so gross an abuse of the discretion confided to him, or
such an evasion of positive duty as to amount to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law, and that in such a case a mandamus
would afford a remedy where there was no other adequate remedy provided by law.
Meyer v. Carolan, 9 Tex. 250, 255 (1852) (Wheeler, J., concurring). But see id. at 254
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Following Arberry, the Texas Supreme Court consistently noted
that mandamus was an extraordinary remedy 1 7 1 that was available
only in those cases in which there was an inadequate legal
remedy. 1 7 2 Thus, it was clear that in those situations where a final
judgment had been entered in a cause, the proper remedy to

correct trial court errors was an appeal or writ of error to the
appellate court and not mandamus.1 73 In the same light, the court
(majority opinion) (asserting that if a public official "wantonly disregard[ed]" his required
duty that a suit for malfeasance of office, not mandamus, would lie).
171. See, e.g., In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 180 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding)
(recognizing that mandamus was an extraordinary writ); Munson v. Terrell, 101 Tex. 220,
221, 105 S.W. 1114, 1115 (1907) (orig. proceeding) (stating that mandamus was "an
extraordinary writ, and rests largely in the sound discretion of the court"); Ark. Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Madden, 91 Tex. 461, 462, 44 S.W. 823, 824 (1898) (orig. proceeding)
(noting that mandamus was a remedy of last resort and should not issue if the applicant "is
left in no worse position without the writ than he would be should a mandamus issue");
Hume v. Schintz, 90 Tex. 72, 74, 36 S.W. 429, 429 (1896) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing
that mandamus was an extraordinary writ): Jones v. T.H. McMahan & Gilbert, 30 Tex.
719, 728 (1868) (referring to all writs issued by the district court as extraordinary);
Houston Tap & Brazoria Ry. Co. v. Randolph, 24 Tex. 317, 329 (1859) (referring to the
writ of mandamus as an extraordinary remedy).
172. See, e.g., Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)
("[The] requirement that mandamus will not issue where [the relator has] an adequate
remedy by appeal is well-settled."); Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 377, 60 S.W. 665, 666
(1901) (orig. proceeding) (stating that where there was another "plain, adequate, and
complete remedy," mandamus would never be awarded); Steele v. Goodrich, 87 Tex. 401,
403, 28 S.W. 939, 939-40 (1894) (orig. proceeding) (stating that a writ of mandamus would
not issue where there was an adequate remedy by appeal). This basic principle of
mandamus law was succinctly stated by then-Justice Gaines: "But the writ of mandamus is
a remedy of the last resort. It is universally held that if a party ha[s] an adequate commonlaw or statutory remedy he cannot resort to this writ, and the rule has been repeatedly
announced in this court." Screwmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. Benson, 76 Tex. 552, 555, 13
S.W.379, 380 (1890) (granting mandamus to reinstate a member of a voluntary association
who had been expelled and had no other adequate remedy). In a later opinion, Chief
Justice Gaines stated that this other remedy needed to be adequate, complete, and
"reasonably necessary to the enforcement or establishment of the right which is sought to
be secured." Hogue v. Baker, 92 Tex. 58, 61, 45 S.W. 1004, 1004 (1898) (orig. proceeding).
Under Texas law, if an applicant establishes a clear right to mandamus, including the
inadequacy of a legal remedy, then mandamus must be granted. See Scott v. Twelfth
Court of Appeals, 843 S.W.2d 439, 442-43 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (noting that
while the decision to grant mandamus is considered discretionary, "the court's discretion
lies in deciding whether the prerequisites for mandamus relief have been met, not in
deciding whether to grant relief irrespective of such prerequisites").
173. See, e.g., Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840 (stating that mandamus will not lie when an
appeal provides an adequate remedy); Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. 1985)
(orig. proceeding) (noting that the court would not supervise a trial court's incidental
rulings where an adequate remedy by appeal exists); Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 367, 311
S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958) (orig. proceeding) (noting that mandamus would not issue to
correct a trial court's errors when there was an adequate remedy by appeal); Aycock, 94
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clearly recognized that mandamus would lie in those cases where
to enter any
the court refused to proceed to try a case or refused
1 74
judgment upon a valid and duly entered verdict.
In discussing the inadequacy of the remedy as a basis for the
issuance of mandamus, Texas Supreme Courts often referred to
the dictum of Bradley v. McCrabb noting that the alternative
remedy had to be one that was effective and not one that was
tedious. 175 For example, in Terrell v. Greene,'7 6 the trial court
refused to permit the county attorney to appear and represent the
county in a suit pending in the court. 1 7 7 The county attorney
78
sought a writ of mandamus from the Texas Supreme Court.'
Recognizing that an appeal was generally accepted as an adequate
remedy to forestall mandamus relief, the court declared that the
county attorney had no right to appeal in this case as he was not a
Tex. at 377, 60 S.W. at 666 (noting that an appeal from a final judgment was "a complete
and adequate remedy").
174. See, e.g., Aycock, 94 Tex. at 376, 60 S.W. at 666 (reciting that a judge could be
compelled by mandamus to proceed to try a case as well as to enter a judgment upon a
verdict); Hume v. Schintz, 90 Tex. 72, 74, 36 S.W. 429, 430 (1896) (orig. proceeding)
(holding that a trial court has no discretion but to enter a judgment according to a proper
verdict); Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex. 1, 6 (1872) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the entry of a
judgment on a valid verdict was a purely ministerial action). The court in Lloyd stated
that an appeal would ordinarily provide "ultimate and complete justice," but when a judge
refused to enter a judgment on a valid verdict, an appeal "would be wholly inadequate if
not completely unattainable, and the party aggrieved be wholly without a remedy."
Lloyd, 35 Tex. at 8. Specifically, the court explained that such appeal would be
inadequate because the possibility existed that no appealable judgment would ever be
entered. See id. at 8-9 (describing how a trial court, having entered a new trial on its own
prior to the entry of a judgment, might continue to do so in the future so that no
appealable judgment would ever be entered). Thus, mandamus should issue to command
the trial court to enter judgment on a verdict. Id. at 9-10 (noting that the authority to
compel the trial court to proceed to trial and judgment was provided by statute). The
statutory authority authorizing the supreme court to compel trial courts to trial and
judgment remains to this date. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(b) (Vernon 2004)
(authorizing the supreme court to issue writs of mandamus to compel trial courts "to
proceed to trial and judgment in ... case[s] agreeable to the principles and usages of
law"). See generally Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex.
1967) (orig. proceeding) (noting that the statutes authorizing the appellate courts to
compel entry of judgment were only applicable in cases involving a purely ministerial
duty); Kleiber v. McManus, 66 Tex. 48, 50, 17 S.W. 249, 250 (1886) (orig. proceeding)
(upholding as constitutional that portion of a statute authorizing the supreme court to
issue mandamus to compel district courts to proceed to trial and judgment).
175. Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504, 506 (Tex. 1843).
176. Terrell v. Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 31 S.W. 631 (1895) (orig. proceeding).
177. Id. at 541, 31 S.W. at 632.
178. Id.
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party.1 79 The court then stated by way of obiter dictum that, even
assuming that the county attorney possessed the right to appeal,
such appeal would not have afforded effective relief. 180 In
explaining this dictum, the court noted that even if the county
attorney was successful in having the case reversed following a
trial in which he had been refused permission to appear, the case
would have to be tried again.1 81 Although not citing Bradley v.
McCrabb's dictum that mandamus was available for a tedious
remedy, but clearly aware of its presence, the court described such
remedy as "unreasonable, and unjust to the parties interested in
the cause."' 182 Finally, the court addressed the argument that the
county attorney had another alleged complete remedy by way of
suit against the county to recover the commissions for having
tendered his services to the county although those services had
been refused. 18 3 The court held that there was more than
pecuniary compensation involved in the right of which the county
attorney had been deprived-there was an intangible loss that
accompanied the inability to discharge faithfully his public
duty. 18 4 As the court concluded, "[t]he fact that Terrell might
have recovered from the county commissions allowed him by law
would not prevent him from demanding that he should be lawfully
admitted to the discharge of the duties of the office to which the
people of Tarrant county had elected him."' 8 5 The court's
conclusion was consistent with the common law and early
American precedents that the remedy sufficient to prevent the
issuance of mandamus relief had to put the applicant in the same
legal position that he would have been in had mandamus been
granted. In Terrell, mandamus issued to restore the county
attorney to his office so that he was able to carry out the duty he
179. Id. at 544, 31 S.W. at 634.
180. Id.
181. Terrell, 88 Tex. at 544,31 S.W. at 634.
182. Id.
183. Terrell v. Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 545, 31 S.W. 631, 634 (1895) (orig. proceeding).
In essence, the defendants asserted that because the county attorney had tendered his
service to the county to appear in the case, he was therefore under law entitled to the
statutory fees for representing the county even though the court had refused to permit him
to perform his duty. Id.. Thus, the defendants argued, the county attorney had an
adequate remedy by way of action against the county to recover his fees. Id. The result of
pursuing this remedy would be complete recovery of any pecuniary loss. Id.
184. Id.

185. Terrell, 88 Tex. at 545, 31 S.W.at 634.
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had been elected to perform. 18 6 None of the other proposed
87
remedies could have achieved this result.'
During this early formative period, the Texas Supreme Court
stayed true to the basic fundamental principles of mandamus
jurisprudence that had existed at common law. For example, even
in cases where judgments entered by courts were clearly
erroneous, the court refused to intervene by way of mandamus.1 8 8
Explaining its position in these cases against an argument that
appeal of a final judgment would be inadequate, the court
asserted:
If, as argued in behalf of the relators, that remedy [appeal or a writ
of error] be not adequate, then no tribunal can, in any event, afford
such remedy in such a case. If, with the entire record before it,that is to say, the pleadings, the bills of exception, the statement of
186. Id. at 549, 31 S.W. at 636. After addressing the issue of the inadequacy of
alternative remedies, the court discussed the issue of whether the district judge had
discretion to prohibit the county attorney from exercising his legal right to represent the
county in litigation. Id. at 545-48, 31 S.W. at 634-36. In concluding that this was a purely
ministerial duty, the court artfully stated:
[T]he general rule is that,.where a person holds an uncontested title to an office,
mandamus may be issued to put him in possession, or where he has an undisputed
right to exercise the functions of an office, and, having actual and undisputed
possession, he is illegally ousted or suspended from the performance of its duties, he
may be restored to his rights as such officer by writ of mandamus.
Id. at 548, 31 S.W.at 635.
187. Id. at 545, 31 S.W. at 634.
188. See, e.g., Matlock v. Smith, 96 Tex. 211, 214, 71 S.W. 956, 957 (1903) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that no matter how "palpably erroneous" a judge's decision in
refusing to dismiss a lawsuit, mandamus would not lie); Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 377,
60 S.W. 665, 666 (1901) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the determination of what
judgment to enter upon a verdict involved the discretion of the trial judge, and that the
judge's discretion could not be controlled by mandamus); Ewing v. Cohen, 63 Tex. 482,
483-84 (1885) (stating that the writ of mandamus could not be used to compel an inferior
court to enter a different judgment). Consequently, although the supreme court clearly
had the authority to direct a trial court to proceed to trial and judgment, it had no
authority to direct the trial court how to try or decide a case before it. See, e.g., Ewing, 63
Tex. at 483-84 (outlining the limitations of a writ of mandamus in terms of correcting
errors). The opinions of the court during this period uniformly held that the specific
judgment to render in a case was an exercise of discretion which was not subject to
mandamus. See, e.g., Aycock, 94 Tex. at 376, 60 S.W. at 666 (noting that the rendering of a
judgment involved the exercise of discretion). It is rather obvious that any erroneous
rulings on entering a judgment could be the subject of appeal in the future. English courts
followed the same rule. See The King v. Justices of Middlesex, 106 Eng. Rep. 947, 947-48
(K.B. 1821) (stating that while King's Bench could issue mandamus to compel an inferior
court to proceed to trial and judgment, the court was unaware of any cases that would
permit it to direct that a particular judgment be entered).
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facts, the charges of the court, the verdict and judgment,-the
appellate court cannot adequately correct an error in the judgment
rendered in the trial court, it would seem
that a law providing for an
189
appeal is a mistake in jurisprudence.

Furthermore, mandamus clearly did not lie in the area of
correcting erroneous rulings or orders on motions or pleas that
were mere incidents of the normal trial process. For example, in
Little v. Morris,1 90 the Texas Supreme Court refused to issue a
writ of mandamus to compel a trial judge to reinstate a writ of
sequestration and to annul an order for restoration of the
possession of the premises pending a final resolution of the
trespass to try title suit involving the land in question. 19 1 First, the
court stated that the sequestration proceeding was not an
independent cause of action, but was merely auxiliary and in aid of
the trespass to try title suit. 192 Likewise, the court concluded that
the trial court's order quashing the writ of sequestration and
restoring the defendant to the property pending a final resolution
of the underlying action was collateral and incidental to the main
cause of action.' 9 3 Finally, the court held that mandamus would
not lie to correct a discretionary ruling of the trial court in the
conduct of the proceedings before it. 194 As one can see, during
189. Aycock, 94 Tex. at 377-78, 60 S.W. at 666 (observing that mandamus was not to
function as an alternative to an appeal or writ of error). A later court put it similarly: "A
writ of mandamus cannot be used to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error, and is
not the proper remedy by which to correct or reverse erroneous rulings of an inferior
tribunal, whether interlocutory or final." Robertson v. Work, 114 Tex. 461, 467, 270 S.W.
1006, 1008 (1925) (orig. proceeding).
190. Little v. Morris, 10 Tex. 263 (1853).
191. Id. at 266-67.
192. Id. at 266.
193. Id. Justice Wheeler stated that the ruling was not subject to appeal because it
was an interlocutory order over which the court had no jurisdiction. Id.
194. Little, 10 Tex. at 267 (stating that mandamus was not a form of appeal). The
decision of the court was premised on the grounds that the trial court's ruling involved the
exercise of discretion, and therefore the court had no authority to issue the writ. See id.
(explaining that mandamus "does not lie ... in a matter involving the exercise of
judgment"). Although the Little court cited no authority for this proposition, later
opinions of the Texas Supreme Court have continued to hold that mandamus would not
issue to control rulings made during the trial involving matters within the discretion of the
trial judge. See, e.g., Ewing v. Cohen, 63 Tex. 482, 485 (1885) (noting that the court was
unaware of any rule of law that would permit a court to control the discretion of an
inferior court on preliminary issues). In Ewing, Chief Justice Willie explained the
philosophical basis for the court's refusal to interfere with preliminary rulings of trial
courts in the following language:
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this formative period of mandamus jurisprudence the court
continued in the tradition of Bradley v. McCrabb while making no
serious departures from the common law history discussed above.

The appellee contends that the district court was merely compelling the
performance of a preliminary act. Be it so, yet we know of no rule of law that places
the judicial discretion of one court upon a preliminary question within the control of
another, though it may be of superior jurisdiction. It is not the point at which the
proceedings may have arrived that governs the right to the mandamus. It is the
nature of the question upon which the court is called to pass, and the character of
judgment it must render.
Id. at 484-85. While some cases dealing with the refusal of the supreme court to issue
mandamus in the case of incidental trial court rulings have followed Ewing and based their
decisions on the fact that the court was performing a mere discretionary duty which was
not the subject of mandamus relief, the large majority of cases have asserted that there
was an adequate remedy from the trial court's erroneous ruling by way of appeal following
the final disposition of the matter. See, e.g., Hammond v. Ashe, 103 Tex. 503, 504, 131
S.W. 539, 539 (1910) (orig. proceeding) (stating that generally appellate review, not
mandamus, was the method to revise rulings made during the trial); Steele v. Goodrich, 87
Tex. 401, 403, 28 S.W. 939. 939-40 (1894) (orig. proceeding) (noting that mandamus would
not lie when there was a remedy by way of appeal). The Texas Supreme Court has
continued to assert that it will not micromanage trial courts by interfering with incidental
rulings made during the trial of a case prior to final judgment. See, e.g., Polaris Inv. Mgmt.
Corp. v. Abascal, 892 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (stating that the court
has repeatedly refused to grant mandamus to correct incidental rulings of trial courts);
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Walker, 787 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. 1990) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (noting that mandamus is not ordinarily used to review
incidental trial rulings for which there is an adequate appellate remedy). The primary
reason given for denial of mandamus relief in these more recent cases has been that the
preliminary rulings were considered mere incidents in the normal trial process and that
there would be an adequate remedy by appeal for correction of any such erroneous rulings
upon entry of a final judgment. See, e.g., Bell Helicopter, 787 S.W.2d at 955 (denying a
petition for mandamus to correct an incidental ruling based on the availability of an
adequate remedy through appeal). In Pope v. Ferguson,445 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1969) (orig.
proceeding), Chief Justice Calvert stated that the court has uniformly held that it lacked
jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to correct or supervise courts in various incidental
rulings including:
(1) pleas to the jurisdiction, (2) pleas of privilege, (3) pleas in abatement, (4) motions
for summary judgment, (5) motions for instructed verdict, (6) motions for judgment
non obstante veredicto, (7) motions for new trial, and a myriad of interlocutory
orders and judgments; and, as to each, it might logically be argued that the petitioner
for the writ was entitled, as a matter of law, to the action sought to be compelled.
Id. at 954. He observed that the court's intervention in these incidental matters in
situations where there was an adequate remedy by appeal would not only destroy the
orderly trial proceedings, but would also make outmoded the fundamental principle of the
American legal system-trial and appeal. Id.
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C. The Maturationof Mandamus Jurisprudence,1910-1991
Shortly after the beginning of the twentieth century, two modest
shifts occurred in mandamus jurisprudence. One of these changes
openly expanded mandamus authority beyond purely ministerial
actions into the area of abuse of discretion that had first been
mentioned in the Arberry decision. 1 95 The other shift, initiated by
Chief Justice Cureton, opened the way for a more lenient
procedure for the granting of mandamus relief that remained
viable until finally questioned and limited by the decision in
Walker v. Packer.1 9 6 The first case of significance in these shifts in
focus was Wright v. Swayne.' 97 Wright involved a dispute over the
title to land in Tarrant County.' 9 8 The case was tried to juries on
three separate occasions, and on each occasion the jury answered
questions favorable to the defendants.' 9 9 Upon each occasion, the
plaintiffs filed a lengthy motion for new trial alleging errors by the
trial judge and attacked the verdict on factual insufficiency
grounds. z0 0 The trial court granted all three motions.2 0 ' The
order granting the third motion for new trial merely recited that
the court was fully satisfied that it should be granted.20 2 The
defendants sought mandamus relief to compel the judge to execute
the third judgment by naming commissioners to partition the

195. Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457, 472 (1851) (implying that mandamus would issue

to correct a gross abuse of discretion when there was no other adequate remedy at law).
196. Walker v. Packer, 827

S.W.2d 833, 842

(Tex. 1992)

(orig. proceeding)

(disapproving of previous cases to the extent that they relaxed the requirement of
inadequacy of a legal remedy, and "hold[ing] that an appellate remedy is not inadequate
merely because it may involve more expense or delay than obtaining [mandamus]").
197. Wright v. Swayne, 104 Tex. 440, 140 S.W. 221 (1911) (orig. proceeding). Justice

Ramsey, rather presumptuously assuming the importance of the case for the future of
mandamus jurisprudence, began his opinion with the following language:

We have concluded that under the case as made the petitioners are not entitled to
the writ asked. In view of the importance of the question, however, as well as out of

respect to learned counsel, we have thought it proper to write our views at some
length, and, in order to make the opinion of value as a precedent, as well as to make it

easily understood, it is necessary to give some detailed statement of the case, the
questions involved, and how they arose.
Id. at 441-42, 140 S.W. at 221.
198. Id. at 442, 140 S.W. at 221.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Wright, 104 Tex. at 442, 140 S.W. at 221.
202. Id. at 443, 140 S.W. at 222.
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property on the basis that the judge was prohibited from granting
the third motion by statute 20 3 and that his action in granting the
motion was unauthorized and therefore void.20 4 In response to
the application filed in the supreme court, the trial judge stated
that he had granted the third motion for new trial in part because
of an error that he had committed during the trial of the case in
admitting certain testimony that, in his opinion, materially
influenced the jury against the plaintiff.20 5 Therefore, the judge
asserted, his action in granting the new trial was not in
contravention to the statute prohibiting the granting of more than
two new trials because he had made an error of law.2 0 6 In
analyzing the issue, the court noted that if the action of the court
were void and of no effect:
[I]t is not doubted or denied that petitioners would be entitled to the
due execution of the judgment in their favor, and, if the court should
wilfully refuse to execute its own judgments according to their true
intent and effect, we would have the authority and it would be our
duty to direct it to proceed to execute the judgment and sentence of
the law. 20 7
In effect, the court was stating that if the trial court entered an
order that was void, the trial court would move outside its
protected area of discretion and enter the area of pure ministerial
203. Id. at 442-43, 140 S.W. at 221-22 (observing that article 1372 of the Revised
Statutes provided that "not more than two new trials shall be granted to either party in the
same cause, except when the jury have been guilty of some misconduct or have erred in
matter of law"). Article 1372 was a codification of the original provision enacted in 1846
and was subsequently modified several times before being repealed in 1941. Act approved
May 13, 1846, 1st Leg., R.S., § 109, 1846 Tex. Gen. Laws 363, 392, reprinted in 2 H.P.N.
GAMMEL, THE LAWS OF TEXAS 1822-1897, at 1669, 1698 (Austin, Gammel Book Co.
1898), repealed by Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 25, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201,
amended by Act of Mar. 5, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., ch. 53, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 66. The
purpose of the 1939 act was to authorize the Supreme Court of Texas to promulgate rules
of practice for the courts in the state. Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 25, 1939
Tex. Gen. Laws 201. The amendment related to interim rulemaking authority of the
supreme court for rules prior to the effective date of the act, September 1, 1941. Act of
Mar. 5, 1941, 47th Leg., R.S., ch. 53, 1941 Tex. Gen. Laws 66. This particular restriction on
the number of new trials that can be granted is presently found in Rule 326 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. TEX. R. CIV. P. 326 (possessing the unambiguous title "Not
More Than Two").
204. Wright, 104 Tex. at 442, 140 S.W. at 221.
205. Id. at 443, 140 S.W. at 222.
206. Wright v. Swayne, 104 Tex. 440, 443, 140 S.W. 221, 222 (1911) (orig.
proceeding).
207. Id. at 444, 140 S.W. at 222.
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action.2" 8 In this area, the trial court would have had only one
way to act-to deny the motion.20 9 In such a situation, mandamus
would lie. 210 However, the supreme court found that the trial
court's granting of a new trial was not in contravention of the
statute, but involved a matter of discretion which was not subject
to mandamus from the court. 2 11 The significance of this case for
the future of mandamus jurisprudence involved the obiter dictum
concerning the supreme court's opinion that if the trial court's
order had been void, mandamus would have issued in this case.21 2
In 1919, shortly before Justice Cureton began to sit on the court,
Justice Greenwood wrote an opinion outlining the parameters of
what was meant by an adequate remedy. In Gulf, Colorado &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Muse,2 1 3 the court granted mandamus

commanding an inferior court judge to enforce a final judgment
that he had previously rendered.21 4 In Muse, a verdict had been
returned, but before a judgment was prepared and signed the trial
court granted a new trial on the basis of a motion filed by the
plaintiff.2 15 The defendant filed a motion for rehearing and, at a
later date, the trial court set aside its previous order granting a new
208. See id. (explaining that the Texas Supreme Court could issue mandamus to an
inferior court only to compel performance of a ministerial act).
209. See id. (noting that mandamus would issue in the event that the trial court
granted a void motion).
210. Id.
211. Wright, 104 Tex. at 443-47, 140 S.W. at 222-24. The basis for the court's holding
was twofold. First, although the trial court's order was silent as to the basis for granting
the motion for new trial, the supreme court asserted that the presumption should be that
the court followed the law and would not have granted the motion improperly. Id. at 44647, 140 S.W. at 224. Furthermore, the judge's response to the mandamus application
satisfied the supreme court that the judge had not granted the motion for an impermissible
reason. Id. at 447, 140 S.W. at 224.
212. Id. at 444, 140 S.W. at 222. The Texas Supreme Court has continued to hold
that mandamus will issue in the case of the entry of a void order. For example, in Buttery
v. Betts, 422 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding), the trial court granted a motion for
a new trial after its plenary power had expired. Id. at 151. The supreme court
conditionally issued a writ of mandamus holding that an appeal following a retrial on the
merits would not be an adequate remedy because relators were entitled to a final
judgment "without establishing that right after a needless retrial and an appeal." Id.; see
also In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (holding that there
is no adequate remedy by appeal when a court enters a new trial after its plenary power
has expired).
213. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Muse, 109 Tex. 352, 207 S.W. 897 (1919) (orig.
proceeding).
214. Id. at 362, 207 S.W. at 900.
215. Id. at 358, 207 S.W. at 897-98.
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trial and finally entered a judgment on the original verdict." 6 The
plaintiff then requested the case be set for trial.2 1 7 When his
request was denied, he sought mandamus relief from the court of
appeals. 2 18 The court of appeals held that the order of the trial
court setting aside the granting of the new trial was void and
granted mandamus commanding the judge to proceed to trial in
the cause. 2 1 9 The defendant then petitioned the supreme court
for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to enforce his
judgment and not to set the case for trial. 2 2 0 Although the
supreme court held that the order of the trial court was not
void, 2 2 ' the court still granted the mandamus.2 2 2 The plaintiff
argued that mandamus by the supreme court to enforce the
reinstated judgment was not necessary since the defendant could
2 23
appeal any adverse judgment following a retrial of the case.
The court rejected that argument forcefully:
For it has been the law of Texas since Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam,
507, that the writ of mandamus "will not only issue, in cases where
the party having a specific legal right has no other legal operative
remedy, but, where the other modes of redress are inadequate or
tedious, the writ will be awarded." Not only would the remedy to
defendant of appeal and writ of error, after another trial, be
manifestly tedious, but such remedy would also be inadequate; for it
is the very essence of defendant's right that it is entitled not to have
to respond further to plaintiff's cause of action than by payment of
his judgment. 2 2 4
The court was clearly articulating that an adequate legal remedy
was one that protected the very right that the party was legally

216. Id. at 358-59, 207 S.W. at 898.

217. Id. at 359, 207 S.W. at 898.
218. Muse, 109 Tex. at 359, 207 S.W. at 898.
219. Id. at 359-60, 207 S.W. at 898. The court of appeals' opinion was not reported,
but is briefly referred to in the court's opinion. Id. The court of appeals determined that
the trial court's order vacating its previous order granting a new trial was void because it
had been entered following the expiration of the trial court's jurisdiction over the case. Id.
220. Id.
221. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Muse, 109 Tex. 352, 361-62, 207 S.W. 897, 899
(1919) (orig. proceeding).

The court was of the opinion that the order vacating the

granting of the new trial was entered at a time when the trial court retained jurisdiction of
the matter and therefore was not void. Id. at 361-62, 207 S.W. at 899.
222. Id. at 362, 207 S.W. at 899-900.
223. Id. at 362, 207 S.W. at 900.
224. Id.
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entitled to have enforced, and that the party should not be
required to undertake tedious methods to achieve its acknowledged legal right.22 5 Accordingly, the defendant in Muse was
entitled to have the judgment enforced. 226 The fact that upon a
new trial he might win or lose, and in the case of losing could
appeal, was not a relevant inquiry in determining whether to have
the judgment rendered against him enforced.2 27 Moreover, such
remedies were not adequate under the Muse court's reasoning, for
the party the effective relief of enforcement of
they did not give
2 28
his legal right.

225. Muse, 109 Tex. at 362, 207 S.W. at 900 (citing Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504,
506 (Tex. 1843)).
226. Id. In a subsequent case involving the same railroad, the commission of appeals
relied upon Muse in issuing a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to enter a
judgment on a verdict. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Canty, 115 Tex. 537, 543-45,285
S.W. 296, 299-300 (1926) (orig. proceeding). In Canty, a verdict was returned finding a
defendant "guiltless" on the only ground of negligence submitted by the court; however,
the trial court granted a new trial claiming an irreconcilable conflict in the verdict. Id. at
545, 285 S.W. at 300. The commission of appeals held that there was no conflict, and
therefore mandamus would issue to compel the judge to perform his ministerial function
of entering a judgment on the verdict. Id. Citing Muse, the commission of appeals noted
that the essence of relator's right could only be protected by the entry of a judgment in his
favor. Id.; see also Cortimeglia v. Davis, 116 Tex. 412, 415-16, 292 S.W. 875, 876 (1927)
(orig. proceeding) (holding that mandamus would issue to compel a trial court to enter a
judgment on a verdict where the answers were not conflicting). These opinions rarely
discussed the adequacy of the remedy of appeal for the simple reason that appeal was not
available from the granting of a new trial because such order was an interlocutory order
from which appeal was not authorized. In addition, the discretion of a trial court to grant
a motion for new trial or to vacate verdicts was broad. See, e.g., Anchor v. Martin, 116
Tex. 409, 411, 292 S.W. 877, 877 (1927) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the granting of a
motion to set aside a verdict involved discretion and was not subject to mandamus). In
Johnson v. Court of Civil Appeals for the Seventh Supreme District of Texas, 162 Tex. 613,
350 S.W.2d 330 (1961), the court stated that there had been only two instances where an
appellate court of the state had issued a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to set
aside an order granting a motion for new trial:
(1) When the trial court's order was wholly void as where it was not entered in the
term in which the trial was had; and
(2) Where the trial court has granted a new trial specifying in the written order the
sole ground that the jury's answers to special issues were conflicting.
Id. at 615, 305 S.W.2d at 331; see also Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916,
918 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing the two instances in which appellate courts
in Texas had interfered with a trial court's granting of a new trial).
227. See Muse, 109 Tex. at 362, 207 S.W. at 900 (rejecting the argument advanced by
plaintiff that a new trial and a possible subsequent appeal provided an adequate legal
remedy).
228. Id. (expressing the defendant's right as the right "not to have to respond further
to plaintiff's cause of action than by payment of his judgment").
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Six years later, Chief Justice Cureton took his first opportunity
to explain the parameters of what was meant by an adequate legal
remedy. In Yett v. Cook,2 2 9 the district court had, at the request
of the plaintiff, entered a writ of mandamus compelling certain
individuals in their official capacities to call an election "for the
purpose of electing five councilmen, who [would] constitute the
city council of the city of Austin."' 23 0 On the same day that the
judgment was entered in the mandamus proceeding, the plaintiff
obtained a temporary injunction compelling obedience by the
defendants to the mandamus. 2 3 1 The mandamus order was then
duly appealed and properly superseded;2 3 2 however, the
injunction entered by the trial court had the effect of prohibiting
the losing parties from exercising their rights to suspend the
judgment through supersedeas bond pending appeal. 2 3 3 The
losing parties then sought mandamus relief from the Texas
Supreme Court to compel the trial court to stay the injunction
pending a conclusion of their appeal.2 3 4 In giving the opinion of
the court, Chief Justice Cureton summarized the mandamus
jurisprudence of Texas.2 3 5 He first noted that mandamus relief
was a method by which lower courts could be supervised by
superior courts. 2 3 6 It was at this point that he quoted from a
leading treatise of the day that outlined the general rules of
mandamus jurisprudence as follows:
While a writ of mandamus will not as a general rule issue to
review an exercise of judicial discretion, it may be employed to
compel an inferior tribunal to act or to exercise its discretion,
229. Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 175, 268 S.W.715 (1925) (orig. proceeding).
230. Id. at 179, 268 S.W. at 716.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 189-90, 268 S.W. at 721 (stating that in its supervisory role the court has
the power to compel a lower court to preserve the right of a party to appeal).
234. Yett, 115 Tex. at 178, 268 S.W. at 716.
235. Id. at 178-91, 268 S.W. at 716-21.
236. Id. at 185-87, 268 S.W. at 719 (citing examples from other states and leading
American treatises on the use of the writ of mandamus to control the actions and
judgments of lower courts). Chief Justice Cureton's reliance upon the authority of other
states and leading American treatises was explained by his observation that the provisions
relating to mandamus in the Texas Constitution and statutes were "but declaratory of and
are to be construed in the light of the common law." Id. at 184, 268 S.W. at 718. The
common law adopted in Texas was the "English common law as declared by the courts of
the various states of the United States." S. Pac. Co. v. Porter, 160 Tex. 329, 334, 331
S.W.2d 42, 45 (1960).
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although the particular method of acting or the manner in which the
discretion shall be exercised will not be controlled. But as a general
rule it will not issue for this purpose where there is a remedy by
appeal or other method of review. In some cases, however,
mandamus may be employed to correct the errors of inferior
tribunals and to prevent a failure of justice or irreparable injury
where there is a clear right, and there is an absence of any other
adequate remedy; and it may also be employed to prevent an abuse
of discretion, or an act outside of the exercise of discretion, or to
correct an arbitrary action which does not amount to the exercise of
discretion.2 3 7
The chief justice also wrote that the writ could issue in cases
'2 3 8
where the other "modes of redress are inadequate or tedious."
He continued his discussion by listing the various situations where

mandamus had been granted by the Texas Supreme Court during
its long history. 23 9 His opinion for the court concluded that in this
case, the court had the authority to issue mandamus because the
relators had no effective remedy by appeal, as they were prevented
by the injunction from the exercise of that remedy.2 4 0 While the
Yett decision was true to the existing Texas authorities, the dictum
237. Yett, 115 Tex. at 185. 268 S.W. at 719 (emphasis added) (citing 26 CYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 190 (William Mack ed., Am. Law Book Co. 1907)). However,
at this time the court had not exercised its mandamus authority in situations of "abuse of
discretion" or "arbitrary action." Earlier courts had by way of dictum implied that the
court had such power, but as yet it had not been exercised. See, e.g., Meyer v. Carolan, 9
Tex. 250, 255 (1852) (Wheeler, J., concurring) (opining that mandamus would issue in the
case of a public officer committing a gross abuse of discretion when no other adequate
remedy at law was available); Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457, 472 (1851) (implying that in
cases of gross abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy at law the court might issue a
mandamus); see also Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 51, 291 S.W.2d 677, 682-83 (1956)
(orig. proceeding) (noting that as of 1956, there had been no cases where the writ had
been issued by the court involving matters of discretion).
238. Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 175, 188, 268 S.W. 715, 720 (1925) (orig. proceeding)
(citing Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504, 507 (Tex. 1843)).
239. Id. at 186-88, 268 S.W. at 719-20. The opinion listed various cases in which
mandamus had issued: to compel a court to proceed to trial and judgment; to enter a
judgment on a valid verdict; to enforce a judgment which had not been properly
superseded; to compel a judge to vacate a void order granting a new trial and to enforce
the judgment; and to compel a court to perform a legal duty. Id. The opinion further
noted that the supreme court possessed the authority to issue mandamus to vacate a
district court's entry of a writ of mandamus where such was proper under the law. Id. at
189, 268 S.W.at 720-21.
240. Id. at 189-90, 268 S.W. at 721 (explaining that the court should exercise its
discretion to issue the writ in this case to "prevent a failure of justice" (quoting 18 RULING
CASE LAW Mandamus § 15 (William M. McKinney & Burdett A. Rich eds., 1917))).

2007]

GRANTING MANDAMUS RELIEF IN TEXAS

concerning arbitrary action was only awaiting the right case for
implementation into true precedent.
Having explained the state of mandamus jurisprudence in Texas,
Chief Justice Cureton next undertook to expand the role of
mandamus in supervising lower courts. Cleveland v. Ward2 4 '
began as a simple suit filed in district court in Johnson County
seeking "the cancellation of certain notes ... [and] the deed of

trust securing them," and to remove the cloud on the title to
certain land.2 42 This first suit was followed by a second suit filed
by the defendants in district court in Dallas County seeking to
recover on the very same notes and for foreclosure of the deed of
trust.2 4 3 What ensued thereafter was a tangle of various orders,
injunctions, and competing applications for mandamus and
prohibition in the Dallas and Fort Worth courts of appeal.2 4 4 The
immediate issue before the supreme court was the mandamus
proceeding filed by the original plaintiffs in the Johnson County
241. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063 (1926) (orig. proceeding),
overruled by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). While
Cleveland is generally associated with its holding concerning the doctrine of dominant
jurisdiction, the primary focus of this article will be on the mandamus aspect of the case.
The court's holding in regard to the dominant jurisdiction aspect of the case is still the law.
See, e.g., In re SWEPI, L.P., 85 S.W.3d 800, 809 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)
("[M]andamus relief is appropriate when one court interferes with another court's
[dominant] jurisdiction[ over a case]."); Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex. 1974)
(orig. proceeding) (holding that when one court attempts to interfere with a prior filed
action in another court, the supreme court is authorized to issue a mandamus to resolve
the conflict of jurisdiction).
242. Cleveland, 116 Tex. at 8-9, 285 S.W. at 1066.
243. Id. at 9, 285 S.W. at 1066.
244. Id. at 8-16, 285 S.W. at 1066-69. The opinion of the court described the
stalemate that existed as follows:
The parties plaintiff in the Johnson county case cannot proceed in that case without
violating an injunction issued by the district court of Dallas county; the judge cannot
proceed without violating a writ of prohibition issued by the Court of Civil Appeals at
Dallas, nor refuse to proceed without violating a mandamus issued by the Court of
Civil Appeals at Fort Worth. The Dallas county district court cannot proceed to try
that case, nor can the plaintiffs in the case proceed with it without violating an
injunction of the district court of Johnson county; and the judge of the Dallas county
district court cannot proceed without violating a writ of prohibition issued by the Fort
Worth Court of Civil Appeals, nor refuse to proceed without violating a mandamus
issued by the Court of Civil Appeals at Dallas. It is impossible for either of the trial
courts or any litigant to do anything in the causes pending in the respective trial
courts without being in danger of contempt, either of a trial court, of a Court of Civil
Appeals, or both.
Id. at 15, 285 S.W. at 1069.
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case to compel that district judge to proceed to trial.24 5 The court
began its discussion of the mandamus issue in the case by noting
that it clearly had the authority to require a district judge to
proceed to trial and judgment 24 6 subject to the "rule that
mandamus does not ordinarily issue when an adequate remedy by
appeal exists."' 2 47 However, there was clearly no remedy from the
judge's refusal to proceed to trial in Johnson County; the relators'
ability to appeal from the order of the Dallas County district judge
overruling relators' plea in abatement and injunction was
"inadequate and not commensurate with the relief to which the
relators here are entitled."'2 48 In explaining the type of relief that
relators were entitled to, the court asserted that the remedy
needed to provide "relief on the very subject-matter of the
application, equally convenient, beneficial, and effective" as that
of mandamus relief.2 49 Then, to emphasize these obiter dicta,
Justice Cureton cited extensively from an authoritative American
treatise which he noted "correctly states the rule":
In order that the existence of another remedy shall constitute a
bar to relief by mandamus, such other remedy must not only be an
adequate remedy in the general sense of the term, but it must be
specific and appropriate to the circumstances of the particular case.
It must be such a remedy as is calculated to afford relief upon the
245. Id. at 8, 285 S.W. at 1065.
246. Cleveland, 116 Tex. at 13, 285 S.W. at 1068 (citing Texas statutory as well as case
law authority).
247. Id. at 14, 285 S.W. at 1068 (emphasis added).
248. Id. The court gave no explanation for this observation, although none was
needed. Even if the relator had been successful on the various appeals, the initial trial
court would have still been under writs of prohibition and mandamus not to proceed.
Thus, the court concluded that mandamus should issue because the right of appeal was
clearly inadequate. Id. As a practical matter, while the appellate court would have had
jurisdiction to hear the appeal from the grant of the temporary injunction, it could not
have heard the appeal concerning the plea in abatement until the final judgment in the
case. See V.D. Anderson Co. v. Young, 128 Tex. 631, 638, 101 S.W.2d 798, 801 (1937)
(orig. proceeding) (noting that the order on a plea in abatement is an interlocutory order
not subject to appeal until entry of a final judgment in the case): McFarland v. Hammond,
106 Tex. 579, 580, 173 S.W. 645, 645 (1915) (recognizing the statutory authority to appeal
from interlocutory orders granting temporary injunctions).
249. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 14, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (1926) (orig. proceeding),
overruled by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Justice
Cureton was clearly taking this opportunity to import the common law directly into this
case, so that it might become precedent in the future. See, e.g., The King v. Severn & Wye
Ry. Co., 106 Eng. Rep. 501, 502 (K.B. 1819) (noting that the alternative specific and legal
remedy had to be "equally convenient, beneficial, and effect[ive]").
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very subject of the controversy. For, if it is not adequate to afford
the party aggrieved the particular right which the law accords him,
mandamus will lie, notwithstanding the existence of such other
remedy....
The remedy at law which will operate as a bar to mandamus
must generally be such a remedy as will enforce a right or the
performance of a duty. A remedy cannot be said to be fully
adequate to meet the justice and necessities of a case, unless it
reaches the end intended and actually compels a performance of the
remedy within the meaning
duty in question, and is not an adequate
2 50
of the rule under consideration.

In just a matter of lines, Chief Justice Cureton was able to
incorporate the entire English common law "rule" concerning the
nature of an adequate remedy-necessary to trump the issuance of
mandamus relief-as understood in the United States into the
jurisprudence of the State of Texas. What is of interest about the

opinion is that none of this "new jurisprudence" (or, more
correctly, incorporation of common law) was necessary for a
resolution of the case, as the court had already held that an appeal
was not an adequate remedy in this case. 2 5 '
Notwithstanding the broad language in Cleveland, its obiter
dicta were not used for several decades as a window for an
expansion of mandamus authority.2 5 2 However, prior to that
250. Cleveland, 116 Tex. at 14-15, 285 S.W. at 1068 (quoting 2 THOMAS CARL
SPELLING, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IN EQUITY AND AT LAW § 1375

(1893)).
251. Id. at 14, 285 S.W. at 1068 (noting the right to appeal from the two orders was
"inadequate and not commensurate with the relief to which the relators here are
entitled").
252. In fact, until Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 190, 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959) (orig.
proceeding), overruled by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding), no supreme court opinion had relied upon the more lenient test in
Cleveland-that the other remedy had to be "equally convenient, beneficial, and effective
as mandamus"-for the granting of mandamus relief. There was, however, one Texas
Commission of Appeals decision whose opinion was adopted by the Texas Supreme Court
that used this more lenient standard. See Way v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 119 Tex. 419,
430, 29 S.W.2d 1067, 1072 (1930) (orig. proceeding) (noting that the Cleveland case was
one of the outstanding opinions in Texas jurisprudence). During this thirty-plus year
period of time, several mandamus cases came before the court. The court uniformly
granted mandamus relief in those few cases where there was not an adequate or effective
remedy by appeal. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Adams, 154 Tex. 448, 456, 279 S.W.2d 308,
314 (1955) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to compel a trial judge to set the
amount of security in a condemnation case as required by statute); Stakes v. Rogers, 139
Tex. 650, 651-52, 165 S.W.2d 81, 82 (1942) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to
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time, the court did apply the dictum first announced in Arberry25 3
and later in Yett 254 to expand mandamus jurisprudence to a new
type of case. It had always been clear that in the proper case
mandamus would apply when a court or official failed to perform a
ministerial act,25 5 but now the court began to apply it to situations
referred to as abuses of discretion. While it was clearly understood that mandamus would issue to compel the exercise of
discretion, this power was not viewed as including the power to
compel the exercise of discretion one way or the other.25 6
Until 1956, in the case of Womack v. Berry,2 57 the Texas
Supreme Court had not issued a writ of mandamus to correct an
compel a district judge to transfer a hearing to another county as required by law). In the
same vein, the court uniformly denied mandamus relief when there was an effective
remedy by way of appeal or other means. See, e.g., Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 367,
190 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1945) (denying mandamus relief in a case where a statute authorized
the filing of suit to challenge certain tax payments); Manion v. Lockhart, 131 Tex. 175. 180,
114 S.W.2d 216, 219 (1938) (denying mandamus relief where the escheat statute provided
for the filing of suit to recover escheated funds, and such remedy was complete and
effective); Ben C. Jones & Co. v. Wheeler, 121 Tex. 128, 129-30, 45 S.W.2d 957, 958 (1932)
(refusing mandamus when the relief sought could have been gained through an appeal of
the trial court's judgment).
253. Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457, 472 (1851) (implying that mandamus would issue
to correct a gross abuse of discretion when there was no other adequate remedy at law).
254. Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 175, 185, 268 S.W. 715, 719 (1925) (orig. proceeding)
(citing 26 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 190 (William Mack ed., Am. Law

Book Co. 1907)) (explaining that mandamus might issue in the case of an arbitrary action
or an abuse of discretion).
255. Arberry, 6 Tex. at 464-65 (explaining that mandamus would issue to compel the
performance of ministerial duties that left nothing to discretion); Comm'r of the Gen.
Land Office v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471, 478 (1849) (stating that it was well settled that
mandamus would not issue to a government official unless the duty to be performed was
ministerial).
256. See, e.g., Yett, 115 Tex. at 185, 268 S.W. at 719 (noting that mandamus would not
lie to compel "the particular method of acting or the manner in which the discretion shall
be exercised" (quoting 26 CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND PROCEDURE 190 (William Mack

ed., Am. Law Book Co. 1907))); Aycock v. Clark, 94 Tex. 375, 376, 60 S.W. 665,666 (1901)
(orig. proceeding) (declaring that mandamus could compel a court to trial and judgment
but could not dictate what judgment should be entered); Arberry, 6 Tex. at 472
(commenting that mandamus would not lie where an inferior tribunal has exercised its
discretionary authority in rendering a decision). Although it was clear that mandamus
would lie to compel ministerial duties and would not lie in those cases involving discretion,
there was still the difficult task of determining whether a particular act or duty was
ministerial or subject to discretion. See Arberry, 6 Tex. at 467 (defining an act or duty as
ministerial if the "law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision
and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment" (quoting
Comm'r of the Gen. Land Office, 5 Tex. at 479)).
257. Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 291 S.W.2d 677 (1956) (orig. proceeding).
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action of an official or court in the exercise of discretion. 2 58 In
Womack, the relator filed suit claiming the right as the successor

trustee to take possession of and manage the assets left in trust for
three minors under a will. 2 5 9 The trust beneficiaries challenged
the relator's right to possession of the assets. 2 60 One of the
258. Id. at 51, 291 S.W. at 683. The court specifically stated that it found no Texas
case in which a writ of mandamus had been issued to correct an act of discretion by a trial
judge or official. Id. However, there had in fact been at least one earlier decision wherein
a writ of mandamus was issued to compel a trial judge to modify a discovery order that
was excessively broad and determined by the court to have been an abuse of discretion. S.
Bag & Burlap Co. v. Boyd, 120 Tex. 418, 431, 38 S.W.2d 565, 570 (1931) (orig.
proceeding). The Womack court noted that although the writ had never issued for this
purpose, several cases had "recognize[d] the exception." Womack, 156 Tex. at 51, 291
S.W.2d at 683 (failing to allude to the fact that Yett had also recognized the exception).
The various cases cited by the court stated the proposition in a complete form as follows:
"A writ of mandamus will lie to correct the action of a trial judge where he acts in abuse of
his discretion, or in violation of his clear duty under the law, and there is no adequate
remedy by appeal." City of Houston v. Adams, 154 Tex. 448, 456-57, 279 S.W.2d 308, 314
(1955) (orig. proceeding) (emphasis added) (quoting Stakes v. Rogers, 139 Tex. 650, 65152, 165 S.W.2d 81, 82 (1942) (orig. proceeding)); see also Arberry, 6 Tex. at 472 (stating by
way of dictum that mandamus might issue in a case of gross abuse of discretion "where
there was no other adequate remedy provided by law"). It appears clear from these
earlier cases that an abuse of discretion occurred when the facts and circumstances clearly
established a legal right of the party to the performance of the duty by the court or the
official, such that all discretion vanished and the performance became ministerial. See.,
e.g., Terrell v. Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 547, 31 S.W. 631, 635 (1895) (orig. proceeding) (stating
that if an official misapplied the law depriving a party "of an unquestioned legal right" and
no other adequate remedy existed, then mandamus would issue). Thus, what starts off as
an exercise of discretion can become a clear duty to act when the facts and circumstances
come into play. See id. (describing the circumstances under which mandamus will issue to
correct an abuse of discretion). Much later, the court in Johnson v. Fourth Court of
Appeals put it in these terms:
As we wrote in Jones v. Strayhorn: "When it is once decided that a trial judge
exercising a 'discretionary' authority has but one course to follow and one way to
decide then the discretionary power is effectually destroyed and the rule which
purports to grant such power is effectively repealed."
In order to find an abuse of discretion, the reviewing court must conclude that the
facts and circumstances of the case extinguish any discretion in the matter.
Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917-18 (Tex. 1985) (orig.
proceeding) (quoting Jones v. Strayhorn, 159 Tex. 421, 428, 321 S.W.2d 290, 295 (1959))
(citation omitted). For a discussion on the development of the use of the writ of
mandamus to supervise discretionary decisions by trial courts see David W. Holman &
Byron C. Keeling, Entering the Thicket? Mandamus Review of Texas District Court
Witness Disclosure Orders, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 365, 389-94 (1991). Holman and Keeling
note that the Womack court's formulation of an abuse of discretion standard "signal[ed] a
significant expansion in the availability of mandamus review." Id. at 393.
259. Womack, 156 Tex. at 46-49, 291 S.W.2d at 680-81.
260. Id. at 48-49, 291 S.W.2d at 681. Under the terms of the testamentary trust, the
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beneficiaries, having recently volunteered to serve in the military,
moved to stay the proceedings under the provisions of the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 until he had
completed four years of service. 2 6 1 The relator responded,
requesting that the stay be denied, or alternatively that the court
order a separate trial on the claims of the beneficiary seeking the
stay, and stay only those proceedings. 2 62 The trial court granted
the stay as to all proceedings and denied the relator's motion for a
separate trial.2 63 Reviewing the facts and circumstances of the
case, 2 6 4 the supreme court determined that the relator was
entitled to the separate trial and that the trial court had a duty to
order the separate trial, as there was no room for discretion in this
matter.2 65 In the words of the supreme court, the trial court's
three beneficiaries would receive their portion of the trust assets when they reached the
age of twenty-one. Id. at 46-47, 291 S.W.2d at 679. The oldest of the beneficiaries turned
twenty-one the day the suit was filed. Id. at 46, 291 S.W.2d at 680.
261. Id. at 45, 48, 291 S.W.2d at 679, 681. The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act
of 1940 provided that servicemen could under certain circumstances obtain a stay of
litigation in which they were a party. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, ch.
888, § 201, 54 Stat. 1178, 1181 (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. § 522 (Supp. IV 2004)).
The beneficiary had filed a cross action against some of the other defendants seeking the
recovery of certain property and damages from the relator. Womack, 156 Tex. at 47-48,
291 S.W.2d at 680-81.
262. Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 49, 291 S.W.2d 677, 681 (1956) (orig.
proceeding). Following the filing of the application for stay, the relator dismissed any
claims he had against the beneficiary who had filed for the stay. Id. at 48, 291 S.W.2d at
681. However, that dismissal did not affect the beneficiary's claims against the relator.
See TEX. R. Civ. P. 162 (stating that the nonsuit shall not prejudice an adverse party's
claims against the party taking the nonsuit).
263. Womack, 156 Tex. at 49, 291 S.W.2d at 681. Relator requested a writ of
mandamus from the court of appeals, but the court denied the application in an
unpublished opinion. Id.
264. Id. at 45-52, 291 S.W.2d at 679-83. Based on the court's discussion, the most
significant facts were evidently that the relator was not seeking any affirmative relief from
the beneficiary, the beneficiary was not disputing the relator's right to be trustee, and none
of the claims or issues of the beneficiary would be compromised or determined in the
separate trial of the relator's action. See id. at 51-52, 291 S.W.2d at 683 (examining those
facts in considering whether to grant mandamus).
265. Id. at 51, 291 S.W.2d at 683. The court put it in these words:
When all of the facts and circumstances of the case unquestionably require a separate
trial to prevent manifest injustice, and there is no fact or circumstance supporting or
tending to support a contrary conclusion, and the legal rights of the parties will not be
prejudiced thereby, there is no room for the exercise of discretion. The rule then is
peremptory in operation and imposes upon the court a duty to order a separate trial.
Womack, 156 Tex. at 51, 291 S.W.2d at 683. This rule concerning the ministerial duty to
grant separate trials in certain situations remains the rule today. See, e.g., In re Ethyl
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refusal to grant a separate trial constituted "a clear abuse of
discretion" and a "violation of a plain legal duty. ' '" 66 As if in
passing, the court then noted that the wrong to the relator could
not be remedied later by appeal.2 6 7
Womack clearly established the possibility of a new area of
mandamus relief in situations where a trial court committed an
abuse of discretion. 2 68 But consistent with historical precedent,
mandamus would issue in such a case only if the remedy by appeal
was inadequate. 2 6 9

The question of when an appeal was

inadequate was left to later cases to explain. The Womack court
clearly viewed the right and duty of the relator to administer the
property left to the minors as a substantial right.2 7 ° It was implicit
in Womack that, absent mandamus relief, the relator's right would
be lost.

2 71

Shortly after Womack, in hey v. Hughes,2 7 2 the court-citing
Womack-explained that mandamus "[i]nterference is justified
only when parties stand to lose their substantial rights."' 2 73 In ley,
Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Tex. 1998) (quoting Womack, 156 Tex. at 51, S.W.2d at 683,
for the proposition that in certain instances a trial court possesses no discretion to deny a
motion for separate trials).
266. Womack, 156 Tex. at 51, 291 S.W.2d at 683.
267. Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 51, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (1956) (orig.
proceeding). The court later explained that because the stay was for the four-year period
of military service of the beneficiary, by the time the stay was lifted and the case tried, the
two remaining minor beneficiaries would have reached majority and consequently the
relator would be denied "a judicial determination of his right and duty to administer the
property left in trust for the minors." Id. at 52, 291 S.W.2d at 683. The dissenting opinion,
authored by Justice Griffin and joined by Justice Garwood, asserted that the action of the
trial judge fell within the trial court's area of discretion, and thus mandamus relief should
not have been granted. Id. at 54-55, 291 S.W.2d at 685 (Griffin, J., dissenting). However,
the dissent was also of the opinion that if the action of the trial judge had involved fraud or
was purely arbitrary or without reason, then the court would have had the authority to
grant mandamus relief. Id. at 55, 291 S.W.2d at 685 (citing King v. Guerra, 1 S.W.2d 373,
376 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, writ ref'd)).
268. See id. at 51, 291 S.W.2d at 683 (majority opinion) (stating that mandamus will
issue to remedy a clear abuse of discretion).
269. See Womack, 156 Tex. at 51, 291 S.W.2d at 683 (reasoning that mandamus will
issue if it appears that injustice would result which cannot be remedied on appeal).
270. See id. at 52, 291 S.W.2d at 683 (noting that the relator's right to a judicial
determination on the administration of the trust property would be lost without a separate
trial).
271. See id. at 51, 291 S.W.2d at 683 (stating that mandamus relief will issue if
injustice resulting from the court's abuse of discretion cannot be remedied on appeal).
272. Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 (1958) (orig. proceeding).
273. Id. at 368, 311 S.W.2d at 652.
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following a trial the jury returned an incomplete verdict by failing
to answer three of the damage questions.2 7 4 The defendant
moved for a mistrial, but instead the trial court entered an
interlocutory order on liability against the defendant and set a
separate trial on damages. 2 7 5 The relator sought mandamus relief
to compel the trial court to set aside the order for separate trial
and to declare a mistrial in the underlying suit. 2 7 6 The supreme
court held that the trial court had no authority under Rule 174(b)
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to order a separate trial of
liability and damages issues in a personal injury case.2 7 7
Furthermore, the court assumed under the facts of the case that
since the jury verdict was incomplete in that the damages issues
were left unanswered, the entry of a mistrial was a mere
ministerial act.2 7 8 However, the court noted that an appeal of the
matter upon the conclusion of a separate trial and entry of a final
27 9
judgment would be a "plain, adequate and complete remedy,"
274. Id. at 363-64, 311 S.W.2d at 649.
275. Id. at 363, 311 S.W.2d at 649.

276. Id. at 364, 311 S.W.2d at 649.
277. ley, 158 Tex. at 366, 311 S.W.2d at 651. This is still the rule in Texas with at
least one exception. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 174(b) (containing the same language as quoted
and analyzed by the hey court). The exception, as adopted by the court in Transportation
Insurance Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994), permits bifurcated trials in the case of
punitive damages. Id. at 30.
278. Hey, 158 Tex. at 367, 311 S.W.2d at 652. In discussing the issue, the court noted
that it had found no case in which a writ of mandamus had issued to compel a court to
order a mistrial after a jury had returned an incomplete verdict. Id. Of course, this was
because the alternative to a mistrial would have been the entry of a judgment on the
verdict, which would have to be corrected on appeal if erroneous. Id. The potential
problem in Hey was that the entry of the final judgment would have to wait until after the
trial of the damages issues. Id.
279. Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 367-68, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958) (orig.
proceeding). The dissent, authored by Justice Smith, disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the "relator ha[d] an adequate remedy by appeal." Id. at 368-70, 311
S.W.2d at 652-54 (Smith, J., dissenting). His position was that the supreme court's
constitutional authority to issue mandamus was independent of any analysis of whether
there was a remedy by way of appeal. Id. at 370, 311 S.W.2d at 653-54 (stating that once
the majority determined that the trial court lacked the authority to issue the severance, the
"question of adequate remedy by appeal becomes immaterial"). Justice Smith based his
determination in large part upon his misunderstanding of the Womack case. See id. at
369-70, 311 S.W.2d at 653 (interpreting Womack as an abandonment of the requirement
of an inadequate legal remedy). He was of the opinion that Womack held that ohce the
court determined that there had been an abuse of discretion by the trial court, mandamus
relief would follow without a consideration of the availability of an appeal. Id. However,
the Womack case clearly stated that the inadequacy of a legal remedy was one of the
elements that made an action "subject to control by mandamus." Womack v. Berry, 156
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even if the procedure involved some delay and additional costs. 28 0
The reason for this holding was simply that the relator's right
would not be lost through the delay and trial of the damages
issues. 2 8 ' Upon appeal, the case would be reversed because of the
trial court's failure to grant a mistrial, thus the relator would be in
the same position as if the mandamus had been granted-a retrial
of the case.2 8 2 Therefore, the remedy by appeal was adequate
Tex. 44, 51, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (1956) (orig. proceeding).
Prior to the Walker decision, though, the court did occasionally become frustrated
with a particular trial court's abuse of discretion and exercised its mandamus authority
even in a case where there was an adequate remedy at law. See, e.g., Maresca v. Marks,
362 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1962) (orig. proceeding) (implying that the adequacy of a legal
remedy was not an issue once an abuse of discretion was found). In these cases, the court
sometimes asserted that because the interlocutory ruling by the trial court was not
immediately appealable, mandamus would be available if the trial court abused its
discretion. See, e.g., Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. 485, 491-92, 348 S.W.2d 523, 527 (1961)
(orig. proceeding) (holding that the trial court's interlocutory order requiring a husband to
pay the wife's attorney's fees during a divorce and before a final order was a clear abuse of
discretion and mandamus was available). However, accepting this argument would mean
that all interlocutory orders of a trial court prior to the final judgment would, under
proper circumstances, become the subject of mandamus relief. See ley, 158 Tex. at 36870, 311 S.W.2d at 652-54 (asserting that mandamus should issue once a petitioner makes a
mere showing of clear abuse of discretion). Likewise, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Smith would clearly be troublesome if it had ever become the law in the state.
280. ley, 158 Tex. at 368, 311 S.W.2d at 652 (majority opinion). The court put it in
these words:
That procedure [appeal following entry of a final judgment] will entail some delay
and additional costs in correcting the error by appeal, but that there may be some
delay in getting questions decided through the appellate process, or that court costs
may thereby be increased, will not justify intervention by appellate courts through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus.
Id. Since the Rey case, the court has continued to note that the mere costs and delay in
pursuing an appeal do not render the appeal inadequate. See, e.g., In re Kan. City S.
Indus., Inc., 139 S.W.3d 669, 670 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (noting that the court has
repeatedly held that added cost or delay of an appeal does not render it an inadequate
remedy). The court in In re Kansas City stated:
KCSI argues that its remedy by appeal is inadequate because the trial court has
improperly deprived it of the "valuable use" of its own money [still in the registry of
the court pending resolution of an appeal]. That is not the permanent loss of
substantial rights; it is really only a complaint that the normal appellate remedy is too
slow. As we have repeatedly held, the cost or delay incident to pursuing an appeal
does not make the remedy inadequate.
Id.; see also Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Walker, 787 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex. 1990) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) ("Generally, the cost and delay of pursuing an appeal will not, in
themselves, render an appeal an inadequate alternative to mandamus review.").
281. Iley, 158 Tex. at 368, 311 S.W.2d at 652.
282. See, e.g., Powers v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 144 Tex. 415,418-19, 191 S.W.2d
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because the relator would not lose any substantial rights through
that procedure. 2 83
This holding is clearly consistent with
traditional mandamus jurisprudence in that the remedy by appeal
would achieve the very same thing as mandamus, albeit with a
time delay and an added expense. The remedy by appeal was
plainly an adequate, specific legal remedy.
The loosening of standards for the issuance of mandamus took
root and developed into a perceived full-blown problem in the
area of pre-trial discovery. It was there that the obiter dicta of the
Cleveland opinion took firm hold in Texas mandamus jurisprudence. 2 84 The first case in the long line of decisions perceived
as relaxing the standard for mandamus relief was Crane v.
Tunks.28 5 In Crane, the plaintiff filed suit to recover title to
land. 286 During the course of the litigation, the plaintiff filed an
application for a bill of discovery asking that the defendant produce certain books and records for examination.28 7 Following a
7, 9 (1945) (holding that when material issues in the charge are not answered, the verdict is
incomplete and a mistrial should be granted if properly and timely requested).
283. ley, 158 Tex. at 367-68, 311 S.W.2d at 652.
284. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 14, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (1926) (orig. proceeding)
(noting that the available remedy to trump the issuance of mandamus relief had to be as
"equally convenient, beneficial, and effective" as that of mandamus relief), overruled by
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
285. Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959) (orig. proceeding),
overruled by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
286. Id. at 184, 328 S.W.2d at 435-36. The plaintiff's pleadings were in the
alternative. Id. at 185, 328 S.W.2d at 436. He alleged that the land in question had been
conveyed under duress, or in the alternative, pled that the deed conveying the land was in
fact a mortgage to secure a debt owed by the plaintiff to the defendant. Id. at 184-85, 328
S.W.2d at 436.
287. Id. at 185, 328 S.W.2d at 436. From adoption in 1940 until the time of its repeal,
Rule 737 stated in part that the trial court was to grant discovery "in accordance with the
usages of courts of equity." TEX. R. Civ. P. 737, 3 TEx. B.J. 639 (1940, repealed 1999). In
general under the Texas cases, in order to be the subject of a bill of discovery, the facts or
documents requested had to be material to the case. The court described a bill of
discovery as follows:
[A] bill of discovery is usually understood as a bill for the discovery of facts resting in
the knowledge of an opposing party, or of deeds, writings, records, or other things in
his custody or power, necessary for the proper prosecution or defense of a cause of
action then pending, or about to be brought, seeking no relief in consequence of the
discovery as regards the merits of the controversy, but seeking the discovery in aid of
some other proceeding wherein the discovery is necessary.
Equitable Trust Co. v. Jackson, 129 Tex. 2, 4, 101 S.W.2d 552, 553 (1937). The court in
Equitable Trust discussed the statutory predecessor to Rule 737, article 2002 of the
Revised Statutes of 1925. Id. at 3, 101 S.W.2d at 552.
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hearing on the relevancy and materiality of the requested
documents, the trial court denied the bill in certain particulars, but
ordered production of a tax return for the year 1950.288 The court
ordered this production without inspecting the requested
document. 2 8 9 The defendant refused to produce the document,
and the defendant's lawyer was held in contempt; however, the
contempt order was stayed pending the defendant's attempt to test
the order through a writ of mandamus to the Texas Supreme
Court.2 9

o

Upon examination of the issue, the supreme court conditionally
issued a writ of mandamus to prevent the inspection of the
defendant's tax return until the judge had made an initial
determination of relevancy and materiality. 2 9 1 In reaching its
decision, the court rejected the argument that the relator had an
Relying upon the
adequate remedy by way of appeal.2 9 2
Cleveland case, the court stated that an appeal following the
production and the entry of a final judgment in the case did not
provide effective relief. 2 9 3 Specifically, the court concluded that
once the return was produced, the harm to the defendant's right of
privacy would have occurred and appeal would be moot. 2 9 4 The
subsequent appeal could not effectively remedy the problem as the
harm could not be undone. 2 9 5 Having satisfied one of the
requirements for the issuance of mandamus, the court then turned

288. Crane, 160 Tex. at 187-88, 328 S.W.2d at 437-38.
289. Id. at 188, 328 S.W.2d at 438.
290. Id. at 187-88, 328 S.W.2d at 438.
291. Id. at 192, 328 S.W.2d at 441.
292. Id. at 189, 328 S.W.2d at 439.
293. Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 189-90, 328 S.W.2d 434, 439 (1959) (orig.
proceeding) (noting that an appeal would be ineffective to give the relief to which the
relator was entitled), overruled by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992)
(orig. proceeding).
294. Id. at 189, 328 S.W.2d at 439. The court indicated that even though the tax
return was not privileged, the party's right to privacy would be compromised by its
production. Id. at 191-92, 328 S.W.2d at 440. Furthermore, once the tax return was
produced, there would be no way to remedy the damage. Id. at 189, 328 S.W.2d at 439. At
the time of Crane, discovery orders were considered interlocutory, and no appeal could be
taken from a trial court's grant or denial of such order until final judgment in the
underlying case. See Tex. Co. v. Honaker, 282 S.W. 879, 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Ft. Worth
1926, writ ref'd) (stating that no appeals lie from interlocutory orders).
295. See Crane, 160 Tex. at 190, 328 S.W.2d at 439 (quoting the "equally convenient,
beneficial, and effective" language from Cleveland, and concluding that the appeal in this
case would have been "ineffective to afford the relief sought").
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its attention to a determination of whether there had been a
violation of a legal right.2 96 Realizing that the action of the trial
judge was not one that could be characterized as ministerial, the
court, relying in part on Womack, turned to a consideration of
whether the trial court had committed a clear abuse of discretion
in ordering the production of the tax return.2 9 7 The court
concluded that the trial court had a duty to examine the document
and to compel production of only those portions that were
material and relevant to the case. 2 98 Furthermore, the trial
judge's failure to comply with this duty amounted to an "abuse of
discretion," and the court conditionally issued mandamus to
compel the trial judge to perform his duty.2 99
296. Id. at 191-92, 328 S.W.2d at 440-41.
297. Id. at 192, 328 S.W.2d at 440-41.
298. Id.
299. Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 192, 328 S.W.2d 434, 440-41 (1959) (orig.
proceeding), overruled by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). First, the court cited Womack as authority for proposition that "[mandamus]
may issue in a proper case to correct a clear abuse of discretion." Id. at 192, 328 S.W.2d at
440 (citing Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 51, 291 S.W.2d 677, 682 (1956) (orig.
proceeding)). The court then held that the trial judge in this case "abused his discretion."
Id. at 192, 328 S.W.2d at 440-41. Whether the Crane court was attempting to draw a
distinction between the two phrases was unclear; however, from later cases it seems
evident that the court used the phrase "abuse of discretion" interchangeably with the
Womack court's "clear abuse of discretion." See, e.g., Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,
839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) ("Since the 1950's ... this Court has used the writ [of
mandamus] to correct a 'clear abuse of discretion' committed by the trial court."); Johnson
v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding)
("Mandamus issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or the violation of a duty
imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy by law."); State v. Sewell, 487
S.W.2d 716, 718 (Tex. 1972) (orig. proceeding) (equating clear abuse of discretion with
gross abuse of discretion). Chief Justice Phillips explained the concept of abuse of
discretion as follows:
A trial court clearly abuses its discretion if "it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." This standard,
however, has different applications in different circumstances.
With respect to resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the trial court's
discretion, for example, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court. The relator must establish that the trial court could reasonably have
reached only one decision. Even if the reviewing court would have decided the issue
differently, it cannot disturb the trial court's decision unless it is shown to be arbitrary
and unreasonable.
On the other hand, review of a trial court's determination of the legal principles
controlling its ruling is much less deferential. A trial court has no "discretion" in
determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure by
the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will constitute an abuse of
discretion, and may result in appellate reversal by extraordinary writ.
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The opinion in Crane was clearly congruous with the traditional
mandamus jurisprudence of the day. Although Crane involved an
incidental trial court ruling during the trial process, which
generally did not justify interference by way of mandamus, the
remedy by appeal was plainly inadequate, since whatever right the
relator possessed in the privacy of the tax return would forever be
lost once the return was produced for copying and review by the
opposing party.30 0
Hence, the opinion does not support an
inference that the reference to the "equally convenient, beneficial,
and effective" language from Cleveland was meant to dispense
with or loosen the traditional mandamus requirement that the
availability of an adequate remedy by appeal would defeat
mandamus relief.
Nonetheless, following the Crane case, a
number of Texas Supreme Court cases determined that the trial
court had committed a clear abuse of discretion and conditionally
issued a writ of mandamus without any mention of the availability
or adequacy of the remedy by way of appeal. While one could
arguably view some of these cases as dispensing with or loosening
the necessity of determining the second prong of mandamus
relief,30 1 in truth the opinions either reflected an awareness that
no effective remedy existed in the particular case or constituted an
oversight by the court.30 2 In fact, there were two major areas
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839-40 (citations omitted).
Justice Smith dissented in Crane,asserting that the trial court's action had not risen to
the level of fraud or caprice nor was its decision "purely arbitrary.., and without reason."
Crane, 160 Tex. at 197, 328 S.W.2d at 444 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that Crane was a
dangerous precedent that would be used to "constantly attempt to halt" trials by bringing
mandamus to correct discretionary actions by trial courts). Justice Smith was alluding to
the stricter standard for abuse of discretion which was apparently abandoned in Womack.
See, e.g., King v. Guerra, 1 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1927, writ ref'd)
(stating that a gross abuse of discretion is characterized by "fraud, caprice, or by a purely
arbitrary decision").
300. Crane, 160 Tex. at 189, 328 S.W.2d at 439 (majority opinion).
301. See, e.g., Sewell, 487 S.W.2d at 718 (implying that a gross abuse of discretion was
sufficient for the issuance of a mandamus).
302. See, e.g., Stewart v. McCain, 575 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding)
(granting mandamus conditionally to compel trial court to withdraw discovery order
relating to documents that were absolutely privileged under state banking laws); Allen v.
Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Tex. 1977) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus
conditionally to compel trial court to vacate order denying discovery of matters necessary
to show causation); Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. 1977) (orig. proceeding)
(granting mandamus conditionally to compel trial court to command witness to answer
certain deposition questions); Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Cunningham, 502 S.W.2d 544, 550
(Tex. 1973) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus conditionally to direct trial court to
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where the court consistently exercised the authority to issue
mandamus conditionally with little or no discussion of the
availability of an adequate remedy by way of appeal or otherwise.
The first line of cases dealt with a trial court's unauthorized
interference with administrative and regulatory enforcement of
statutes designed for the public good. For example, in State v.
Ferguson,3 0 3 the Public Safety Commission sought a mandamus to
compel a trial court to vacate a temporary injunction that
interfered with the enforcement of certain sections of the penal
code authorizing state officials to halt, detain, or weigh, without
search or arrest warrants, trucks that might be violating statutory
weight restrictions.30 4 The Texas Supreme Court held that the
trial court's order was void 30 5 and conditionally issued the
mandamus to compel the trial judge to vacate that portion of the
temporary injunction enjoining license and weight inspectors from
performing their statutory duties.30 6
The court granted
vacate order compelling discovery of privileged information). It is unclear in these cases
whether the failure to mention or discuss the issue of the inadequacy of the legal remedy
was merely an oversight, or whether the court was actually dispensing with the
requirement. However, in all but Stewart, the court cited Crane in support of the issuance
of the mandamus, and Crane had held that the remedy by appeal was ineffective. Crane,
160 Tex. at 190, 328 S.W.2d at 439. But cf. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 ("The requirement
that mandamus issue only where there is no adequate remedy by appeal is sound, and we
reaffirm it today."). The Walker court admitted that in both Allen and Barker the court
conditionally granted mandamus relief without discussing the availability of an alternative
remedy by appeal. Id. at 840-42 (disapproving those cases "to the extent they might be
read as abolishing or relaxing this rule").
303. State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272 (1939) (orig. proceeding).
304. Id. at 62, 64-65, 125 S.W.2d at 273, 275.
305. Id. at 66, 125 S.W.2d at 276. Specifically, the court stated:
As we view the law, a judge has no more power to direct and supervise an officer of
the executive department of government in the manner and method of discharging his
official duties than would a sheriff or other executive officer have to direct a judge in
the manner and method of discharging his official duties. Were a sheriff to serve
notice upon a judge to speed up the trial of his cases so that litigants might not be
damaged by delay or should direct the judge to enter no judgment except one which
he had good reason to believe was correct, no one would champion his right to do so.
Our holding is that a judge has no more power to direct and supervise the manner and
method employed by an officer of the executive branch in the discharge of his official
duties than has a sheriff or other executive officer to direct and supervise a judge in
the manner and method of discharging his official duties.
Id. at 68, 125 S.W.2d at 276.
306. Id. at 68, 125 S.W.2d at 277. The court cited the Yett case for the proposition
that mandamus would lie to compel a trial court to vacate a void order. Ferguson, 133
Tex. at 63, 125 S.W.2d at 274 (citing Yett v. Cook, 115 Tex. 175, 268 S.W. 715 (1925) (orig.
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mandamus relief in spite of the fact that the State of Texas had
already appealed the trial court's order. 3 0 7 In discussing the
question of the adequacy of the legal remedy, that court broke
new ground in the following language:
It is made to appear that relief is being sought in the Court of Civil
Appeals by appeal in one of these causes. We do not think it
necessary to consider whether these orders are temporary
injunctions, as distinguished from restraining orders, or whether full
relief could be granted by the Court of Civil Appeals, for this court's
jurisdiction is not dependent upon a determination of those
questions. This court has announced the rule that, owing to the
great volume of business coming before it, it will not entertain
jurisdiction of an original mandamus proceeding in a case where like
jurisdiction is conferred upon a Court of Civil Appeals, unless it is
made to appear that relief was first sought in that court. That rule
was announced to aid the court in the dispatch of its business and will
not be followed in a case affecting the state as a whole and in which
the orderly processes of government have been disturbed.3 0 8

In effect, Ferguson held that when a trial court, without any
authority, interfered with the established governmental procedures
dealing with a particular issue, its actions would be void and
mandamus would conditionally issue.3 0 9 While the language used
in the opinion stated clearly that the court's jurisdiction and
authority to grant mandamus relief were not dependent upon
whether full relief could be granted on appeal, the court's
explanation of that "rule" dealt with the narrower issue of seeking
a writ of mandamus in cases of concurrent jurisdiction. 3 10 The
court's policy in such cases was that the applicant should first seek
relief in the court of appeals prior to filing an application in the
Texas Supreme Court. 3 11 Thus, notwithstanding the rather broad
language, the Ferguson case has been chiefly cited and relied on
proceeding)).
307. Id. at 63-64, 125 S.W.2d at 274.
308. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
309. See id. at 66-69, 125 S.W.2d at 276-77 (granting conditional mandamus to
compel the trial court to permit inspectors to carry out their statutory obligations).
310. Id. at 63-64, 125 S.W.2d at 274 (analyzing whether a concurrent appeal affected
the supreme court's jurisdiction to hear a mandamus petition).
311. State v. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 64, 125 S.W.2d 272, 274 (1939) (orig. proceeding).
Today the rule has been formalized. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e) (stating that, absent
compelling circumstances, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction application should first be
made in the court of appeals).
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with regard to questions of validity of a trial court's interference
with the enforcement of penal statutes, 3 1 2 lawyer discipline, 3 1 3 or
312. See, e.g., Crouch v. Craik, 369 S.W.2d 311, 314 (Tex. 1963) (orig. proceeding)
(granting mandamus relief, without a discussion of the availability of a remedy by appeal,
to compel trial judge to vacate injunction enjoining the enforcement of a valid penal
statute); State v. Bush, 151 Tex. 606, 613, 253 S.W.2d 269, 273 (1952) (orig. proceeding)
(granting mandamus relief, without a discussion of the availability of a remedy by appeal,
to compel a trial judge to vacate injunction enjoining enforcement of penal provisions of
the Texas Liquor Control Act).
313. See, e.g., In re State Bar of Tex., 960 S.W.2d 651, 651-52 (Tex. 1997) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus conditionally to compel trial judge to
vacate injunction interfering with attorney disciplinary proceedings on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction); State Bar of Tex. v. Jefferson, 942 S.W.2d 575, 575-76 (Tex. 1997) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief upon holding that trial court was
without jurisdiction to issue temporary restraining order to stay administrative grievance
procedure); Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals v. McFall, 888 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tex. 1994)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus conditionally because trial court had
no jurisdiction, to compel trial judge to vacate injunction preventing board from
suspending lawyer). Although the court in these lawyer discipline cases did not mention
the adequacy of a remedy by appeal, this was in all likelihood because of the realization
that the remedy was inadequate. However, at least one opinion in this area tried to infer
that the availability of a remedy by appeal was not a relevant issue. In State v. Sewell, 487
S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1972) (orig. proceeding), the court stated:
"While it is the general rule that a mandamus will not issue to control the action of
an inferior court ... in a matter involving discretion, the writ may issue in a proper
case to correct a clear abuse of discretion."
In measuring the abuse of discretion, this court has looked with disfavor upon
injunctive encroachments upon delegated administrative and executive powers which
affect the state as a whole. In State v. Ferguson, the members of The Public Safety
Commission of Texas asked for a writ of mandamus commanding a trial judge to set
aside a temporary restraining order which interfered with the peace officers of Texas
in the enforcement of certain provisions of the penal code. The court acknowledged
that an adequate remedy in another court ordinarily is sufficient reason for the denial
of a writ of mandamus. The court went on to say, however, that the rule "will not be
followed in a case affecting the state as a whole and in which the orderly processes of
government have been disturbed." The court then declared that the state's peace
officers could proceed in the discharge of their official duties freed of the restraints of
the writs issued by trial judges.
Id. at 718-19 (alteration in original) (quoting Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 192, 328
S.W.2d 434, 440 (1959) (orig. proceeding), overruled by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,
842 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)) (citations omitted). The court's characterization of
Ferguson,aided in large part by the way it edited the opinion, is not quite accurate, as the
"rule" that the Ferguson court was referring to was the rule that, in cases of concurrent
jurisdiction, one must generally apply for mandamus relief in the court of appeals before
requesting such relief from the supreme court. Ferguson, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d at 272.
Again, today the rule has been formalized. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e). Later, in State Bar of
Texas v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding), the court clarified that
Ferguson was a case where mandamus issued because the trial court failed to comply with
a mandatory statutory provision, and there was an absence of another adequate remedy.
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other administrative functions. 3 14 In each of these cases, if there
was in fact an unauthorized action interfering with the administration of justice that could cause serious repercussions upon the
process of justice in the State of Texas, mandamus would issue
generally because the appellate remedy was deemed ineffective.
The second line of cases also dealt with void orders, but in these
decisions the orders of the trial court were void because of
untimeliness, in that the orders were entered after the plenary
Id. at 834. Given this later statement by the court, it appears that the failure to discuss the
adequacy of the remedy in lawyer discipline cases is because the remedy is inadequate,
given the impact that the trial court's ruling has upon the orderly process of government
and justice in the state.
Furthermore, in cases of only incidental interference with the jurisdiction of the
disciplinary agencies, the court must find an inadequate remedy by appeal in order to
grant mandamus relief. The court has recently stated it in the following terms:
An exception to the general rule [that a party must have no adequate remedy at
law] arises when one court renders an order that directly interferes with another
court's jurisdiction. In such a situation, we have determined appellate relief
inadequate. In re SWEPI, L.P., 85 S.W.3d 800 (Tex. 2002); Perry v. Del Rio, 66
S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2001); Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. 1985); Curtis v. Gibbs,
511 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. 1974). In In re SWEPI, the real party in interest argued that the
relators were not entitled to mandamus relief for a probate court's ruling on a plea to
the jurisdiction because an adequate appellate remedy existed. Although we
recognized that pleas to the jurisdiction will not ordinarily be reviewed by mandamus,
we granted mandamus relief because the probate court erroneously interfered with
another court's jurisdiction: "[Tihe probate court not only erroneously concluded that
it had jurisdiction, but also actively interfered with the jurisdiction of the Harris
County court." In re SWEPI, 85 S.W.3d at 809; see also Curtis, 511 S.W.2d at 268
(issuing mandamus relief because one district court order directly interfered with
another district court's jurisdiction).
BODA likewise argues that appellate relief is inadequate here because the district
court order interferes with BODA's continuing jurisdiction over Watson's suspension.
TEX. R. DISCIPLINARY P. 2.20. Moreover, by allowing Watson to practice law after
BODA revoked probation and suspended Watson's license, the district court's order
"supersedes" BODA's judgment contrary to TRDP 2.20's express language.
Accordingly, this case presents an analogous situation to the circumstances in In re
SWEPI and the jurisdictional interference cases before it. Thus, we believe that
BODA lacks an adequate appellate remedy and mandamus relief is proper.
In re State Bar of Tex., 113 S.W.3d 730, 734-35 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding).
314. See, e.g., In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321, 324 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that mandamus would lie to compel a trial court to dismiss a
shareholder's suit against a utility company where the Public Utility Commission had
exclusive jurisdiction and finding the remedy by appeal inadequate); State Bd. of Ins. v.
Betts, 158 Tex. 612, 614-15, 315 S.W.2d 279, 281 (1958) (orig. proceeding) (holding
mandamus would lie to compel a trial judge to vacate his void order appointing a receiver
for an insurance company in liquidation where the Commissioner of Insurance had
exclusive jurisdiction).
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power of the court had expired. For example, in Fulton v.
Finch,3 1 5 the trial court, after having lost jurisdiction, set aside an
order granting a new trial and refused to go to trial in the case. 3 1 6
The supreme court held that the order purporting to set aside the
order granting a new trial was void.3 1 7 The respondent asserted
that the relator had an adequate remedy at law in that he could
immediately appeal from the void judgment that had been
reinstated by the trial court.3 18 The court rejected this argument,
reasoning that the appeal would not give the relator the specific
relief that he was entitled to-a directive to the trial judge to
proceed to trial.3 1 9 In effect, the court was following the time315. Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823 (1961) (orig. proceeding).
316. Id. at 354, 346 S.W.2d at 826. The judge refused to go to trial because he
believed that the matter had been terminated by the entry of a final judgment. Id. at 354,
346 S.W.2d at 825. The supreme court interpreted then-Rule 329b(3) of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure to mean that an order granting a motion for new trial must be set aside
with in the forty-five day period mentioned in that section. Id. at 355, 346 S.W.2d at 827.
Although the rules relating to new trials have been substantially revised, the law is still the
same-a trial court cannot ungrant or vacate an order granting a new trial outside of its
plenary power. See Porter v. Vick, 888 S.W.2d 789, 789-90 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam) (stating that the rule of Fulton has not been substantively modified).
317. Fulton, 162 Tex. at 352, 346 S.W.2d at 825 (holding that an order setting aside
the granting of a new trial that was signed after the plenary power over the original
judgment had expired was void); see also Enis v. Smith, 883 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. 1994)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that mandamus would be granted conditionally to
set aside a turnover order to enforce a void foreign judgment that could have been
appealed because "the incompatibility of the appellate timetables of Texas and its sister
states may deprive litigants of the ability to file timely appeals of turnover orders in
Texas").
318. Fulton, 162 Tex. at 355, 346 S.W.2d at 827. The court stated that an appeal could
have been taken, but that it was not necessary as the void order vacating the granting of
the new trial would not be a hindrance to the trial court's retrying the case. Id. at 355-56,
346 S.W.2d at 827.
319. Id. at 356, 346 S.W.2d at 827 (stating that the court was not aware of any cases
holding that mandamus relief was unavailable because a void judgment could be remedied
on appeal). The court noted that the relator was not required to accept less than the
mandamus statutes provided-compelling the trial court to trial. Id. at 356-57, 346 S.W.2d
at 827-28 (holding that when a judge refused to proceed to trial in reliance upon a void
order, mandamus would lie). Later in the opinion, the court made the following classic
analysis of the problem:
An order which proclaims its voidness upon its face needs no appellate action to
proclaim its invalidity. It is one thing to say that a void order may be appealed from
but it is another thing to say that it must be appealed from for it would be anomalous
to say that an order void upon its face must be appealed from before it can be treated
as a nullity and disregarded. An order which must be appealed from before it is
ignored can hardly be characterized as "void" and binding on no one.
Id. at 360, 346 S.W.2d at 830.
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honored mandamus principle that the alternative remedy must be
as effective as mandamus.3 2 0 Thus, the court concluded that
because the "relators have applied for a writ of mandamus in
accordance with a statute which is plain in wording," the writ
would be conditionally granted. 3 2 '
Prior to the Fulton case, the court had conditionally issued
mandamus to direct a trial court to set aside a void order in
situations that did not fall under its direct statutory authorization
to compel trial courts to proceed to trial and judgment. In
3 2 2 the trial
McEwen v. Harrison,
court had entered a default
judgment against the defendant.3 2 3 Long after the trial court's
plenary jurisdiction had expired, Texaco filed a motion to vacate
the default judgment in the trial court on grounds that the default
judgment against it was void because the citation had not been
served on any person or entity designated by law to be Texaco's
agent. 3 2 4
The trial court agreed and vacated the default
3
2
5
judgment.
The plaintiff-relator sought mandamus from the
supreme court claiming that the trial court's order vacating its
judgment was void.3 2 6 The supreme court held that the judgment
of the trial court in vacating the default judgment was void, due to
the expiration of plenary power of the trial court, and
conditionally granted the mandamus.3 2 7 There was no discussion
320. See Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 359-60, 346 S.W.2d 823, 829 (1961) (orig.
proceeding) (stating that mandamus will issue when the other remedies are inadequate,
and thus not as effective as mandamus). The court put it in these words: "[W]hen
considering the question of the adequacy of an appeal, it is necessary to examine the
particular situation somewhat more closely." Id. In terms of traditional mandamus
jurisprudence, the court was attempting to determine whether the appeal would be as
effective as mandamus. Id. at 359-60, 346 S.W.2d 829-30. Thus, the question presented to
the court was not whether an appeal was available, but whether the appeal would achieve
the same result as mandamus for the relator. Id. at 359, 346 S.W.2d at 829.
321. Id. at 360, 346 S.W.2d at 830 (referring to the statutory grant of jurisdiction to
the court to compel trial courts to trial and judgment).
322. McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961) (orig. proceeding).
323. Id. at 127, 345 S.W.2d at 707.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. McEwen, 162 Tex. at 133, 345 S.W.2d at 711. The court held that in those
situations where the trial court had jurisdictional power over the case (including a case
alleging that the default judgment entered was void for want of service), the provisions of
then-Rule 329b (now Rule 329b(f) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure) were applicable,
and the trial court had no authority to grant a "motion to vacate" after the expiration of
the court's plenary power. Id. at 131, 345 S.W.2d at 710.
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or mention of the inadequacy of the legal remedy.32 8
Notwithstanding some later decisions of the court 3 29 -as well as
the voices of some commentators suggesting that perhaps the
inadequacy of a legal remedy was not an issue in these cases 33 0the legal remedy available by way of appeal in these cases was
clearly inadequate, and the failure to discuss it should not lead one
to think that it was waived in these cases of mandamus relief from
void judgments entered by trial courts after their plenary power
328. Id. at 126-33, 345 S.W.2d at 707-11. Subsequently, the court followed McEwen
in Deen v. Kirk, 508 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. 1974) (orig. proceeding). In Deen, a conditional
mandamus was granted directing a trial court to vacate an order signed after its plenary
power had expired. Id. at 72. The order signed by the trial judge had set aside an alleged
void judgment. Id. The court held that the trial judge had jurisdictional power to enter
the original judgment and therefore the trial court had no authority to attempt to set it
aside after its jurisdiction over the case had expired. Id. Once again, there was no
mention of the inadequacy of the legal remedy. Id. at 70-72.
However, in other cases the court has addressed the issue. For example, in Buttery v.
Betts, 422 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding), the court, citing Fulton as authority,
held that to require a party to retry the case after the trial court signed a void order
granting a new trial would not be an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 151. The court stated
that the relators were presently entitled to their final judgment, not after retrial and
appeal. Id. In Dikeman v. Snell, 490 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1973) (orig. proceeding), the court,
citing only Fulton, McEwen, and Muse, stated: "In view of our policy for at least a decade
of accepting and exercising our mandamus jurisdiction in cases involving void or invalid
judgments of district courts, Relator had every reason to expect relief from the void
judgment in this case without first attempting an appeal." Id. at 186.
In Dikeman, the court had entered a nunc pro tunc judgment after its plenary power
had expired. Id. at 184-85. The supreme court determined that the signing of the nunc
pro tunc judgment was improper, as it was correcting a judicial, not a clerical, error. Id. at
186. Notwithstanding that an appeal could have been taken from the entry of the order
immediately, the court concluded that a conditional writ of mandamus would issue to
compel the court to set aside the nunc pro tunc judgment. Id. The policy that the court
referred to was that an appeal need not be pursued if it would not provide a specific and
effective remedy. Dikeman, 490 S.W.2d at 186. In such a case, the remedy by appeal
would not be an adequate remedy. See id. (issuing mandamus after rejecting contentions
that the petitioner had an adequate remedy by appeal); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
Muse, 109 Tex. 352, 362, 207 S.W. 897, 900 (1919) (orig. proceeding) (holding that
mandamus relief was available where the appellate remedy was inadequate).
329. See, e.g., Geary v. Peavy, 878 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (viewing the Dikeman case as one where the relator was not required to establish
the inadequacy of the remedy by appeal); Faulkner v. Culver, 851 S.W.2d 187, 189 (Tex.
1993) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief to compel trial court to
vacate a void order without mentioning the adequacy of the remedy).
330. See e.g., Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Demystifying the Extraordinary Writ:
Substantive and ProceduralRequirements for the Issuance of Mandamus, 29 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 525, 572-73 (1998) (claiming that Dikeman and its progeny held that mandamus relief
was available to vacate void orders entered by trial courts without regard to the
availability of a remedy by way of appeal).
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had expired. 3 3 ' Rather, the failure to mention or discuss the
adequacy of the legal remedy should be viewed as an implied
understanding by the court that such a remedy, if available, was
ineffective in giving the relator the specific remedy to which he
331. See, e.g., In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (holding that since the retrial of a case after the trial court had granted a new trial
after its plenary power had expired would be a nullity, the relator has no adequate remedy
at law). However, in the area of recusal of judges, the court is more explicit about the fact
that its mandamus authority is available in the proper case without regard to the
availability of a remedy by way of appeal. The issue involved in recusal cases is
complicated by the fact that the void rulings or orders that are issued come after the judge
ignores the requirement to recuse himself. Since these subsequent orders are void, one
might argue that the remedy by appeal is clearly inadequate; however, the supreme court
has gone further and stated that it is not a relevant inquiry. In In re Union Pacific
Resources Co., 969 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding), the court outlined the law in
the area rather succinctly:
Judges may be removed from a particular case either because they are
constitutionally disqualified, TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11, because they are subject to a
statutory strike, TEX. GoV'T CODE § 74.053(d), or because they are recused under
rules promulgated by this Court. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a, 18b; TEX. R. APP. P. 16. The
grounds and procedures for each type of removal are fundamentally different. See
generally Kilgarlin & Bruch, Disqualificationand Recusal of Judges, 17 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 599 (1986). When a judge continues to sit in violation of a constitutional
proscription, mandamus is available to compel the judge's mandatory disqualification
without a showing that the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. Cf Mitchell
Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. 1997) (addressing the
mandatory disqualification of assigned judges under TEX. GOv'T CODE § 74.053(d)).
This makes sense, because any orders or judgments rendered by a judge who is
constitutionally disqualified are void and without effect. See, e.g., Buckholts Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982); Fry v. Tucker, 146 Tex. 18, 202
S.W.2d 218, 221 (1947). Likewise, on timely objection, the disqualification of an
assigned judge who is not a retired judge is mandatory under section 74.053(d) of the
Texas Government Code and any orders entered by a trial judge in a case in which he
is disqualified are void. See Mitchell Energy Corp., 943 S.W.2d at 440-441; Fry, 202
S.W.2d at 221. Therefore, the objecting party is also entitled to mandamus relief
without a showing that there is no adequate remedy by appeal. See Dunn v. Street,
938 S.W.2d 33, 34-35 (Tex. 1997); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996).
Id. at 428 (emphasis added); see also In re O'Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 450 (Tex. 2002) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that mandamus relief was available to compel trial
judge to disqualify himself under Rule 18b(1)(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
without a showing that the relator lacked an adequate remedy by appeal); In re Perritt,
992 S.W.2d 444, 446-47 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that
mandamus relief was available to compel a judge designated to hear a recusal motion to
disqualify himself under section 74.053(b) of the Texas Government Code). The supreme
court has made a distinction in the case of an erroneous denial of a recusal motion. Union
Pacific, 969 S.W.2d at 428. In that situation, as the judge's rulings would not be void, an
appeal following the entry of a final judgment in the underlying case would be an
adequate remedy. Id. (stating that mandamus relief would be denied because the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure provide for appellate review of the denial of a recusal motion).
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was entitled, as has been understood from the earliest times in
Texas.3 32
During this same period of time, however, the court in several
cases acknowledged the importance of the principle that
mandamus would not issue if there were an adequate remedy, but
undertook no analysis of the issue, in large part because previous
cases had already determined that in similar factual circumstances
the remedy by appeal was inadequate. 3 33 However, two decisions
332. See, e.g., Muse, 109 Tex. at 362, 207 S.W. at 900 (explaining that mandamus may
issue in the face of an ineffective remedy). The court said:
It is no sound objection to the award of the mandamus that the defendant might
finally secure a review of an adverse judgment following a retrial, by means of appeal
to the Court of Civil Appeals and writ of error to the Supreme Court. For it has been
the law of Texas since Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam, 507, that the writ of mandamus
"will not only issue, in cases where the party having a specific legal right has no other
legal operative remedy, but, where the other modes of redress are inadequate or
tedious, the writ will be awarded." Not only would the remedy to defendant of
appeal and writ of error, after another trial, be manifestly tedious, but such remedy
would also be inadequate; for it is the very essence of defendant's right that it is
entitled not to have to respond further to plaintiff's cause of action than by payment
of his judgment.
Id. Thus, where the court vacated a default judgment, as in McEwen, the remedy by
appeal is inadequate as well as tedious, for it would come only after a second trial-and
like Muse, the very essence of the plaintiff's right is to stand on his judgment. Id. That is
the right that mandamus protects in Muse and McEwen that an appeal cannot. The court
has succinctly articulated this position as follows:
Mandamus is appropriate to set aside an order for new trial that is granted after the
court's plenary power expires and that is, therefore, void. Because the trial court had
no power to grant the new trial, any subsequent retrial would be a nullity. Under
these circumstances, [relator] does not have an adequate remedy by appeal and is
entitled to mandamus relief.
Dickason, 987 S.W.2d at 571 (footnote omitted). However, a year later, the court, citing
only Dickason, held that because an order setting aside a venue transfer order after the
plenary power had expired was void, "the relator need not show it did not have an
adequate appellate remedy, and mandamus relief is appropriate." In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). This rather broad
statement leads to confusion. Is the court asserting that mandamus will issue without
regard to the availability of remedy by appeal (most likely), or is it merely acknowledging
the fact that in the case of the entry of a void order the remedy by appeal is clearly
inadequate? By being ambiguous, the court only adds to the confusion in this area.
333. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Ramirez, 824 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. 1992)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that an appeal would not be an adequate remedy
for the erroneous order to produce tax returns); Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700
S.W.2d 916, 917-18 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (stating that writs of mandamus would
not issue to correct mere errors in judgment that could be corrected on appeal following
final judgment); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex. 1980) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that because a trial court's order refusing to comply with a statute

2007]

GRANTING MANDAMUS RELIEF IN TEXAS

decided on the same day contained detailed discussions of the
court's understanding of this requirement for the issuance of
mandamus. In the first, TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v.
Powell,3 3 4 the court granted mandamus relief to a party whose
pleadings had been struck, whose action seeking affirmative relief
had been dismissed, and against whose counterclaim the trial court
had granted interlocutory default judgment, leaving only the
amount of damages left for the trial.3 35 The court held that
sanctions imposed by the trial court "were manifestly unjust in
"
in not considering the availability of
violation of Rule 215 1336
lesser sanctions before imposing death penalty sanctions.3 3 7 In
discussing whether the relator had an adequate remedy by way of
appeal, the court stated:
Specifically, in this case TransAmerican does not have an adequate
remedy by appeal because it must suffer a trial limited to the
damages claimed by Toma. The entire conduct of the litigation is
skewed by the removal of the merits of TransAmerican's position
from consideration and the risk that the trial court's sanctions will
not be set aside on appeal. Resolution of matters in dispute
between the parties will be influenced, if not dictated, by the trial
court's determination of the conduct of the parties during discovery.
Some award of damages on Toma's counterclaim is likely, leaving
TransAmerican with an appeal, not on whether it should have been
liable for those damages, but on whether it should have been

requiring the suspension of an attorney was interlocutory, mandamus would conditionally
issue as no appeal was available); see also Maresca v. Marks, 362 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.
1962) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus conditionally to compel trial court to vacate
order requiring production of tax return); Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. 485, 491, 348 S.W.2d
523, 527 (1961) (orig. proceeding) (concluding that the trial court committed a clear abuse
of discretion by requiring husband to pay wife's attorneys' fees before a final divorce
decree, and holding that mandamus was available as there was no remedy since no appeal
could be taken from the interlocutory order).
334. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991) (orig.
proceeding).
335. Id. at 914.
336. Id. at 919; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.2(b) (stating in relevant part that if "a party
fails to comply with proper discovery requests or to obey an order to provide or permit
discovery the court ... may, after notice and hearing, make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just"). According to the court, the measurement of what would be a just
sanction has to include two standards: first there has to be a direct relationship "between
the offensive conduct and the sanction"; and "the sanctions must not be excessive."
TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
337. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 918-19.
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sanctioned for discovery abuse. This is not an effective appeal.3 3 8
Thus, following traditional analysis, an appellate remedy that
did not achieve the same protection of a party's legal right as
mandamus was not an "effective" or adequate remedy sufficient to
replace mandamus relief. In TransAmerican, the relator would
have been unable to raise the liability issue on appeal, and if he
were to have lost the sanction issue on appeal, he would have been
left with the appellate court reviewing only the damages issue.
The court correctly held that this was an inadequate appeal.
Then, in Braden v. Downey,3 3 9 the trial court ordered discovery
sanctions that, required plaintiff's attorney to perform community
service before the trial concluded and required the plaintiff to pay
the defendant $10,000 in attorneys' fees. 3 40 The supreme court
noted that as the attorney was compelled to perform the
community service before a final judgment was rendered in the
underlying case, the appeal following the final judgment was
inadequate because, even if successful, the appellate court could
not "restore his time or make him whole."' 3 4 1 The court held that
338. Id. at 919 (acknowledging concern that the trial court's sanction order had the
effect of adjudicating the dispute without rendering a final judgment); see also Chrysler
Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 853 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (granting
mandamus conditionally to compel trial judge to vacate a sanction order striking the
defendants' pleadings and entering an interlocutory default judgment on liability). Where
an immediate appeal to challenge the justness of the death penalty sanctions is available.
mandamus relief is unavailable. See, e.g., Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 845 (Tex.
2004) (upholding on appeal the use of death penalty sanctions against a plaintiff and the
entry of a take nothing judgment); GTE Commc'ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725,
732 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that an appeal from death penalty sanctions
was inadequate unless there was the right of immediate appeal).
339. Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).
340. Id. at 926 (Tex. 1991).
341. Id. at 930. The court stated:
Braden's attorney argues that if he is compelled to perform community service before
an appealable judgment is rendered in the case, no relief on appeal can ever restore
his time or make him whole. We agree. Time spent is different from money paid;
recovery of the latter may be problematic, but recovery of the former is impossible.
Nor can Braden's attorney recover damages for service the district court may have
erred in requiring him to perform.
Id. Since the recovery of the time was impossible, arguably the remedy by appeal was not
effective in protecting that right. The court's reference to recovering damages was based
upon a long, recognized history of absolute immunity for judges acting within their
jurisdictional power. See Turner v. Pruitt, 161 Tex. 532, 534-35, 342 S.W.2d 422, 423
(1961) (holding that a judge is immune from suit for actions taken in judicial proceedings
in which the court has jurisdiction); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57
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"if the community service [the plaintiff's] attorney is ordered to
perform must be completed before he is able to obtain review of
that order by appeal, his appellate remedy is plainly
inadequate." 3 4 2 The court thus held that the trial court abused its
discretion and that it needed to modify its order to require that the
community service be performed after the judgment in the case
was final on appeal. 3 4 3 This approach to adequacy was consistent
with the traditional approach in that the right to be enforcedreview of the sanctions orders-could not be protected by ordinary
appeal because the right would have already been compromised
and lost.
In the area of the assessment of attorneys' fees against the party,
the court continued to abide by traditional notions of
mandamus. 3 4 4 The party was ordered to pay $10,000 in attorneys'
fees as discovery sanctions. There was no evidence to support an
award of this amount, nor had the opposing party sought more
than $500.3 4 5 The court was of the opinion that the amount of the
(1978) ("A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to
liability only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction."'). If the court was
implying that a suit for damages, if available, would have been an adequate remedy for
services that he would have been improperly required to perform, the court is straying far
afield from Texas precedent. A damage award for Braden would not have provided the
specific adequate remedy in this case that mandamus would. Mandamus would have given
him the opportunity to appeal the sanction award before performing the service. See
Terrell v. Green, 88 Tex. 539, 31, 545, S.W.631, 634 (1895) (orig. proceeding) (holding that
the availability of a damage award would not be an adequate remedy for being refused the
right to discharge one's public duties).
342. Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 930. However, the court stated that "[i]f ...the
community service imposed ...was not to be performed until the judgment in the case
was final," the attorney had an adequate remedy by appeal. Id.; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 215.3
(providing that sanctions for abusing the discovery process are reviewable on appeal from
the final judgment).
343. Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 930.
344. Id. at 928. The court previously held that the right to appeal following final
judgment was an adequate remedy of the assessment of attorneys' fees against a party as
discovery sanctions. Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex.
1986) (orig. proceeding); Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639-40 (Tex.
1986) (orig. proceeding). Like Braden, the attorneys' fees in both Street and Stringer were
to be paid prior to the final judgment; but unlike Braden, the amounts of attorneys' fees
were reasonable. In Street, the court rejected an argument that an appeal was inadequate
because even if the sanctions were reversed, recovery of the fees already paid was
questionable. Street, 715 S.W.2d at 639-40 ("The uncertainty of recovering the money on
appeal ...is simply not a sufficient reason for the appellate court's interference with the
pre-trial stages of this action.").
345. Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929.
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sanction award and the fact that it had to be paid before a final
judgment created an environment that might inhibit a party's
willingness to continue the case.3 4 6 To avoid what it perceived to
be an inequitable situation, the court held that the requirement to
pay the monetary sanctions before the rendition of a final
'3 4 7
"judgment denied [Braden] an adequate remedy by appeal."
Again, this opinion was consistent with traditional analysis.
Although neither TransAmerican nor Braden referred to Hey, it
was implicit in the courts' decisions that the respective appeals
were inadequate because the court was of the opinion that
substantial rights of the parties would be lost.
D. Walker v. Packer and Its Progeny: The TraditionalMandamus
Standards
Walker3 4 8 involved several discovery disputes that arose during
346. Id. The court acknowledged that sanctions that terminated or inhibited the
presentation of a case were authorized by Rule 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
However, those types of sanctions were to be reserved for "circumstances in which a party
has so abused the rules of procedure, despite imposition of lesser sanctions, that the
party's position can be presumed to lack merit and it would be unjust to permit the party
to present the substance of that position before the court." Id. (orig. proceeding) (citing
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913,918 (Tex. 1991)).
347. Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).
Although the court stated that monetary sanctions should never be used to terminate
litigation, there was no indication that the payment of the sanctions would have forced
Braden to discontinue the litigation. Id. at 929. However, in order to ensure that
monetary damages for discovery abuse would not lead to the termination of litigation in
future cases, the court proposed that trial courts comply with the following procedures:
[I]f a litigant contends that a monetary sanction award precludes access to the court,
the district judge must either (1) provide that the sanction is payable only at a date
that coincides with or follows entry of a final order terminating the litigation; or (2)
make[] express written findings, after a prompt hearing, as to why the award does not
have such a preclusive effect.
Id.
348. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Chief
Justice Philips, the author of the Walker court's majority opinion, remarked that the
dissenters in the case were upset about "strict adherence to traditional mandamus
standards." Id. However, Justice Doggett, one of the dissenters, eloquently characterized
the majority's opinion as one that was jettisoning precedent:
It is only after fifteen years of repeated judicial reliance upon Barker and Allen in
the issuance of numerous opinions that we learn these precedents of our court are not
good law. This is all the more strange in that we had explicitly refused to overrule
them. When that very request was urged in Jampole our answer was unmistakable:
"We decline to do so." But the majority's new answer is simple: "Line them up
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litigation brought by the parents of a baby born with brain damage
against the obstetrician and other defendants. 3 4 9 The dispute that
gave rise to the court's discussion of the adequacy of legal remedy
involved the plaintiffs' "attempt to secure documentary evidence
to impeach one of the defendants' expert witnesses."' 3 5 0 The trial
court denied certain discovery relating to the documents based
upon its understanding and legal interpretation of the supreme
court's precedent on the subject. 3 5 1 Although the supreme court
held that the trial court's erroneous interpretation of the law was
"a clear abuse of discretion, ' 3 5 2 it also held that mandamus was
inappropriate because the plaintiffs "ha[d] an adequate remedy by
appeal."'3 5 3 The court noted that this requirement for the issuance
of mandamus was "well-settled,"' 3 5 4 but in the area of applying
mandamus to discovery orders, the court noted its failure to focus
on this requirement. 3 5 5
However, the court reaffirmed this
"fundamental tenet" of mandamus law and noted the requirement
was sound, stating, "we reaffirm it today .... [and] disapprove of
... any other authorities to the extent they might be read as
abolishing or relaxing this rule."' 3 56 The court also disapproved
against the wall." What does it matter that a dozen or more Texas Supreme Court
cases and countless decisions of the courts of appeals are to the contrary? They can
be disposed of in a mass execution of precedent. Today's firing squad announces that
it is only answering the command of Jim Sales and two law students who separately
criticized the court during the period 1977-79. It thereby rationalizes constructing so
distorted a standard on the corpses of so many prior authorities.
Id. at 851 (Doggett, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted). Although eloquent,
Justice Doggett preferred to jettison 150 years of precedent to preserve a distorted vision
of mandamus jurisprudence in Texas.
349. Id. at 835-36 (majority opinion).
350. Id. at 837.
351. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 838.
352. Id. at 840. The dispute centered upon the reach of the court's opinion in Russell
v. Young, 452 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1970), where the court had conditionally granted
mandamus to vacate a trial court's order authorizing extensive discovery from a non-party
expert witness. The trial court in Walker viewed the opinion as a blanket prohibition from
obtaining information for impeachment purposes only from witnesses who were not
parties. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 838. However, the supreme court noted that, in Walker,
unlike in Russell, the credibility of the expert was in question and the requested
information was limited in scope. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in incorrectly
applying controlling legal principles. Id. at 838-40.
353. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 844.
354. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 & n.8 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)
(citing over twenty cases from 1890 to 1991 supporting this statement).
355. Id. at 840-41.
356. Id. at 842. The court specifically disapproved Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d 41
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authorities relying upon the language in Cleveland-that the
alternative remedy had to "be equally 'convenient, beneficial, and
effective as mandamus"'-to the limited extent that these
authorities "impl[ied] that a remedy by appeal is inadequate
merely because it might involve more delay or cost than
mandamus."' 3 57 The court concluded that mandamus "[i]nterference is justified only when parties stand to lose their substantial
rights." 3 58 The court noted that there might be several situations
where a party to a clearly erroneous ruling on an interlocutory
discovery order would "not have an adequate appellate remedy"
and that in those situations mandamus would be the appropriate
remedy. 35 9 The court's alleged adherence to the traditional
(Tex. 1977) (orig. proceeding), Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977) (orig.
proceeding), "and any other authorities to the extent they might be read as abolishing or
relaxing" the fundamental tenet-"[t]he requirement that mandamus issue only where
there is no adequate remedy by appeal." Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842.
357. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842. It is a shame that the court besmirched Cleveland. It
is clear to anyone who reads that case that mandamus did not issue because of the
additional cost or delay attributed to any appeal. The same is true for Crane.
Furthermore, the concept that the appellate remedy must "be equally 'convenient,
beneficial, and effective as mandamus' was steeped in common law long ago. See, e.g.,
The King v. Severn & Wye Ry. Co.. 106 Eng. Rep. 501, 502 (O.B. 1819) (claiming that an
indictment and related fine were not as "equally convenient, beneficial, and effectual as a
mandamus").
358. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 (quoting Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d
648, 652 (1958) (orig. proceeding) (disapproving Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W.
1063 (1926) (orig. proceeding), Crane v. Tunks, 160 Tex. 182, 328 S.W.2d 434 (1959) (orig.
proceeding), Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984) (orig. proceeding), and
"other authorities to the extent that they imply that a remedy by appeal is inadequate
merely because it might involve more delay or cost than mandamus")). The court
explained its disapproval by stating that the loosened standard initiated in Cleveland-that
the remedy by appeal must "be 'equally convenient, beneficial and effective' as
mandamus"--could be used to justify mandamus review whenever an appeal would
involve more cost or delay than mandamus. Id. None of the cases cited by the court
conditionally granted mandamus because the appeal would involve more cost or delay
than mandamus. Chief Justice Phillips was in large part concerned that the language, as
articulated in Cleveland, might lead to such an argument.
359. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). In the
discovery context, the court gave three different examples in which an appeal following a
trial would not be an adequate remedy: (1) an erroneous order requiring "the disclosure of
privileged information"; (2) the denial of discovery materials necessary for a party "to
present a viable claim or defense"; and (3) those situations where the material would not
be in the record so that there would be no ability for an appellate court to determine if
error had occurred in not requiring the material to be produced. Id. Walker has
consistently been followed in these three areas involving discovery. See, e.g., Thompson v.
Davis, 901 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (acknowledging the inadequacy
of an appeal when the trial court denies "discovery [that] goes to the heart of" the case);
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mandamus standards received mixed reviews from commentators.3 6 ° In any event, Walker should not be read as rejecting the
Cleveland language, only its liberal application. The alternative
remedy must, under Texas precedent, be so effective as to place
361
the relator in as good a position as mandamus could place him
and not be so tedious as to be inadequate.3 6 2
Notwithstanding Walker's strong statement concerning the
soundness of the fundamental tenet of mandamus law, the court
has continued its past practice of discussing the adequacy of a legal
remedy only when it supported the decision the court wanted to
make and downplayed this tenet when it interfered with the
decision the court desired to make. Two weeks after Walker, the
court issued an opinion-conditionally granting mandamusholding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering

Global Servs., Inc. v. Bianchi, 901 S.W.2d 934, 939 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (noting
that a reviewing court would be "unable to evaluate the effect of the trial court's" denial
of discovery when such information did not get in the record); Chapa v. Garcia, 848
S.W.2d 667. 668 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (holding that an appeal would be
inadequate because the denial of discovery vitiated the ability to bring a valid claim). The
dissenting opinion by Justice Doggett (joined by Justice Mauzy) wanted to emasculate
centuries of legal precedent and permit mandamus review in the event of "arbitrary and
capricious rulings by trial judges" without the necessity of showing an inadequate remedy.
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 846 (Doggett, J., dissenting). Later in his opinion. Justice Doggett
indicated that any abuse of discretion would justify mandamus relief. Id. at 855. Justice
Doggett was vociferous in his complaints of the court's disregard of alleged precedent of a
mere fifteen years, while simply ignoring over 300 years of mandamus jurisprudence which
had become part of Texas's law. Id. at 851. Justice Gamage also dissented, arguing that
mandamus should be readily available in every instance of a wrongful denial of discovery.
Id. at 857 (Gammage, J., dissenting).
360. Compare Sharon N. Freytag & Michelle E. McCoy, Appellate Practice and
Procedure, 46 SMU L. REV. 893, 894 (1993) (describing Walker as "an important
departure from earlier opinions"), and W. Wendell Hall, Revisiting Standardsof Review in
Civil Appeals, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1045, 1080 (1993) (stating that Walker had tightened
mandamus parameters), with Ernest E. Figari, Jr., A. Erin Dwyer & Donald Colleluori,
Texas Civil Procedure, 46 SMU L. REV. 1055, 1081 (1993) (calling Walker a reaffirmation
of "the strict standard for obtaining mandamus relief").
361. See, e.g., Terrell v. Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 545, 31 S.W. 631, 634 (1895) (orig.
proceeding) (stating that a damage remedy was insufficient to give the petitioner the
specific relief to which he was legally entitled).
362. See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Muse, 109 Tex. 352, 362, 207 S.W. 897, 900
(1919) (orig. proceeding) (stating that mandamus will issue where "other modes of redress
are inadequate or tedious"); Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504, 506 (Tex. 1843) (noting
that the writ of mandamus will issue where other modes of redress are inadequate or
tedious); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *110 (acknowledging that
mandamus might issue even in cases where there is another remedy, if such remedy is
tedious).
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the production of certain documents, and therefore, the issuance
of the writ of mandamus by the court of appeals ordering the trial
court to vacate its order requiring production was improper.3 63 In
that case, the trial court ordered discovery of investigations of an
accident in spite of an argument by the defendant that such items
were privileged from discovery as they were conducted in
anticipation of litigation. 364
The court of appeals granted
mandamus relief reversing the trial court order, and the plaintiff
sought relief from the Texas Supreme Court.3 65 Upon reviewing
the evidence, the court determined that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in ordering the production of the

363. Scott v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 843 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). This was the second mandamus opinion issued by the court following
Walker. The first was Dawkins v. Meyers, 825 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding),
which was issued the week following Walker. Dawkins involved an individual who had
been declared ineligible to be a candidate for the Texas House of Representatives by the
chairman of the Republican Party under the chairman's interpretation of the limitation on
eligibility for office contained in article III, section 19 of the Texas constitution. Dawkins,
825 S.W.2d at 445-46 (noting that the constitution prohibits certain elected and appointed
officials from being candidates for the Texas legislature). The court agreed with the
determination of the disqualification and therefore denied the petition for mandamus on
grounds that no duty to the relator had been breached. Id. In the absence of a finding of
an abuse of discretion or breach of legal duty owing to the relator there was no need to
address the inadequacy of the legal remedy. See, e.g., Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig,
876 S.W.2d 304, 310 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (Hecht, J., dissenting) (stating that it is
unnecessary to consider the adequacy of the remedy if the trial court has not abused its
discretion) superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 1296, sec. 1, § 51.014(a)(7), 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4936, 4937 (Vernon) (current
version codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2006)).
364. Scott, 843 S.W.2d at 440. At the time of the Scott case, the Flores test applied to
the determination of whether an investigation was conducted in anticipation of litigation
for purposes of a discovery exemption. Id. See Flores v. Fourth Court of Appeals. 777
S.W.2d 38, 40-41 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding) (establishing a two prong analysis to
determine whether "an investigation is done in anticipation of litigation"). Former Rule
166(b)(3) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure protected most party communications
made in anticipation of litigation from discovery. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166(b)(3) (Vernon 1987,
repealed 1999): see TEX. R. Civ. P. 192.5(a)(2), 192.5(b)(2) (giving the current rule).
Under Flores, party communications and investigations conducted following an incident
were considered prepared in anticipation of litigation if a reasonable person would have
concluded from all the circumstances that there was a substantial chance of litigation, and
the party resisting discovery had a good faith belief that litigation was imminent. Flores,
777 S.W.2d at 40-41. The court in National Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 204
(Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding), modified Flores by eliminating the requirement that the
party needed to have conducted the investigation when litigation was imminent.
365. Scott, 843 S.W.2d at 439.
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investigation. 36 6 The court conditionally granted mandamus relief
to vacate the appellate court's action and to reinstate the trial
court's order compelling production of the disputed documents,
only briefly mentioning the requirement that mandamus would not
issue absent an inadequate remedy by appeal.3 6 7 Justice Hecht
dissented, chastising the court for not requiring the relator to
establish that his remedy by appeal was inadequate. 368 Justice
366. Id. at 440.
367. Id. (citing Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985)
(orig. proceeding)). The failure of the court to mention Walker is troublesome. First, it
was Walker, not Johnson, that had just announced that "[tihe requirement that persons
seeking mandamus relief establish the lack of an adequate appellate remedy is a
'fundamental tenet' of mandamus practice." Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.
1992) (orig. proceeding); see also In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210
S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) ("The issuance of mandamus by the court
of appeals is improper ... if the record fails to demonstrate the lack of an adequate
remedy on appeal."); Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 305 (stating unequivocally that "the burden of
showing ... the inadequacy of a remedy by appeal is placed on the relator"). Second, it
was Walker, not Johnson, that identified and explained when an appeal would be
inadequate in discovery disputes. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843-44.
368. Scott, 843 S.W.2d at 442 (Hecht, J., dissenting). Justice Hecht's dissenting
opinion is extremely critical of the majority's failure to cite Walker and, more importantly,
to adhere to its teachings. Id. On these two points he expressed his dissatisfaction with
the majority opinion in the following words:
[R]elators have failed to show an inadequate appellate remedy. There is, of course,
no appeal to this Court from the judgment of an appellate court granting mandamus
relief in an original proceeding; such judgments can be reviewed by this Court only on
application for mandamus against the court of appeals, as relators have filed in this
case. Nevertheless, when the court of appeals grants mandamus relief against a trial
court, it directs that court to take action which may be reviewable on appeal from the
final judgment rendered in the case. That is the situation here, where the court of
appeals has directed the trial court to rescind its order allowing discovery. When the
trial court complies, its ruling may be appealed after final judgment, should relators
choose to do so. Hence, relators unquestionably have a remedy by appeal in these
circumstances.
The question is whether relators have demonstrated that their appellate remedy is
inadequate. If the trial court, like the court of appeals, had ruled contrary to relators
that is, if it had denied discovery instead of allowing it, relators could not obtain
mandamus relief without demonstrating either that they fall within one of the
situations described in Walker when appeal may be inadequate, or that appeal is
inadequate for some other reason. Relators have done neither. Without this showing,
mandamus should issue only if the inadequate remedy by appeal requirement does
not apply when mandamus is sought against a court of appeals, or if the right to
appeal is always inadequate in these circumstances. Neither Walker nor any other
decision by this Court limits application of this requirement to decisions of trial
courts, and there is no rational basis for doing so. There is no reason to think that
appeal is somehow less adequate because the last ruling was by the court of appeals
rather than the trial court. The issue, adequate redress, is the same in either case.
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Hecht concluded his opinion by noting that although the court
acknowledged the requirement, it refused to enforce the requirea meaningless one-sentence liturgy
ment, as it has become "but
369
benediction."
the
before
Over the next thirteen years, the court never rejected the
"litany" required for the issuance of mandamus, but it continued
its "tradition" prior to Walker of infrequently analyzing the issue,
doing so only when it was convenient for the desired result.
However, during this period of time dissenting opinions continued
to remind the court and the Bar that there was more to the
extraordinary remedy than simple rhetoric.3 ° In a relatively few
number of cases, the court actually analyzed the adequacy issue.
For example, in Anglin Co. v. Tipps,3 7 ' the court conditionally
issued a writ of mandamus to direct a trial court to order the
claims in dispute to proceed to arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act.3 7 2 In Anglin, a contractor moved to compel
arbitration pursuant to a contractual provision that provided for
arbitration of all matters arising under the contract that could be
subjected to arbitration.3 7 3 Notwithstanding the contractual provision, the trial court denied arbitration of the Deceptive Trade
Following the
Practices Act (DTPA) claims in the case. 3 7 4
appellate court's overruling of the contractor's motion for leave to
file a petition for writ of mandamus, the contractor filed for leave
to file a writ of mandamus in the supreme court.3 7 5 After initially
Thus, relators must meet the second requirement for mandamus directed to the court
of appeals in the same way as for mandamus directed to the trial court. Here, they
have not shown that they can.
Scott, 843 S.W.2d at 442 (citations omitted).
369. Id.
370. See., e.g., In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 202 (Tex. 1999) (orig.

proceeding) (Baker, J., dissenting) (lamenting the court's return to the more lenient
standard of requiring the appellate remedy to be as "equally convenient, beneficial, and
effective as mandamus"); In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding)
(Baker, J.,dissenting) (observing that the court was only "paying lip service about the lack
of an adequate appellate remedy"); Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923
S.W.2d 500, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (Baker, J., dissenting) (asserting that more

was required for mandamus than a determination that the trial court abused its discretion
and that a quick fix was desired).
371. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
372. Id. at 273.
373. Id. at 267.

374. Id. at 268.
375. Id.
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determining that the trial court had abused its discretion in failing
to apply the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to the DTPA
claim, 3 7 6 the court turned its attention to a determination of
whether there was an adequate remedy by appeal.3 7 7 The court
acknowledged that both the Texas and federal arbitration statutes
provided for interlocutory appeals from orders granting or denying
requests to compel arbitration under each respective statute. 3 7 8
However, as "federal procedure [did] not apply in Texas" when
applying the FAA, 3 7 9 there was no right to an interlocutory
appeal from a state court's order denying a motion to compel
arbitration under the FAA. 3 80 Thus, absent the availability of
mandamus relief, the party would have to wait for a judgment in
the underlying litigation, and then raise the arbitration issue on
appeal from that final judgment. The court, obviously having
already made up its mind, did not consider this possibility in its
phrasing of the issue: "When a Texas court enforces or refuses to
enforce an arbitration agreement pursuant to the Federal Act, we
must determine whether that decision should be reviewed by
interlocutory appeal or mandamus."' 3 8 1 Then the court observed
that an interlocutory appeal of this order was not available under

376. Anglin, 842 S.W.2d at 271. Initially, the court observed that the FAA applied to
all contractual disputes involving interstate commerce, and then determined that the
evidence presented to the trial court clearly established that the contract in question
involved interstate commerce. Id. at 269-70 & n.6. Then, noting that the FAA preempted
state laws in order to achieve its goal of creating an expedited and less expensive means to
resolve disputes, the court held that the DTPA claims were subject to arbitration under
the FAA. Id. at 271.
377. Id. (citing Walker for the proposition that mandamus would not issue when the
trial court's abuse of discretion could be corrected by appeal).
378. Id. at 271-72 (citing both the federal and states statutes). Thus, when a decision
was entered following a hearing under the FAA, an interlocutory appeal was available;
likewise when an order was entered following a hearing under the state arbitration statute,
an interlocutory appeal was available from that decision.
379. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
380. Id. The court acknowledged that other than limited statutory exceptions in the
case of some interlocutory orders, appeals in Texas were available only from final orders
or judgments. Id. While there was a statutory exception for the trial court's denial of a
motion to arbitrate under the state statute, there was no such exception for a trial court's
denial of a motion to arbitrate under the federal statute. Id. at n.10. (citing Article 2382(a) of the then Texas Revised Civil Statutes, presently codified at section 171.098 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code).
381. Id. at 272 & n.ll. (listing various state courts of appeals opinions that permitted
either interlocutory appeal or mandamus when trial courts had denied applications to
compel arbitration).
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thus, the "only" recourse would be to permit
the Texas law, 3 8 2 3and
83
mandamus relief.

Referring to the time honored principle, the court stated that
mere expense and time delays caused by appeal would not support
the issuance of mandamus, but if the subject matter of the appeal
were "vitiated" and rendered "illusory," mandamus would be
available. 384 The court concluded that, absent mandamus relief,
the relator "would be deprived of the benefits of the arbitration
clause it contracted for, and the purpose of providing a rapid,
inexpensive alternative to traditional litigation would be
defeated."' 38 5 In making such a pronouncement the court cited no
authority. However, it is clear from the opinion that the decision
was based upon policy considerations, not mandamus
jurisprudence. While giving lip service to the Walker tenet, the
court's decision to permit "mandamus to fill th[e] gap in appellate
jurisdiction '3 86 was probably motivated by the court's awareness
that the United States Supreme Court would review any decision
382. Anglin, 842 S.W.2d at n.12. (stating that under federal law district courts have
the power to certify interlocutory appeals).
383. Id. at 272. The court acknowledged the cumbersome remedy that parties would
have in cases where the trial court denied their application to compel arbitration. Id.
They would be required to pursue "an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's denial
under" state law as well as "mandamus from the denial under the Federal Act." Id.
384. Id. Two years later, in Freis v. Canales, 877 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. 1994) (orig.
proceeding), the court held that "a party who is compelled to arbitrate [under the FAA]
without having [contractually] agreed to do so" could obtain mandamus relief. The court
explained that, just as in Anglin, when the party "ha[d] lost its bargained-for right to
arbitrat[e]" by being required to resolve the dispute through litigation, the relator in Freis
had lost his right to have the matter resolved by litigation, and thus "ha[d] no adequate
remedy by appeal." Id. But see In re Palacios, 221 S.W.3d 564, 565 (Tex. 2006) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that, absent satisfying a heavy burden, the FAA precludes
mandamus review of orders compelling arbitration if the underlying case was not
dismissed).
385. Anglin Co.v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272-73 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). The
court has continued to follow Anglin, permitting mandamus relief in cases where the
motion to arbitrate under the FAA has been denied. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180
S.W.3d 127, 130 & n.7 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc.,
173 S.W.3d 67, 69-70 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); In re AdvancePCS Health, L.P., 172
S.W.3d 603, 608-09 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367, 370 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding); In re L & L Kempwood Assocs., L.P., 9 S.W.3d 125,128 & n.18.
(Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding). The Texas Supreme Court has also held that when a party
is denied the right to arbitrate under the laws of another state, he is entitled to mandamus
relief. In re J.D. Edwards World Solutions Co., 87 S.W.3d 546, 551 (Tex. 2002) (orig.
proceeding).
386. Anglin, 842 S.W.2d at 272.
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denying the contractual right to arbitrate under the FAA because
to allow state court litigation to "run its course would defeat the
core purpose of a contract to arbitrate."'3 87 In fact, Chief Justice
Phillips observed in a later opinion that the Texas Supreme Court
viewed the United States Supreme Court's Southland case "as a
mandate from our nation's highest court to provide an extra'3 88
ordinary remedy."
The court should have taken the opportunity to place these
statements in concert with its earlier precedent, that an appeal is
inadequate if it involves the loss of substantial legal rights. Or
perhaps assert that in this case an appeal would have been tedious
and ineffective as the party would have been forced to litigate his
claim, lose, and then win an appeal on the issue of arbitration in
order to effectuate his right. While alluding to these arguments in
the opinion, the court refused to cite its earlier precedent and
clearly chose to place the issue of arbitration rights under the
federal protective policy. Such an approach is ineffective in trying
to develop a coherent body of rational judgments in the area of
mandamus.
Furthermore, absent another compelling federal
policy, the court's failure makes it harder to rely upon this case as
precedent in the future.
Although taking the opportunity to examine the adequacy of the
legal remedy, the court took further liberties with mandamus
38 9
jurisprudence in the case of CanadianHelicoptersLtd. v. Wittig,
where the court denied mandamus relief to a foreign corporation
whose special appearance had been denied. 3 90 The court stated
that "the requirement that relator lack an adequate remedy by

387. Id. at 273 n.14 (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1984)).
388. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 142 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (citing three factors influencing the mandamus

remedy in FAA cases).
389. Canadian Helicopters

Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. 1994)

(orig.

proceeding).
390. Id. at 310 (denying mandamus relief because the relator had failed to establish
the inadequacy of the remedy by appeal), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of
May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, sec. 1, § 51.014(a)(7), 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.

4936, 4937 (Vernon) (current version codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006)). Chief Justice Philips, the author of Walker,
writing for the majority, stated that the court's opinion would focus on whether or not this
defendant who was denied a special appearance lacked an adequate remedy by appeal. Id.

at 305-06 (reciting that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and that a heavy burden is
placed on a relator to show the inadequacy of a remedy by appeal).
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[way of] appeal ... [was] met only when parties are in danger of
permanently losing substantial rights."' 3 9 1 Initially, the court

rejected the relator's argument that it would be time consuming
and inconvenient to be forced to try the case before being able to
obtain review of the trial court's order on appeal.3 92 The court
then briefly distinguished two generally recognized exceptions to
391. Id. (citing no authority but noting that mere expense or delay would not satisfy
this requirement). This phrase, without the word "permanently," first became a lynchpin
of mandamus jurisprudence in Texas in lley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 368, 311 S.W.2d 648,
652 (1958) (orig. proceeding) (citing Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 51-52, 291 S.W.2d
677, 683 (1956) (orig. proceeding)) (holding that interference by way of mandamus "is
justified only when parties st[ood] to lose their substantial rights"). The Womack court
put it in these words:
The express purpose of the rule is to further convenience and avoid prejudice, and
thus promote the ends of justice. When all of the facts and circumstances of the case
unquestionably require a separate trial to prevent manifest injustice, and there is no
fact or circumstance supporting or tending to support a contrary conclusion, and the
legal rights of the parties will not be prejudiced thereby, there is no room for the
exercise of discretion. The rule then is peremptory in operation and imposes upon
the court a duty to order a separate trial. While the refusal to grant a separate trial
under such circumstances is usually termed a clear abuse of discretion, it is
nevertheless a violation of a plain legal duty. If it also appears that the injustice
resulting from such refusal cannot later be remedied on appeal, the action of the court
is subject to control by mandamus.
Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 683. The Walker court also stated that an appellate remedy is
inadequate "when parties stand to lose their substantial rights." Walker v. Packer, 827
S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (citing ley, 311 S.W.2d at 652). The three
examples given in Walker in the discovery context all involved a permanent loss that could
not be remedied by appeal. Id. at 843-44 (referring to an erroneous order requiring "the
disclosure of privileged information," the denial of discovery materials necessary for a
party to present a claim or defense, or those situations where the material would not be in
the record so that there would be no ability for an appellate court to determine if error
had occurred in not requiring the material to be produced). The court has continued to
hold that an appeal is not an adequate remedy if it occurs too late to prevent the
permanent loss of a substantial right. See, e.g., In re Kansas City S. Indus., Inc., 139
S.w.3d 669, 670 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (stating that "[a]n appeal is inadequate
when it comes too late to correct the court's error without the loss of substantial rights to
the complaining party"); see also Mantas v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 659
(Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (granting conditional mandamus relief to abate appeal
pending enforcement of settlement agreement as a lot of the settlement's benefit would be
lost if relator were "required to expend time and resources in prosecuting the appeal");
Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272-73 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (granting
conditional mandamus relief to enforce a contractual arbitration agreement to prevent the
loss of a bargained for right).
392. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 306 (stating that these "factors alone can never justify
mandamus relief"). The court stated that mandamus was not permitted in the case of
erroneous refusal to dismiss a case on subject matter grounds, and it could not distinguish
that position from an erroneous refusal to dismiss on grounds of personal jurisdiction. Id.
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the rule that mandamus would not lie to remedy an erroneous trial
court decision on a special appearance, 3 9 3 rejected relator's
393. Id. at 306-07. The court had in an earlier opinion recognized a comity
exception. United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. 1977) (orig.
proceeding). In Ashley the court authorized mandamus following a trial court's overruling
of a special appearance filed by Mexico because of concerns with comity and foreign
affairs involved with the issues of Mexico's sovereign immunity. Id. (instructing the trial
court to vacate its order overruling Mexico's special appearance). The Wittig court noted
that those principles were not in play in this case. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 306-07. The
comity exception to the general prohibition of mandamus review of denials of special
appearance was more fully explained by the court in K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 593
(Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding), which held that an appeal is not an adequate remedy when
issues of sovereign immunity and comity are involved because of "the risk of harm to
interstate and international relations likely to occur if a Texas trial court erroneously
exercises jurisdiction over another sovereign." Id.
The second exception to the general rule involved child custody cases where the court
observed "that the remedy by appeal is frequently inadequate to protect the rights of
children and parents." Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 307. The Wittig court cites its earlier opinion
in Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding), which granted
conditional mandamus relief because of the failure of the trial court to transfer a custody
dispute to the required venue in spite of the availability of an appeal because "j]ustice
demands a speedy resolution of child custody" cases. Proffer, 734 S.W.2d at 673. The
court has continued to give special treatment to cases involving children in custodial
matters. See, e.g., Geary v. Peavy, 878 S.W.2d 602, 603-04 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding)
(holding that mandamus is an appropriate remedy to resolve a jurisdictional dispute
involving child custody matters). In Geary, the trial court denied a motion to dismiss the
child custody case even though a Minnesota court had acquired jurisdiction of the matter
first. Id. at 603. While the relator could have clearly appealed the order denying the
motion to vacate the custody case, the court granted mandamus relief without discussing
the inadequacy of the remedy and referring only to "the unique and compelling
circumstances." Id. (giving no citations to support its position). However, more recently
the court denied mandamus relief in a case involving the trial court's refusal to dismiss a
termination suit. The mandamus was denied because the court felt that the statutory
accelerated appeal provided an adequate remedy. See In re Tex. Dep't of Family &
Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613-14 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) ("[Ain
accelerated appeal provided an adequate remedy."). The court noted:
We do not hold that a party complaining of a trial court's failure to dismiss a SAPCR
within the statutory deadline could never be entitled to mandamus relief, but under
the facts of this case, we cannot conclude that an accelerated appeal was not an
adequate remedy. Impending transfer of physical possession of the children or a trial
court's unreasonable delay in entering a final decree might alter this conclusion, but
this record raises neither concern. In fact, because the trial court entered the final
decree on August 13, 2004, Ludwig and Higdon could have initiated an accelerated
appeal under section 263.403 of the Texas Family Code at worst two days after they
filed their petitions for writ of mandamus.
Id. at 614. But see In re Francis 186 S.W.3d 534, 538, 543 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)
(granting mandamus conditionally in a non-child custody case because the statutory
expedited appeal was inadequate in that it could not be completed before the issue in
question became moot).
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federal due process argument, 3 94 and dismissed the relator's
assertion that its defense would be severely compromised absent
mandamus relief. 3 95 The court then opened Pandora's Box by
asserting by way of dictum that mandamus might lie in the case of
"truly extraordinary circumstances":
We do not foreclose the possibility that a trial court, in denying
a special appearance, may act with such disregard for guiding
principles of law that the harm to the defendant becomes
irreparable, exceeding mere increased cost and delay. In such a
situation, a defendant's remedy by appeal may be inadequate and
mandamus therefore appropriate. However, regardless of whether
or not the trial court in this instance erred, this is not the type of
extraordinary situation where mandamus should be considered. 396
Thus, the court was asserting that an appeal following a trial in
which the court denied a special appearance might be inadequate
in those situations where the trial court acted in an arbitrary
fashion causing the defendant irreparable harm. Although not
clear, given the court's earlier rulings, this irreparable harm was
probably meant to be similar to the loss of substantial rights.
Unfortunately, the court gave no examples of what it meant by
extraordinary circumstances and left it to later decisions to explain
more fully when such situations would occur. Justice Hecht's
394. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 307-08.
395. Id. at 308. In Walker the court used the phrase "waste of judicial resources" in
discussing a party's inability to present a viable claim in a case in which the court had
denied discovery. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843. The relator obviously latched on to this
language and asserted that having to try a case which would result in an obvious reversal
would be a waste of judicial resources. The court rejected this argument on the basis of
Walker. Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 308 n.l (Tex. 1994) (orig
proceeding), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 1296, sec. 1, § 51.014(a)(7), 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4936, 4937 (Vernon) (current
version codified at TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2006)).
396. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 308-09. Clearly recognizing the lack of authority for such
bold obiter dictum, the court attempted to bolster its position by arguing that it was
merely following the trend of some other states by authorizing mandamus review of
special appearances in cases of extraordinary circumstances, but the majority of the cases
cited authorized the issuance of a writ of prohibition (not a mandamus). Id. at 309.
Instead of analyzing the differences between the various states' writs or their respective
jurisdictional authority for authorizing the issuance of such writs, the court merely cites
American Jurisprudence for the proposition that "substantially identical principles control
the" two writs. Id. at 309 n.12. While acknowledging that mandamus relief in such cases
was not the consensus nationwide, the court then noted that some states provided for
interlocutory appeals in these cases. Id. at 309 n.13.
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dissenting opinion in Wittig called the majority to ask for confusing
mandamus jurisprudence. 3 97 He was especially critical of the
dictum in the case involving "a super-clear abuse of discretion
[that made an] appeal an inadequate remedy" in cases of special
appearance. 39 8 He noted that, until this opinion, the two
fundamental tenets of mandamus had worked independently-a
finding of an abuse of discretion did not lead to the authority to
issue a mandamus unless there was also a finding of an inadequate
remedy by appeal. 3 9 9 Now, according to Justice Hecht, in special
appearance cases, unless this "extraordinary situations" language
has broader application, 40 0 all that was necessary for the court to
have the authority to issue a mandamus was to find extraordinary
circumstances. 40 1 Although Justice Hecht was correct to be
critical of the opinion of the court, the dictum stated that in
extraordinary situations the appellate remedy might be
inadequate, apparently implying that the court would still have to
initiate an evaluation of the appellate remedy before granting
mandamus relief.4 0 2 However, as later cases would establish,
Justice Hecht's premonition was more than accurate.
Following Wittig, the court began to grant mandamus relief in
cases where the trial courts had denied special appearances to
nonresidents based upon the "extraordinary situations" dictum in
Wittig. All the court did was locate exceptional circumstances in
the record, rely upon the Wittig dictum, and issue the conditional

397. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 310-11 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (arguing that the opinion
lacked not only clarity but also consistency with other opinions of the court). He chided
the majority for what he viewed as its inconsistency in finding an adequate remedy in the
case of a denial of a special appearance, but finding the remedy inadequate in the case of a
denial of a right to arbitrate under the FAA. Id. at 311.
398. Id. at 310.
399. Id. (explaining that until this decision the determination of whether an appellate
remedy was adequate had never depended on whether the ruling was "arguably wrong, or
probably wrong, or even blatantly wrong").
400. Id. (observing that the court did not say whether this exception was only for
cases of erroneous denials of special appearance or was to have broader application).
401. Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 310-11 (Tex. 1994) (orig.
proceeding) (noting that it would have been helpful had the court given some guidance in
the difference between the various types of abuse of discretion), superseded by statute on
other grounds, Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, sec. 1, § 51.014(a)(7), 1997
Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4936, 4937 (Vernon) (current version codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006)).
402. Id. at 308-09 (majority opinion).
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writ of mandamus. In National IndustrialSand Ass'n v. Gibson,4 ° 3
the court granted mandamus relief upon a finding that the trial
court was clearly erroneous in overruling the defendant's special
appearance on grounds that irreparable harm would befall the
defendant if the error was not corrected until after a trial on the
merits.4 ° 4 The court briefly reviewed the record and concluded
that there was no evidence to support either general or specific
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.4 °5 Thus, "the 'total
and inarguable absence of jurisdiction' justifies extraordinary
relief."' 4 0 6 The majority apparently read Wittig to mean that if the
extraordinary circumstances existed, then the appeal was
inadequate without any showing. 40 7 The dissent asserted that this
case was not one of the two recognized exceptions that the court
had identified in Wittig in which an appeal might be inadequate, 40 8
and thus, the defendant needed to establish that the appeal was
indeed inadequate. The dissent stated that not only had the
defendant failed to establish that appeal would be inadequate,40 9
403. Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n. v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769 (1995) (orig. proceeding).
404. Id. at 771 (asserting that this case fell within the Wittig exception because the
exercise of jurisdiction in this case was "with such disregard for guiding principles of law
that the harm to the defendant becomes irreparable").
405. Id. at 774-76.
406. Id. at 776 (citing Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 309) (asserting that other states granted
relief in special appearance cases where there were extraordinary circumstances). The
Wittig court was in turn quoting Barnes v. Thomas, 635 P.2d 135, 136 (Wash. 1981).
However, unlike Gibson or Wittig, Barnes involved a lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and a writ of prohibition. Id. at 136-37.
407. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d at 771, 776. Initially, the majority recited the general rule
that an appeal was an adequate remedy to the "denial of a special appearance." Id. at 771.
It then stated that the Wittig rule made an exception in the case where the denial of the
special appearance was in total disregard of the law. Id. It then found that the Wittig
exception applied to this case, and in one sentence concluded that an appeal would be
inadequate because of the irreparable harm "caused by the trial court's denial of the
special appearance." Id. at 776. Wittig, of course, had stated in its infamous dictum that in
the case of extraordinary circumstances an appeal may be inadequate. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d
at 308-09. From the wording, one would assume that the relator would still have to carry
his burden of showing the inadequacy. The Gibson majority clearly felt this was not
necessary. Gibson,897 S.W.2d at 771.
408. Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n. v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 777 (Tex. 1995) (orig.
proceeding) (Cornyn, J., dissenting) (referring to parent-child relationship cases and those
involving matters of comity).
409. Id. The dissent noted that the defendant "makes no argument that it will suffer
any particular harm as a result of being put to an appeal other than that being put to trial
will violate its right to due process." Id. Of course, Walker had held that the relator had
to establish that the appellate remedy was inadequate. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,
840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
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but also that the court had given no explanation of how the appeal
would be inadequate. 4 10 The dissent correctly understood the
dictum in Wittig to require a showing that the remedy was
inadequate even in the case of extraordinary situations.4 1 '
Shortly thereafter, the court granted another mandamus in a
special appearance case. In CSR Ltd. v. Link,4 12 the court held
that the problems inherent in mass tort cases gave rise to
extraordinary circumstances that made an appeal from a clearly
erroneous special appearance decision inadequate.4 13 The court
identified three factors that made the appeal inadequate and which
supported the court's conditional issuance of mandamus in the
case. First, there was the large number of additional lawsuits to
which the nonresident defendant might become exposed as the
case was progressing through the litigation process.4 1 4 Second,
the court stated that defendants in mass tort cases were under
severe financial strains, causing significant pressure to settle cases
notwithstanding the underlying merits of the cases. 4 1 5 A speedy
resolution that the nonresident defendant was not amenable to
process in Texas would extricate the defendant from many of these
claims. The final factor that the court considered was "[t]he most
efficient use of the state's judicial resources."'4 16 The time spent,
410. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d at 777 (Cornyn, J., dissenting) ("If the Court is free to
ignore that tenet [inadequate remedy by appeal as a fundamental tenet of mandamus
practice] in this case, it may as well begin issuing extraordinary writs to correct denials of
summary judgments.").
411. Id. (stating that the Wittig dictum did not "dispense with the required showing of
inadequate appellate remedy").
412. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
413. Id. at 596. The court clearly recognized that even in the case of extraordinary
circumstances the appeal still needed to be inadequate to justify mandamus relief.
414. Id. at 596 (stating that the potentially large number of lawsuits to which the
relator might be exposed was a significant factor in the court's determination that appeal
was inadequate in this case).
415. Id.
416. Link, 925 S.W.2d at 596-97 (arguing that "[b]ecause of the size and complexity
of the asbestos litigation, the most prudent use of judicial resources" was to permit a writ
of mandamus to be used to decide the question of jurisdiction). The court relied upon
Walker to support the argument that this matter could "overtax the state's judicial
resources." Id. at 597. This reference to Walker is misplaced as the only discussion in
Walker on waste of judicial resources concerned the waste in trying a case without being
able to present an adequate defense or claim because the court had denied discovery.
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Walker was not
referring to wasted resources in trying cases that would ultimately be reversed, as was the
case in Link. In fact, the court had rejected the very same argument in Wittig, albeit
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the cost to the state, and the use of judicial resources, would all be
for naught as the case would ultimately be reversed because of the
improper determination made on the special appearance. Thus,
the court held that the circumstances of the case justified granting
mandamus relief to resolve the personal jurisdiction issue.4 17
Justice Baker dissented and pointed out that the court's new
standard in cases of special appearances was not supported by
precedent. 4 18 He suggested that, given the perceived problems in
the area of special appearance, either Rule 120a be amended to
permit interlocutory appeals in cases of denials of special
appearance, 419 or th
the legislature enact a provision that would
allow for interlocutory appeals in special appearance cases.4 2 0
involving only one lawsuit. Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 308 n.l
(Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of May 27,
1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, sec. 1, § 51.014(a)(7), 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4936, 4937
(Vernon) (current version codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7)

(Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006)). In any event, apparently the waste of judicial resources
argument has survived to become a standard approach in these cases of exceptional
circumstances under the Wittig rule. For example, the court used the same logic in finding
an inadequate remedy by appeal because of the time and expense involved in In re E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 92 S.W.3d 517, 523-24 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding). The
court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus to compel the trial courts to vacate their
orders denying a motion to dismiss under the statutory forum non conveniens, finding the
remedy by appeal inadequate because the defendant faced more than 8,000 plaintiffs in
litigation that had already lasted six years and could last many more. Id. at 524.
417. Link, 925 S.W.2d at 597 (noting again the concerns of judicial efficiency in mass
torts and the magnitude of potential risk for the defendant). As in Wittig, the court noted
that permitting mandamus relief from the denial of special appearance in extraordinary
circumstances was in accord with other jurisdictions. In support of this statement it cited
some of the same cases that it had relied on in Wittig. In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Baker tried to distinguish all of the state cases. Id. at 602-03 (Baker, J., dissenting) (listing
his analysis under the heading "The Court's Authorities Are Flawed").
418. Id. at 603-04. Justice Baker chastised the court for ignoring precedent and
paying lip service to the doctrine of stare decisis. Id. He concluded by asserting that
"[m]andamus should not issue simply because we disagree with a trial court's ruling." Id.
at 604.
419. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 601 (explaining that the court itself had
already provided for interlocutory appeals from orders sealing court records through
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76(a)(8)).
420. Id. at 601-02. The court noted that the legislature had already authorized
interlocutory appeals in other pre-trial matters. Asserting that under his reading of 120a
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, appeal following final judgment was the remedy
when a special appearance was denied, and absent legislative authorization for an
interlocutory appeal; there was no interlocutory remedy available. Id. at 601. The
legislature responded and in 1997 enacted legislation authorizing interlocutory appeals
from the denial of a special appearance. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(7)

(Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006).
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The court continued to apply the Wittig extraordinary situations
approach in later cases, but, in an attempt to placate the criticism
of some of the earlier dissenting opinions, began to address the
availability of an alternative legal remedy. However, its decisions
uniformly found that in those cases of exceptional circumstances,
the remedy by appeal was just not as effective as mandamus.
Furthermore, the court expanded its extraordinary situations cases
beyond the area of special appearance. For example, in the 1999
case In re Masonite Corp.,421 the court applied the exception to a
trial court's order transferring venue.4 2 2 In Masonite, hundreds of
homeowners had filed suit in Jim Hogg and Duval counties
alleging that defective materials had been used in the building of
their homes. 4 2 3 In the large majority of suits, the counties in
which the suits were filed were not counties of proper venue
because the alleged defective building materials were not installed
in the counties of suit insofar as the homeowners' residences were
located in other counties.4 2 4 The defendant filed a motion to
transfer venue to the county of its principal place of business.4 2 5
The plaintiffs then sought to have the court sever their claims and
transfer the cases to the various counties of residence of the
plaintiffs.4 2 6 The trial court overruled all motions and "'on its
own motion,' severed the claims of the non-resident homeowners
and transferred them to the counties of their respective
residences," which would have been counties of proper venue if
the individual plaintiffs had originally filed suit there.4 2 7 The
421. In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding).
422. Id. at 198-99.
423. Id. at 195-96.

424. Id. at 196. The plaintiffs asserted venue under a portion of the general venue
rule that provided that the plaintiff could bring his suit "in the county in which all or a

substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(a)(1) (Vernon 2002).
425. In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 196. The general venue rule also provides
that venue may be proper "in the county of the defendant's principal office in this state, if

the defendant is not a natural person." TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002 (a)(3)
(Vernon 2002).
426. In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 196.

427. Id. Proper venue means a county of mandatory venue, or if not applicable, a
county provided by the general rule or the permissive venue provisions. TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE § 15.001(b) (Vernon 2002). As no mandatory provision applied, had the
plaintiffs filed under the general venue rule in the counties where all or a substantial part
of the events took place, those counties would have been counties of proper venue.

However, since a large portion of the homeowners acknowledged that venue was not
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defendant, asserting that the claims of the nonresident plaintiffs
should have been transferred to the county of its principal place of
business, sought mandamus relief. After being denied mandamus
relief in the court of appeals, the relator sought mandamus relief in
the supreme court. 4 28 The court initially held that the trial court
decision "was a clear abuse of discretion."' 42 9 The majority
opinion held that this case was one of exceptional circumstances
where appeal presents an inadequate remedy. 4 30 The exceptional
circumstances were identified as the strains this suit would place
on the parties and the judicial resources of the state because, as the
court put the matter: "[C]laims of hundreds of plaintiffs, instead of
being tried in a proper forum, are now being tried in multiple
improper forums-all trials with automatic reversible error. There
is no reason for
the resources of Texas courts and the parties to be
43 1
so strained."

proper in the county of suit, and the defendant had offered prima facie proof that Dallas
was a county of proper venue, the cases should have been transferred to Dallas. In re
Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 197. Instead, the court improperly severed the various
claims and, on its own, transferred the cases to the respective counties of residence of the
various defendants. The supreme court held that the court had no discretion but to
transfer the nonresident plaintiffs' cases to the county specified in the defendant's motion
to transfer venue as it had offered prima facie proof that that county was a county of
proper venue. Id. at 197-98.
428. In re Masonite Corp.. 997 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding)
(stating that the court of appeals had denied relief because of the remedy by appeal). In
both the court of appeals and the supreme court, the relator argued that the order of the
trial court was void; therefore, the relator was entitled to the mandamus relief without
regard to whether it had an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 198. The supreme court did
not address this issue because it determined that the order, although contrary to the
statute, was not void, but erroneous. Id. at 198-99.
429. Id. at 197-98. The clear abuse of discretion was apparent to the court because
the trial court transferred the cases on its own motion, without any authority, to counties
other than those established at the hearing to be counties of proper venue.
430. Id. at 198-99 (citing Wittig in support of the proposition that truly extraordinary
circumstances would render a remedy by appeal inadequate).
431. In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 198. The court cited the Link case in
support of this proposition. In Link, the court stated that the use of the state's judicial
resources in an efficient manner was a factor in determining whether an appeal was
adequate. CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (citing
Walker and concluding that under the circumstances of the case, a trial on the merits and
appeal, would "overtax" the judicial resources). This reference to Walker is misplaced, as
the only discussion in Walker on "wasted resources" concerned the waste in trying a case
without being able to present an adequate defense or claim because the court had denied
discovery. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). Walker
was not referring to wasted resources in trying cases that would ultimately be reversed, as
was the case in Masonite.
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The court distinguished the Masonite situation from the normal
situation where a court denied a motion to transfer venue and the
effects were only on one court and the respective parties,4 3 2
whereas in this case the effects would have been felt in fourteen
different counties.4 3 3 The dissent decried the court's failure to
adhere to precedent and noted that there were none of the
"exceptional circumstances" that the court found in Link,4 3 4 nor
was the built-in reversible error a sufficient exceptional circumstance. 4 35 The dissent was apparently concerned with the court
expanding review of preliminary matters determined by the trial
court without legislative authorization.4 3 6 Not being a special
432. In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 199 & n.31 (noting that in such a case, even
in the case of reversible error, mandamus would not issue) (citing Polaris Inv. Mgmt.
Corp. v. Abascal, 892 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1995)).
433. The court went on to explain that in this case, the burden would involve
"fourteen other counties, hundreds of potential jurors [and large amounts of taxpayers'
money]." Id. The focus on judicial resources rather than the impact upon the defendant
to arrive at the Wittig exceptional circumstances exception was belittled by the dissent in
this case. Justice Baker chided the majority:
The majority asserts it does not retreat from Walker's requirement that there be no
adequate appellate remedy before mandamus will issue. But the majority then
focuses on preserving judicial and public resources instead of the parties' rights. The
majority does not explain why mandamus relief should not be granted in each case
where reversible error exists, because doing so would certainly preserve judicial and
public resources. Additionally, the majority expresses discomfort to being an
"accomplice to sixteen trials that will amount to little more than a fiction." What if,
instead of sixteen trials, there were just ten? Five? How much "waste of judicial and
public resources" should be tolerated before a Court grants mandamus relief? The
fallacy in the majority's decision is that the Court no longer has, nor does it provide,
guidance on this issue for future cases.
Id. at 200-01 (Baker, J., dissenting).
434. Id. at 201. Justice Baker distinguished the court's reliance on the Link case by
pointing out that in Masonite the number of potential plaintiffs was fixed, and not being a
mass tort case, there was no inherent pressure to settle the case irrespective of the merits.
435. See id. at 201-02 (arguing that determining built-in reversible error as an
exceptional circumstance is directly contrary to the findings in Wittig and Walker).
436. In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d at 202 (arguing that as both the venue statute
and the rules of procedure prohibit interlocutory appeals from a trial court's
determination of a venue matter, the granting of mandamus relief in this case would
circumvent this policy). Since the interlocutory appeal of trial court venue determinations
had been repealed in 1983, the court had been consistent prior to this decision in denying
mandamus relief from trial court venue determinations, as they were viewed as incidental
rulings correctable on appeal. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of
Appeals, 929 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) ("[V]enue determinations
[were] incidental trial rulings that [were] correctable on appeal."); Montalvo v. Fourth
Court of Appeals, 917 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (holding that no appeal
was available from a trial court's venue determination). However, the court had on rare

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:3

appearance case, the Masonite opinion was clearly an
impermissible extension of the Wittig dictum and its progeny. The
Masonite decision, however, represents the court's growing
intolerance with the unwillingness of trial courts to interpret and
apply the law correctly to the matters before them. While one can
empathize with the court's frustration, the result is a growing body
of law in the area of mandamus that is inconsistent and incoherent.
This frustration of the court became more apparent just before
the Prudential decision, as the court uniformly began to grant
mandamus relief in cases of clear abuses of discretion by the trial
court and would dispense with the Walker requirement that the
relator establish an inadequacy of the remedy by appeal. For
example, the court's holding in In re Ford Motor, Co. 437 ordered
Ford to pay the plaintiffs, as sanctions, $10,000,000 within ten days,
and $25,000 in the event Ford sought a mandamus to challenge the
various sanctions that were imposed on Ford as a result of
discovery abuse. 4 3 8 The court of appeals granted Ford's petition

occasion issued a mandamus to correct a trial court's improper application of venue
procedures without considering whether there was an adequate remedy at law. See Union
Carbide Corp. v. Moye, 798 S.W.2d 792, 792-93 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (holding
that the court had mandamus authority to compel a trial court to give a relator a
reasonable time to supplement a venue record prior to the venue determination in a case
involving a "motion to transfer venue on the ground that an impartial trial could not be
had" within the county of suit under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 257); Henderson v.
O'Neill, 797 S.W.2d 905, 905 (Tex.1990) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the court had
mandamus authority to compel a trial court to give the required days notice before the
venue hearing); Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding)
(holding that the mandatory venue provision of the Family Code in a child custody matter
could be enforced by mandamus). Since Masonite, the court has held that mandamus was
proper when a trial court attempted to set aside an order granting a motion to transfer
venue after its plenary power had expired. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605
(Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (holding that mandamus was proper when a trial court
signed an order vacating an order to transfer venue after its jurisdictional power of the
case expired).
In 1995, the legislature added a provision permitting mandamus as a statutory remedy
to enforce a mandatory venue provision. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642
(Vernon 2002). The court construed this provision to authorize mandamus, even without
a showing of an inadequate remedy at law. See In re Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 998 S.W.2d 212,
216 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (holding that under this section of the venue statute it
was not necessary to show an inadequate remedy by appeal).
437. In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
438. Id. at 718. The sanction order also required Ford to pay the plaintiffs
$10,000,000 within ten days. Id. The court of appeals issued a mandamus compelling "the
trial court to vacate the $10,000,000 sanction," but held that the attorneys' fees matter
"could be remedied [by] appeal." Id.
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for mandamus, directing the trial court to vacate "the $10,000,000
sanction [as] an arbitrary fine not authorized" under the Rules of
Civil Procedure, but left undisturbed the sanctions in the event
Ford sought mandamus relief.4 3 9 Ford then sought relief from the
supreme court. Although no date was specified for the payment of
this sum, the court held that the trial court had clearly abused its
discretion in requiring that the money be paid regardless of the
outcome of the mandamus proceeding. 4 4 0 The court asserted that
such an order would have a chilling effect on the exercise of the
rights of a party to seek mandamus relief. 4 4 1 While this proposition might be true in the abstract, the record in this case
clearly established that there was no chilling effect. The majority
also argued that a penalty imposed for the exercise of a
prospective right would require an assessment on the part of the
defendant as to whether it desired to continue the litigation.4 4 2
Again, the evidence conclusively established that the sanctions did
not "skew" the case such as to make an appeal inadequate.4 4 3
Thus, totally ignoring the circumstances of the case before it, the
court held that an appeal was inadequate whenever "a court
imposes a monetary penalty on a party's prospective exercise of its

439. Ford Motor Co. v. Tyson, 943 S.W.2d 527, 532 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997) (orig.
proceeding), mand. granted in part, In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1998)
(orig. proceeding) (holding that although the amount was immaterial the sanction was an
unauthorized arbitrary fine from which there was "no adequate remedy [by] appeal to
correct the unauthorized divestiture of ...ownership rights").
440. In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d at 721 (holding that the trial court abused its
discretion when it awarded appellate/mandamus attorneys' fees that were not conditioned
on the outcome of the proceeding).
441. Id. at 722.
442. Id. at 722-23 (relying by analogy on Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929
(Tex. 1991), where the court had held "that [an] appeal is not an adequate remedy for
monetary sanctions for discovery abuse ordered to be paid before final judgment if the
party's continuation of the litigation is threatened"). Again, there is nothing in the record
to reflect that Ford was in any way hindered by the sanction order. Id.
443. See In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d at 724 (Enoch, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (observing that the sanction had not prevented Ford from seeking a
mandamus); id. at 726 (Baker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reciting that
the record was clear that Ford could even pay the $10,000,000 and continue the case). The
majority opinion relied upon earlier precedent for the proposition that sanctions cannot be
permitted to skew the "procedural dynamics of the case." Id. at 722 (majority opinion)
(citing Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 595 (1996)) (holding
that a trial court's order requiring an insurance company to pay other party's attorneys'
fees so skewed the trial process that "remedy by appeal was inadequate").
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legal rights." 44' 4 The two dissenting opinions both argued that
neither Ford nor the court had established the inadequacy of the
remedy by appeal in this case.44 5 The opinion of the court was
just another example of the growing frustration of the Texas
Supreme Court with the incidental rulings of trial courts in the
state. While the granting of mandamus relief has always been case
specific, the court no longer seems bound by this limitation, and
will grant such relief whenever it is of the opinion that the trial
444. Id. at 723. The court gratuitously observed that the right to try to seek relief by
way of mandamus without penalty was forever lost, even if the money is recovered. It is
unclear if the court was attempting to equate the loss of this right to the loss of a
substantial right, which might justify mandamus relief in the proper case, or whether the
relator was trying to state what the compelling circumstances were for the issuance of the
writ. See, e.g., Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)
(stating that an appellate remedy was inadequate "when parties stand to lose their
substantial rights"); Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272-73 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding) (granting conditional mandamus relief to enforce a contractual arbitration
agreement to prevent the loss of a bargained for right). At the time of the Ford case, the
rules of appellate procedure required the applicant for the writ to state the compelling
reasons for the issuance of the writ. See TEX. R. APP. P. 121(a)(2)(D), 60 TEX. B.J. 876,
930 cmt. (Tex. 1986, repealed 1997) (the petition for mandamus "shall state the relief
sought and the basis for the relief, as well as the compelling circumstances which establish
the necessity for the writ to issue"). The present rule no longer contains this requirement
except in cases of concurrent jurisdiction between the courts of appeal and the supreme
court. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the rule requires that the writ must first be
presented to the lower court "unless there is a compelling reason not to do so," and the
petition in such a case "must state the compelling reason why the petition was not first
presented to the court of appeals." TEX. R. App. P. 52.3(e): see also Tilton v. Marshall, 925
S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (noting that Walker and Wittig, as well as
the rules of appellate procedure, require the presentation of compelling circumstances for
mandamus to issue).
From time to time, the court has referred to compelling
circumstances as being necessary for the issuance of mandamus-although it is unclear
whether it was referring to the requirement of the rule, or was referring to the
extraordinary circumstance announced in Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d
304, 309 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of
May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, sec. 1, § 51.014(a)(7), 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
4936, 4937 (Vernon) (current version codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006)); In re TXU Electric Co., 67 S.W.3d 130, 132
(Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding) (Phillips, C.J., concurring) (stating that mandamus would
not issue absent compelling circumstances); Republican Party of Tex. v. Dietz, 940 S.W.2d
86, 93-94 (Tex. 1997) (citing Geary v. Peavy, 878 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1994) (stating that the
compelling circumstances of the case justified the exercise of mandamus jurisdiction);
Geary v. Peavy, 878 S.W.2d 602, 603 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (holding that "the
unique and compelling circumstances" in a child custody case justified the exercise of
mandamus jurisdiction).
445. In re Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d at 723 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (Enoch,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 726 (Baker, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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court's ruling is arbitrary, capricious, or without legal justification.
In such cases, the court will find the appeal inadequate in the
abstract, and grant mandamus relief without examining the actual
facts and circumstances of the case before it.
Within weeks following Ford, the court conditionally granted a
petition for writ of mandamus in another case of a clear abuse4 4of6
discretion. The In re Allstate County Mutual Insurance Co.
court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by
incorrectly characterizing a valid appraisal clause contained in an
automobile insurance liability policy as an unenforceable
arbitration provision.4 4 7 The court, acknowledging that a finding
of an abuse of discretion alone did not justify mandamus relief
without a finding of an inadequate remedy by appeal, turned to
that issue.4 4 8 In a brief and cursory fashion, the court concluded
that the trial court's conclusion would deny the defendant the
development of proof going to the heart of the case and would
severely impact the defendant's ability to establish its defenses to
the plaintiff's claims.4 4 9 It is clear from a reading of the majority's
opinion that it was deeply troubled and frustrated with the trial
court's inability or unwillingness to apply the law correctly to this
case-a law that had been laid down in 1888.450 Given this fact, it

446. In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2002) (orig.
proceeding).
447. Id. at 196. The case involved a suit claiming that the insurance company had
violated statutory and common law duties in connection with valuation of the insured's
property damage under an automobile liability insurance policy. Id. at 195. The policy
contained an appraisal provision that governed the resolution of disputes concerning the
insured's vehicle's value. Id. After suit was filed, the insurance company filed a motion to
abate the proceedings and invoked the appraisal clause. Id. Denying the motion, the trial
court found the clause was an unenforceable arbitration agreement. Id. The supreme
court held this decision to be "[a] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law
correctly" and "constitute[d] an abuse of discretion." In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co.,
85 S.W.3d at 195.
448. Id. at 196.
449. Id. The court, by way of analogy, used the rule articulated in Walker, which
provided "that denial of discovery 'going to the heart of a party's case may render the
appellate remedy inadequate."' Id.
450. In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 195 & n.1 (Tex. 2002) (orig.
proceeding) (noting that in Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. v. Clancy, 71 Tex. 5, 8
S.W. 630, 631 (1888), the court had clearly "distinguished between appraisal and
arbitration clauses"); see also id. at 196 (reciting again that the courts in Texas have been
correctly "distinguish[ing] between appraisal and arbitration over a hundred years,"
during which time "they have enforced appraisal provisions"). Justice Baker, in obvious
displeasure with the court, asserted in his dissent that the court's real purpose in this case
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was going to issue the mandamus, but-to avoid substantial
criticism-took the time to address the inadequacy of the remedy.
However, Justice Baker in his dissent cogently pointed out that the
relator failed to establish that the trial court's order would hinder
it in making its defenses such that the trial would be a waste of
judicial resources. 4 5 1 He pointed out that the basis of the
plaintiffs' claims dealt with allegations of fraud in the initial
valuation process and not on the appraisal provision of the
insurance contract.4 5 2 He further asserted that there were other
methods for the relator to acquire the information to which the
trial court's ruling had limited its access.45 3 Once again the court,
out of noticeable frustration, merely substituted its opinion for
that of the trial court on an incidental preliminary matter while
paying lip service to the requirement of a finding of an inadequate
remedy by appeal.4 54
4 55
On the same day the court issued its decision in Prudential,
the court issued two additional opinions involving mandamus
relief. The first was a per curiam opinion in the case of In re Van
Waters & Rogers, Inc.,456 in which the court presented a rather
was "to avoid making the parties go through the time and expense of a trial" and appeal.
Id. at 200 (Baker, J., dissenting). The costs and delays caused by trial and appeal of a case
that would probably ultimately be reversed were not a sufficient basis for the exercise of
mandamus authority. See, e.g., Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding) (disapproving of previous "authorities to the extent that they imply that a
remedy by appeal is inadequate merely because it might involve more delay or cost than
mandamus").
451. In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d at 199 (Baker, J., dissenting)
(referring to the court's opinion as wholly advisory). Justice Baker agreed with the
majority that if the trial court's order had in fact deprived the insurer of putting on a
defense, the court should exercise its mandamus authority. Id. at 198. But he asserted
"the relator must 'establish the effective denial of a reasonable opportunity to develop the
merits of his or her case, so that the trial would be a waste of judicial resources."' Id. at
198 (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843). Absent such a showing, Justice Baker claimed that
the relator had failed to establish "that no adequate appellate remedy exist[ed]." Id.
452. In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 197 (Tex. 2002) (orig.
proceeding). Justice Baker observed that the court was unable to find any authority "that
the appraisal process' outcome is entirely dispositive of the breach of contract claim." Id.
at 199.
453. Id. at 198-99.
454. Id. at 200 (asserting that the court was careful not to suggest that it was
returning to the more lenient standard stated in Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W.
1063, 1068 (1926), that the appellate remedy needed to "be 'equally convenient, beneficial,
and effective as mandamus"').
455. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
456. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
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detailed discussion of the inadequacy of the appeal, giving the
appearance that the court was unaware that its discussion would
be rendered somewhat "meaningless" by the Prudential
decision.4 5 7 In Van Waters, over four hundred former employees
of a manufacturing company claimed injuries as a result of
exposure to various chemicals manufactured or distributed by over
fifty defendants.4 58 The "court consolidated the claims of twenty
of the plaintiffs and set those claims down for trial."'4 5 9 Following
the consolidation order, several of the defendants sought
mandamus from the court of appeals and, after being denied,
applied for relief from the supreme court. 4 6 0 After reviewing the
record, the court held "that the trial court abused its discretion in
consolidating" the various workplace tort claims of multiple
plaintiffs against multiple defendants, in clear contravention of two
earlier supreme court cases.4 6 1 Without mentioning the balancing
test laid out in Prudential,4 6 2 the court then addressed whether the
defendants had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. 4 6 3 It
stated:
Absent extraordinary circumstances, mandamus will not issue unless
defendants lack an adequate appellate remedy. An appeal is
inadequate when parties are in danger of permanently losing
substantial rights. Such a danger arises when the appellate court
would not be able to cure the error, when the party's ability to
present a viable claim or defense is vitiated, or when the error

457. Id. at 210-11.
458. Id. at 206.
459. Id.

460. Id. at 206-07.
461. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 210 (stating that the case as
consolidated would create "significant jury confusion and undue prejudice"). The twenty
different plaintiffs had all worked for the same company, but at different times and in
different positions, and were not exposed to the same chemicals nor did they suffer from
the same injuries. Id. at 209-10. The court concluded that the trial court had abused its
discretion in the consolidation orders upon two previous rulings in the area of mass torts
alleging exposure in a workplace. Id. at 207-08 (citing In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606,
611 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding); In re Bristol-Myers Squibb, 975 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex.
1998) (orig. proceeding)).
462. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding) (stating that the appellate court must determine the adequacy of the remedy
only in cases where the court makes the initial determination that the benefits to
mandamus review outweigh the detriments to such review).
463. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 210-11 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
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cannot be made part of the appellate record.4 6 4
In this case the court noted that the unrelated claims of the
plaintiffs, the exposure of the plaintiffs to different defendants'
products, and the different defensive theories of the various
defendants, would lead to jury confusion and prejudice to the
defendants, which "would be impossible for an appellate court to
untangle" on appeal; thus, mandamus should issue.4 6 5
Given the fact that Van Waters was issued the same day, but
after Prudential, the court's references to exceptional circumstances making an ordinary appeal inadequate 4 6 6 and further
statements that an appeal was inadequate when there was a danger
of losing substantial rights4 67 were strange because the court made
464. Id.
465. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 211 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
466. Id. at 210-11. The court cited Walker v. Packer,827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992)
(orig. proceeding) for this proposition which was clearly wrong, as Walker does not
mention extraordinary circumstances. That test was announced in Canadian Helicopters
Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 309 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (stating that in
extraordinary situations the remedy of appeal may be inadequate), superseded by statute
on other grounds, Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, sec. 1, § 51.014(a)(7),
1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4936, 4937 (Vernon) (current version codified at TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006)). There have
been a few cases where the court has held that extraordinary circumstances make the
remedy by appeal inadequate. See, e.g., In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 198 (Tex.
1999) (orig. proceeding) (holding that the "'exceptional circumstances' make appeal an
inadequate remedy"); CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 951, 597 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding) (stating that extraordinary circumstances in the case arising from the denial of
a special appearance could not be adequately remedied on appeal); Nat'l Indus. Sand
Ass'n. v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 771, 776 (Tex. 1995) (finding an appeal inadequate
because of the exceptional circumstances arising from the denial of a special appearance);
Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 308-09 (stating that extraordinary circumstances might make an
appeal from an erroneous denial of a special appearance inadequate). There are of course
a few other situations where the court held that an appeal was inadequate because of
special circumstances. See, e.g., K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tex. 1994) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that an appeal is not an adequate remedy when issues of sovereign
immunity and comity are involved); Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tex. 1987)
(orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief because of the trial court's failure to transfer
a custody dispute to the required venue in spite of the availability of an appeal because
"b]ustice demands a speedy resolution of child custody... issues").
467. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 211 (citing Wittig correctly for
this proposition). In Wittig the court used this language to note that a party could
establish that he does not have an adequate remedy at law by showing that he is "in
danger of permanently losing substantial rights." Wittig, 876 S.W.2d at 306; see also
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 (noting that a remedy is inadequate "when parties stand to lose
their substantial rights"). There does not appear to be any difference from the articulation
of the principle in terms of permanently losing a substantial right, or losing a substantial
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no reference to the Prudential balancing test. 4 6 8 Interesting,
however, is the fact that Van Waters was probably truer to
traditional mandamus jurisprudence than the majority of court
opinions since Walker. The reasons given for the inadequacy of
the appeal are consistent with the concept that an adequate
remedy by appeal needs to give the same relief that could be had
by mandamus in order to protect the legal right of the relator. In
effect, the appellate remedy in Van Waters was not as4 6"equally
9
convenient, beneficial and effective as mandamus" relief.
right. Compare Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 142 (Phillips C.J., dissenting) (mentioning
"permanent deprivation of a substantial right"), and Van Waters, 145 S.W.3d at 211 ("An
appeal is inadequate when parties are in danger of permanently losing substantial
rights."), with Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 368, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958) (orig.
proceeding) ("Interference [by mandamus] is justified only when parties stand to lose their
substantial rights."). The first articulation of this principle was in the Hey decision where
the court determined that an appeal would be an adequate remedy for the erroneous
decision of the trial court to conduct a separate trial on damages in a personal injury case.
ley, 158 Tex. at 368, 311 S.W.2d at 653. Hey cited Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 291
S.W.2d 677 (1956) (orig. proceeding), for this proposition, but with no page reference.
The closest reference in Womack to a loss of a right is the following language, where the
court indicated that mandamus must issue to compel a separate trial: "In practical effect,
therefore, the action of the trial court denied relator a judicial determination of his right
and duty to administer the property left in trust for the minors." Womack, 156 Tex. at 52,
291 S.W.2d at 683. Under the facts of Womack, absent mandamus relief, the relator would
permanently lose this right. Id. (noting that by the time the stay of the proceedings
required under the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act was lifted, the trust beneficiaries
would no longer be minors and the trustee would never have been able to exercise his
right to administer the minors' property). The same was true in the examples given in
Walker relating to discovery orders. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842-43 (Tex.
1992) (orig. proceeding) (stating that a trial court's erroneous order requiring the
disclosure of privileged information, denying the discovery materials necessary for a party
to present a claim or defense, or disallowing discovery so that it does not appear on the
appellate record, could not be remedied by appeal). In Van Waters, the characterization
of the problem as articulated by the court would also result in a permanent loss of the
right to a fair trial. See Van Waters, 145 S.W.3d at 211 (stating that the appellate court
would not be able "to untangle the confusion or prejudice on appeal").
468. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136 (stating that the appellate court must determine
the adequacy of the remedy by appeal only in cases where the court initially determines
that the "benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments"). Van Waters
has not been cited once by the supreme court since its issuance on any aspect of its
discussion concerning the availability of an alternative remedy.
469. See, e.g., Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 14, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (Tex. 1926)
(orig. proceeding) (using the language, "convenient, beneficial, and effective" to describe
mandamus). Walker disapproved of Cleveland to the extent that this language was
understood to imply that delay and costs associated with appeal do not make it
inadequate, but the concept that the remedy by appeal needs to be as "convenient,
beneficial, and as effective as mandamus," is a time honored principle both in Texas and at
common law. See, e.g., The King v. Severn & Wye Ry. Co., 106 Eng. Rep. 501, 502 (Q.B.
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The second case was decided by the same 5-4 split as in
Prudential.470 In re AIU Insurance Co.47 1 involved a forum
selection clause in an insurance policy. 47 2 The policy covered the
parent company as well as all of its subsidiaries located in other
states.47 3 "A few months after the policy issued, [one of the
insured's subsidiaries] merged with [another company that] had
wells and a pipeline gathering system in [Texas.]" ' 47 4 The other
company had been party to litigation for over three years prior to
the effective date of the insurance policy. 47 5 The subsidiary
sought liability coverage under the disputed policy, and the carrier
undertook the defense under a reservation of rights.4 7 6 The
subsidiary sued the carrier in Texas asserting various contractual
breaches and insurance code violations, as well as seeking a
declaratory judgment that the claims be covered against it. 477 The
carrier moved to dismiss the suit claiming that the forum selection
clause required the suit be brought in New York. 4 7 8 Following
the trial court denial of the motion, the carrier sought mandamus
relief from the court of appeals, which was denied, and then sought
the relief from the supreme court. 479 The court initially held that
the forum selection clause was enforceable and that the trial court
had abused its discretion in not enforcing it. 48 0 Then, without
reference to the Prudentialbalancing test,48 the court turned its
attention to whether the carrier had an adequate remedy at law.
1819) (claiming that an indictment and related fine was not as "equally convenient,
beneficial and effectual as a mandamus").
470. See In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (holding
5-4 that mandamus was available to enforce the forum-selection clause).
471. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
472. Id. at 110.
473. Id. at 110-11.
474. Id. at 111.
475. Id.

476. In re AIUIns. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 111.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.

480. Id. at 111-15 (relying primarily upon federal precedent establishing that "absent
'fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power,"' forum selection clauses
should be enforced).
481. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig.

proceeding) (stating that the appellate court must determine the adequacy of the remedy
by appeal only in cases where the court makes the initial determination that "the benefits
[to mandamus review] outweigh the detriments").
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Relying upon its earlier holding in Anglin that mandamus would
lie to enforce an arbitration agreement, the court held that, just as
in Anglin, the failure to enforce the contractual provision "would
'vitiate and render illusory the subject matter of an appeal.' ' '4 8 2
The court also stated that subjecting a party to trial and possible
appeal in a forum other than as contractually agreed is
harassment ,483 "adding a layer of expense that would otherwise
not exist," 4 8 4 and harmful error that would be reversed on appeal,
leading to "a meaningless waste of judicial resources. ' 485 Finally,
noting that other states have used mandamus to enforce forum
selection clauses, 4 8 6 the court concluded that AIU did not have an
adequate remedy by appeal.4 8 7 The dissent simply noted that the
insured had other remedies to achieve the benefit of its bargain,
and had failed to show that any of those remedies were
inadequate. 4 8 8 The dissent also correctly noted that there were
important differences between arbitration and forum selection
clauses. 4 8 9 The court's equation of the forum selection clause to
482. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (relying
upon Anglin Co., Inc. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)). The
court saw no meaningful distinctions between an arbitration clause and the forum
selection clause at issue in this case regarding the availability of an alternative remedy. Id.
at 116. The court explained that, in Anglin, the fact that the party might have won the
litigation at trial, or that the party could have recovered damages for breach of contract, or
that had the party lost the trial, it could have pursued its arbitration rights on appeal, did
not deter the court from concluding that an appeal following the trial would be
inadequate. Id. at 115-16.
483. Id. at 117.
484. Id. at 118 (citing Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 595
(Tex. 1996) and observing that the breaching party might prolong the proceedings to
extract a favorable settlement).
485. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 118 (citing In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d
194, 198-99 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) as an example of mandamus being granted to
prevent a waste of judicial resources).
486. Id. at 119-20. The court recognized that the United States Supreme Court had
not reviewed the denial of motions to dismiss based on forum selection clauses on
interlocutory appeal because that particular "contractual right ... was not 'important
enough."' Id. at 120 (citing Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 502 (1976)
concurring)).
(Scalia, J.,
487. Id. at 121.
488. Id. at 124 (arguing that a party's rights under a forum selection clause are not
lost if "vindication is postponed until a final, appealable judgment is rendered in the
case") (citing Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 502 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
489. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (Phillips,
J., dissenting) (stating that there was a long history of public policy support for arbitration
clauses while forum selection clauses have only recently been looked upon with favor).
The dissent also noted that other than in the case of arbitration clauses, there are no
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the arbitration clause was in fact a poor analogy given the
significant federal and Texas policies favoring arbitration of
disputes, 4 90 and the Supreme Court's Southland decision, which
held that the Court would intervene if a state did not grant
immediate relief in cases denying the contractual right to arbitrate
under the FAA. 4 9 1 However, the court's reliance on Anglin gives
support to the proposition that the ultimate basis of the court's
decision was its perception that the contractual forum selection
clause was a substantial right that would be lost absent mandamus,
rendering the appellate remedy inadequate.4 9 2 However, it would
have helped the consistency and coherence of mandamus jurisprudence in the state to have made the issue of lost rights explicit,
rather than implicit. This view of the case is given additional
credence by the fact that another contractual provision was
enforced by mandamus on the very same day. Apparently, the
court was equating the loss of contractual rights to the loss of
substantial rights, thus making a remedy by appeal inadequate.
precedents for using mandamus relief to enforce contractual provisions. Id.
490. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)
(noting that the FAA was designed "to overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to
enforce agreements to arbitrate"); Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992)
(orig. proceeding) (noting that Texas courts are favorably disposed toward arbitration
agreements).
491. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1984) (holding that the Court
would review any decision denying the contractual right to arbitrate under the FAA
because to allow a state court proceeding to "run its course would defeat the core purpose
of the contract" to arbitrate).
492. In Freis v. Canales, 877 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam), the court characterized Anglin as a case where "the party, being required to
resolve its dispute by litigation, has lost its bargained-for right to arbitration" and thus
"has no adequate remedy by appeal." The AIU court explained that in Anglin the fact
that the party might have won the litigation at trial, or that the party could have recovered
damages for breach of contract, or that had the party lost the trial it could have pursued its
arbitration rights on appeal, did not deter the court "from concluding that an appeal
following a trial would be an inadequate remedy." AIU, 148 S.W.3d at 115-16. The AIU
court asserted that the same "considerations are present when there is an agreement to
pursue litigation in a forum other than Texas." Id. at 116. Although AIU cited no support
for either proposition, the only valid reason for these conclusions is that the contractual
right to arbitrate and the contractual right to pursue litigation outside of Texas would have
been lost; therefore, there was no adequate remedy by appeal. See, e.g., Canadian
Helicopters, Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding) (holding
that the lack of an adequate remedy by way of appeal "is met only when parties are in
danger of permanently losing substantial rights"), superseded by statute on other grounds,
Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, sec. 1, § 51.014(a)(7), 1997 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 4936, 4937 (Vernon) (current version codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE

ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006)).
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IV.

THE BALANCING TEST

A. The Prudential Insurance Co. Case
In a 5-4 decision on September 3, 2004, the Texas Supreme
Court conditionally granted a petition for writ of mandamus in the
case In re Prudential Insurance Co. of America.4 9 3

The case

involved a simple suit to rescind a lease agreement and to recover
damages. 4 9 4 The issue presented to the court involved the validity
of the jury waiver provision that was contained in the lease.4 9 5
Nine months into the lease, the lessee sued Prudential, seeking
termination of the lease on grounds of a persistent sewage
odor.4 96

After the tenant filed a proper demand for a jury trial,

"Prudential moved to quash the jury demand, based on the
[contractual] waiver in the lease."' 4 97 Following a hearing, the
court denied Prudential's motion. 498 After having its mandamus
relief denied by the court of appeals, 4 99 Prudential then petitioned
for mandamus relief from the Texas Supreme Court. 50 0 The court
493. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
494. Id. at 127. The lease agreement that was the subject matter of the litigation had
been actively negotiated for over six months. Id. The tenant's lawyers had in fact
"successfully insisted on a number of changes in" the originally proposed lease agreement.
Id. The guaranty agreement was also negotiated between the parties and several changes
were successfully made to it. Id. The lease agreement was guaranteed by the principals of
the limited partnership that executed the lease as tenant. In re Prudential,148 S.W.3d at
127. The guaranty did not contain a waiver of jury trial provision, but did provide for a
performance guaranty of all of tenant's obligations under the lease in the event of the
tenant's default. Id. at 128.
495. See id. at 127-28 (stating that the lease contained the following provision:
"Tenant and Landlord both waive a trial by jury of any or all issues arising in any action or
proceeding between the parties hereto or their successors, under or connected with this
Lease, or any of its provisions").
496. Id. at 128. The leased premises were being used for a restaurant and the sewage
odor made the premises uninhabitable for their intended use. Not surprisingly, Prudential
counterclaimed against both the lessee and the guarantor for unpaid rent. Id.
497. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 128 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding).
498. Id. The tenant and the guarantor raised various state constitutional arguments
as well as policy arguments against the waiver. Id. at 128-29. The guarantors pointed out
that the jury waiver was not contained in the guarantee. Id. at 129. The trial court denied
Prudential's motion to quash the jury demand without any explanation. Id.
499. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 05-02-01104-CV, 2002 WL 1608233 (Tex.
App.-Dallas, July 22, 2002) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
500. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02-0690, 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 394 (Jan. 16,
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provision

was

enforceable, 50 1 and that "the trial court's refusal to enforce... [it]
was a clear abuse of discretion."'5 0 2 Turning to the question of
whether Prudential had an adequate remedy by way of appeal, the
court began its discussion by boldly stating that:
The operative word, "adequate," has no comprehensive definition; it
is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential
considerations that determine when appellate courts will use original
mandamus proceedings to review the actions of lower courts. These
considerations implicate both public and private interests.
Mandamus review of incidental, interlocutory rulings by the trial
courts unduly interferes with trial court proceedings, distracts
appellate court attention to issues that are unimportant both to the
ultimate disposition of the case at hand and to the uniform
development of the law, and adds unproductively to the expense and
delay of civil litigation. Mandamus review of significant rulings in
exceptional cases may be essential to preserve important substantive
and procedural rights from impairment or loss, allow the appellate
courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law that would
otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare
private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted
enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.
An appellate remedy is "adequate" when any benefits to mandamus
review are outweighed by the detriments. When the benefits
outweigh the detriments, appellate
courts must consider whether the
50 3
appellate remedy is adequate.

2003). After the judge who had originally denied Prudential's motion to quash left office,

the matter was abated so that the new judge could reconsider the original motion. In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02-0690, 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 546 (Apr. 3, 2003) (relying on
Rule 7.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure). Upon reconsideration, the new
judge denied the motion, and upon the filing of the order in the supreme court, the court
reactivated the case to the active docket. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 02-0690, 46
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 794 (June 19, 2003).
501. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135. The court also held "that the guaranty
incorporated the jury waiver [found] in the lease." Id.
502. Id. (stating that trial courts have no discretion in ascertaining the law or in
applying the law to the factual situation).
503. Id. at 136. As this principle is stated at the end of the paragraph, one is logically
led to believe that the detriments of mandamus review are: undue interference with trial
courts, distractions to the appellate courts, delay, and expense of mandamus review of
incidental rulings; while the benefits of mandamus review are: to prevent the loss of
substantive and procedural rights, give direction to the law, and prevent time and expense
being wasted from an eventual reversal. This new test was not mentioned in the other two
mandamus cases handed down the same day as Prudential;the court in those opinions
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The court rejected what it called rigid, or simple, rules, as they
were inconsistent with the flexibility that the court claimed to be
the remedy's principle virtue.5 ° 4 The court then proceeded to give
examples of three exceptional cases where the flexibility of
mandamus led the court to the determination, from the facts and
circumstances of the case, that the appellate remedy was
inadequate, in large part, because of the expenses and time delay
to be incurred by the parties and the judicial system.50 5 The court
then noted that increased mandamus relief was in its opinion
preferable to enlargement of interlocutory appeals by the
legislature,5 ° 6 as interlocutory appeals lie as a matter of right and
applied the more rigid and simple rules of traditional mandamus jurisprudence. See In re
AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 118 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (acknowledging
Prudential merely for the proposition that a contractual waiver of a jury trial was
enforceable by mandamus); In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203. 211 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding) (omitting any reference to Prudentialand stating "[a]n appeal is
inadequate when parties are in danger of permanently losing substantial rights"). But see
W. Wendell Hall, Standardsof Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 47, 65 (2006) (noting
that AIU and Prudentialsignal that mandamus will receive a warmer reception in the
court than under the Walker decision).
504. In re Prudential,148 S.W.3d at 136-37. The idea that flexibility is the principle
virtue of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus is consistent with the court's desire to
use the remedy on an ad hoc basis. Yet, to assert that flexibility is the principal virtue of
the law is to misunderstand the interrelationship between virtue and that of law and justice
in a society. Years ago, Lon Fuller argued that some of the principal virtues of the rule of
law were that like cases would be treated alike, that the law was relatively stable in that
changes in the law were reasonably predictable, and that this stability and predictability
benefited the resolution of disputes. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94
(1964). More recently, a contemporary philosopher writing about the Aristotelian link
between law and virtue noted: "To be just is to give each person what each deserves; and
the social presuppositions of the flourishing of the virtue of justice in a community are
therefore twofold: that there are rational criteria of desert and that there is a socially
established agreement as to what those criteria are." ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE 152 (2d ed. 1984).
505. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136-37 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding) (recognizing that an appellate remedy would not be inadequate merely
because of expense or time delays). The three cases were: In re E.I DuPont de Nemours
& Co., 92 S.W.3d 517, 523-24 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (finding the remedy by
appeal inadequate because of time and expenses to be incurred by the defendant who
faced more than 8,000 plaintiffs in litigation that had lasted six years already and could last
many more), In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194, 199 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding)
(referring to a strapping of state and party resources unless mandamus relief were
granted), and Travelers Indemnity Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tex.
1996) (orig. proceeding) (holding that a trial court's order requiring insurance company to
pay other party's attorneys' fees so skewed the trial process that remedy by appeal was
inadequate).
506. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 137-38 (asserting that the expanding nature of
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must be decided, while mandamus issues as a matter of
discretion. 50 7 Instead of applying its new balancing test, the court
then entered into a brief discussion of the adequacy of the remedy
by appeal in this case and concluded, rather simply, that appeal
would not provide an adequate remedy in this case because the
contractual right to have a non-jury trial would be lost in whole or
in part "by having been subject to the procedure it agreed to
waive. '' 50 8 Like AIU and Anglin, the court was once again
holding that the loss of a contractual right was the loss of a
substantial right that made the remedy by appeal inadequate. The
court concluded its opinion with the observation that other courts,
including a lower Texas court, had used mandamus to enforce
contractual jury waivers.50 9 Interspersed through the court's
interlocutory appeals was a result of the unavailability of mandamus relief).
507. Id. at 138. But see Scott v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 843 S.W.2d 439, 442-43
(Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that while the decision to grant mandamus is
considered discretionary, "the court's discretion lies in deciding whether the prerequisites
for mandamus relief have been met, not in deciding whether to grant relief irrespective of
such prerequisites").
508. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 138 (using the identical argument that it had
accepted in AIU that, if the relator received a favorable jury verdict, the right would be
lost forever; whereas if the relator lost at trial and lost on appeal, the right would be gone
forever; and finally, if the relator lost at trial, and the appeal was successful, it would have
lost a part of its right by being forced to undergo a jury trial in the first place). It was at
this point in the opinion that the court referred to arbitration by way of analogy. Id. The
court observed that it had granted mandamus relief to compel arbitration because, even if
the error in compelling arbitration were reversed on appeal, the relator would have been
deprived of the benefits of his contracted clause. In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 138.
Obviously from the majority's opinion, a similar loss of a contractual right would occur
here without mandamus. Id. at 139. The court entered into this discussion of the
availability of a remedy because, although it announced a new test, it still applied the
traditional test in this case. Id. at 143 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion,
Chief Justice Phillips distinguished the granting of mandamus relief to compel contractual
arbitration, which had been denied by the trial court, from the denial of jury waiver
provision. Id. He explained that the enforcement of arbitration agreements through
mandamus was influenced by strong public policies favoring arbitration: the anomaly of
interlocutory appeals under state arbitration statutes, but not under the federal statute in a
state court; and the "Supreme Court's pronouncement that appellate delays defeat[] the
'core purpose' of contracts to arbitrate." Id. at 142.
509. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 139 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding) (stating that the court was unaware "of a published decision denying [the]
relief"). Interestingly enough, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had been on record
for nearly twenty years denying such relief in the proper case. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of
Waukesha v. FDIC, 796 F.2d 999, 1006 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding mandamus inappropriate
because it was not a case of necessity as the petitioner could appeal the district court's
order at the conclusion of the trial); see also In re Linee Aeree Italiane (Alitalia), 469 F.3d
638, 640 (7th Cir. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (stating that there was no irreparable harm in
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rambling justification for jettisoning centuries of mandamus
jurisprudence was most likely the true reason for the decisionwanting to expand its ability to supervise inferior courts through
ad hoc decision making to remedy what it viewed to be the
pressures from the final judgment rule and the state's limited
510
interlocutory appeals.
Chief Justice Phillips, writing the dissenting opinion joined by
three other justices, lamented the court's retreat from Walker.
Following the court's earlier precedents, he stated that Prudential
was not in jeopardy of permanently losing its contractual right to a
non-jury case. 512 Chief Justice Phillips noted that the appellate
remedy in this case was adequate-a reversal of the case upon
appeal because of the erroneous denial of the motion to quash the
jury waiver provision in the contract.5 13 Presumably, in such a
case, the retrial of the case would be a non-jury case as required by
the contract. In such a situation, the dissent saw no permanent
loss of any right, substantial or otherwise, merely a postponement.51 4
Chief Justice Phillips concluded by repeating that
being denied a statutory right to a non-jury trial). See generally Nathan A. Forrester,
Comment, Mandamus as a Remedy for the Denial of Jury Trial, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 769
(1991) (discussing the differences between the Seventh Circuit and the other federal courts
on the issue of mandamus as a remedy for the denial of a jury trial).
510. Twice during the rambling exposition, the court referred to Charles Alan
Wright's treatise on federal courts which opined that writs could "provide[] a valuable ad
hoc relief valve for the pressures that are imperfectly contained by the statutes permitting
appeals from final judgments and interlocutory orders." In re Prudential,148 S.W.3d at
137 n.53, 139 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3934.1, at 572, 574 (1996)).
511. Id. at 141 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
512. Id. (citing Wittig and other cases for the traditional rule on the fundamental
tenet requiring the relator to establish the existence of an inadequate remedy).
Apparently, the dissent conceded that the contractual right to a non-jury case is a
substantial right. Id.
513. Id. at 141-42 (noting that under the harmful error analysis the case would be
reversed if there were a material fact issue in dispute).
514. In re Prudential,148 S.W.3d at 161. As Chief Justice Philips addressed the issue:
The Court suggests, however, that if we do not act immediately Prudential's
contractual right will be lost forever. I disagree. The Court confuses the adequacy of
Prudential's appellate remedy with the damages Prudential may suffer as a
consequence of its tenant's breach of contract. The purpose of the appellate remedy
is not to compensate Prudential for this contractual breach, but to correct the trial
court's error. If Prudential has been otherwise damaged, it should seek damages
directly from the breaching party as in any other contract case.
Id. This response did not directly address the possibility that the relator might win the
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incidental trial court rulings are not to be the subject of mandamus
relief unless there is a "permanent deprivation of a substantial
right," which, in his opinion, was not the case here. 5 15
Based upon over one hundred years of precedent, Chief Justice
Phillips' observation concerning the deprivation of a right was
clearly erroneous. The right to a non-jury trial would be lost in the
event the case was tried to a jury, irrespective of the outcome of
that case.51 6 Furthermore, neither damages by way of breach of
contract nor a non-jury retrial after successful appeal would revive
the lost right. 5 17 The argument that should have been addressed
by the dissenting opinion, here and in AIU, was that the
contractual rights lost were not ones that Texas considered to be
substantial, such that their loss would make a remedy by appeal
inadequate. In Texas, the constitutional right to trial by jury can
be waived by failure to act promptly.5 18 If a trial court improperly
denies a right to trial by jury, the decision is subject to appeal-not
mandamus. 519 A trial court's erroneous decision concerning
where venue is proper in a suit on a written contract to perform an
obligation in a particular county is also not subject to
mandamus. 5 20 Thus, valid arguments could have been made that

jury trial, or that he might lose both the jury trial and the appeal.
515. Id. at 142.
516. See generally Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex. 1991)

(orig.

proceeding) (noting that time spent and lost could not be compensated for).
517. See generally Terrell v. Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 31 S.W. 631, 634-36 (1895) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that damages did not satisfy the failure to perform or receive the
specific duty to which one was entitled).
518. See, e.g., Bradley Motors v. Mackey, 878 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1994) (per
curiam) (holding "that a party who fails to appear at trial after filing an answer,"
demanding a jury, and paying a jury fee "waives the right to a jury trial"). In order to be
entitled to a jury trial in a civil suit in Texas, a person is required to timely request a jury
and pay the required fee. TEX. R. Civ. P. 216.
519. See, e.g., Halsell v. DeHoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding)
(holding that a refusal to grant a jury trial can, in the proper case, be reversed on appeal).
520. See, e.g., Polaris Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Abascal, 829 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex. 1995)
(noting that venue rulings are generally not reviewable by mandamus); see also TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642 (Vernon 2002) (providing for mandamus relief when
the trial court refuses to enforce a mandatory venue provision). Contractual provisions to
perform an obligation in a particular county are governed by a permissive venue
exception. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.035 (Vernon 2002). Contractual
provisions establishing venue in a stated county are generally against public policy, and are
considered void and unenforceable. See Leonard v. Paxson, 654 S.W.2d 440, 441 (Tex.
1983) ("[We] h[o]ld 'that the fixing of venue by contract, except in such instances as
permitted [by the permissive venue exception for contracts] is invalid."').
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a contractual jury waiver clause or a forum selection clause does
not rise to the level of a substantial right. Merely being in a
contract does not make a right substantial.
The majority's
opinions in these two cases sidestep this issue for the obvious
reason that the court did not want to be seen as placing contractual
rights on the same plane as substantial rights, justifying the
issuance of mandamus relief because the appeal was deemed
inadequate. Thus, in these two cases, the court erroneously relied
on Anglin, while failing to admit the fact that Anglin was decided
on the basis of public policy, not mandamus jurisprudence. There
is no public policy that would justify mandamus in the case of a
forum selection clause or a jury waiver clause; thus, the court
erroneously decided these two cases-unless it wanted to admit
that these two contractual clauses rose to the level of substantial
rights. That, it refused to do.
B.

The New Balancing Test in Practice

Although the court purported to make a new test for
determining the adequacy of the legal remedy by way of appeal,
the court has been reluctant to deviate from the traditional
mandamus jurisprudence.5 21 In fact, in large part, the court has
521. In the following cases involving a party seeking mandamus relief from the Texas
Supreme Court, the Prudential case was cited by the court merely for the general
statement that mandamus was available only when there had been an abuse of discretion
and there was no adequate remedy at law; there was absolutely no mention of the new
balancing test. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d 295, 298 (Tex. 2006) (orig.
proceeding) (reciting the two fundamental principles of mandamus jurisprudence); In re
Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 612 (Tex. 2006) (orig.
proceeding) (stating the two fundamental principles of mandamus jurisprudence); In re
Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Tex. 2006); In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253,
256 (Tex. 2005) (mentioning only the two fundamental principles of mandamus
jurisprudence); In re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (accepting that mandamus was available only if the remedy by appeal was
inadequate). On the other hand, some courts of appeal have applied the new Prudential
balancing test. See, e.g., In re Unitec Elevator Servs. Co., 178 S.W.3d 53, 66 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2005 orig. proceeding) (noting that in this case the benefits of
mandamus were outweighed by the detriments); In re State, 175 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2005 orig. proceeding) (concluding that under the facts and circumstances
"the benefits of mandamus outweigh[ed] the detriments, rendering appeal an inadequate
remedy for the State"): see also In re Foremost County Mut. Ins. Co., 172 S.W.3d 128, 13536 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005 orig. proceeding) (reciting the balancing test but holding
that the exceptional circumstances of the case justified the issuance of mandamus without
weighing the benefits and detriments).
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merely relied upon pre-Prudential precedent in reaching the
decision concerning the adequacy of the legal remedy without any
reference to the Prudentialbalancing test. For example, the court
has continued to grant mandamus relief under the well-settled rule
in order to prevent the production of confidential information or
privileged documents, as there was clearly no adequate remedy in
these cases; 522 has granted mandamus where trial courts have
ignored their own orders granting a new trial;523 and has granted
mandamus where the trial court has erroneously disqualified
counsel for one of the parties.5 24 It appears fiom a review of the
court's mandamus cases since Prudential that the test announced
in Prudential was to apply only in cases where there was no
directly comparable precedent that would fit the facts and
circumstances of the case before it, and the court was dissatisfied
with the decision of the trial court. In case after case, the court has
merely relied upon the traditional statements espoused in
Walker,or upon definitive holdings of pre-Prudential cases, in

reaching its decision to grant or deny the conditional writ of
25
mandamus.

5

522. See In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d at 297-98 (noting that it was a well-settled
standard that mandamus was proper when "the trial court has abused its discretion" and
where an appeal was inadequate).
523. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827,
831 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (compelling trial court to proceed to trial).
524. See In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(compelling trial court to vacate an order entered that had improperly disqualified counsel
for one of the parties).
525. See In re Tex. Dep't of Trans., 218 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam) (citing neither Prudential nor Walker, but relying on pre-Prudential
precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel application of mandatory venue);
In re Disc. Rental, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 831, 832 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(citing neither Prudential nor Walker, but relying on pre-Prudentialprecedent to grant
mandamus conditionally to vacate execution on a void judgment); In re Bank One, N.A.,
216 S.W.3d 826, 826-27 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing neither
Prudential nor Walker, but relying on pre-Prudential precedent to grant mandamus
conditionally to compel enforcement of contractual arbitration agreement); In re Ford
Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d at 297-98 (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Prudential and
Walker for the two fundamental tenets of mandamus jurisprudence); In re Tex. Dep't of
Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d at 612 (orig. proceeding) (citing Prudentialand
Walker for the two fundamental tenets of mandamus jurisprudence); In re Graco
Children's Prods., Inc., 210 S.W.3d 598, 600-01 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(citing neither Prudential or Walker, but relying on pre-Prudentialprecedents to grant
mandamus conditionally to compel trial court to vacate order requiring the production of
documents); In re Carlisle, 209 S.W.3d 93, 95-96 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (relying on pre-Prudentialprecedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel
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the performance of a duty imposed under the election code); In re Barnett, 207 S.W.3d
326, 328-29 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on pre-Prudential
precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel the performance of a duty under
the election code); In re Applied Chem. Magnesias Corp., 206 S.W.3d 114, 116-17 (Tex.
2006) (orig. proceeding) (relying on pre-Prudential precedent to grant mandamus
conditionally to compel application of mandatory venue); In re D. Wilson Constr. Co., 196
S.W.3d 774, 780-81 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (citing Walker, but relying on prePrudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel enforcement of a
contractual arbitration agreement); In re Dallas Peterbilt Ltd., L.L.P., 196 S.W.3d 161, 163
(Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing neither Prudential nor Walker, but
relying on pre-Prudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel
enforcement of a contractual arbitration agreement); In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195
S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (citing neither Prudentialnor Walker, but
relying on pre-Prudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel
enforcement of contractual arbitration agreement): In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 687
(Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (citing neither Prudentialnor Walker, but relying on prePrudentialprecedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel trial court to vacate its
order withdrawing its order granting new trial); In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 569-70 (Tex.
2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Walker, but denying mandamus relief
because party had appealed trial court's sanction order: relying on pre-Prudential
precedent to grant mandamus relief conditionally to compel trial court to comply with
rules concerning net worth determinations for supersedeas bonds); In re Mayes-Hooper,
189 S.W.3d 777, 778 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on pre-Prudential
precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel trial court "to vacate its order ...
granting grandparent possession"); In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc.. 192 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex.
2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing neither Prudentialnor Walker, but relying on
pre-Prudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel enforcement of
contractual arbitration agreement); In re Dillard Dep't Store, 198 S.W.3d 778, 782 (Tex.
2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on pre-Prudential precedent to grant
mandamus conditionally to compel enforcement of contractual arbitration agreement); In
re Angelini, 186 S.W.3d 558, 560-61 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus
relief because appellate courts cannot deal with disputed fact issues in an original
mandamus proceeding); In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 729 (Tex. 2006)
(orig. proceeding) (relying on pre-Prudential authorities to grant mandamus conditionally
to compel intervention); In re Dillard Dep't Store, 186 S.W.3d 514, 515-16 (Tex. 2006)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing neither Prudential nor Walker. but relying on prePrudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel enforcement of
contractual arbitration agreement); In re Sharp, 186 S.W.3d 556, 557 (Tex. 2006) (orig.
proceeding) (relying on pre-Prudentialprecedent to grant mandamus conditionally to
compel the performance of a duty imposed under the election code); In re Holcomb, 186
S.W.3d 553, 555 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (relying on pre-Prudential precedent to
grant mandamus conditionally to compel the performance of a duty imposed under the
election code); In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 543 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) ("When a
candidate has been denied a place on the ballot due to official error, we have generally
granted mandamus relief."); In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 131. 135 (Tex.
2005) (orig. proceeding) (relying on pre-Prudential precedent to grant mandamus
conditionally to compel trial court to order nonparties' claims to arbitration); In re
Columbia/St. David's Healthcare Sys., L.P., 178 S.W.3d 781, 782 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on two post-Prudential cases that relied on prePrudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel a probate judge to
comply with the venue provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code); In re
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Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 255-56, 262 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)
(citing Prudential and Walker for the two fundamental tenets for mandamus
jurisprudence, but relying on pre-Prudentialprecedent to grant mandamus conditionally
to compel trial court to vacate order compelling production of privileged documents); In
re Nexion Health at Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69-70 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam) (citing Prudentialfor the simple proposition that "[m]andamus relief is only
available when a party has no adequate remedy at law," but relying on pre-Prudential
precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel enforcement of contractual
arbitration agreement); In re AdvancePCS Health, L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 608-09 (Tex.
2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing neither Prudentialnor Walker, but relying on
pre-Prudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel enforcement of
contractual arbitration agreement); In re Tex. Ass'n of Sch. Bds., 169 S.W.3d 653, 660
(Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (citing neither Prudentialnor Walker, but in a case of first
impression, refusing to grant mandamus on grounds that the transaction in question was
not a major transaction under the mandatory provisions of the venue statute); In re
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc., 167 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. 2005)
(orig. proceeding) (relying on pre-Prudentialprecedent to grant mandamus conditionally
to compel trial court to comply with its own order granting new trial): In re Kellogg Brown
& Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 742 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (relying on prePrudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to order the court of appeals to
vacate its order compelling arbitration); Powell v. Stover, 165 S.W.3d 322, 324, 328-29
(Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (relying on pre-Prudentialprecedent to grant mandamus
conditionally to abate a child custody matter pending a resolution of the application of the
jurisdictional requirements of the Texas Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act): In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317, 321-22 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (citing both Walker and Prudential for the fundamental
principles of mandamus jurisprudence, but relying on both pre-Prudentialprecedent as
well as policy considerations to grant mandamus conditionally to compel trial court to
grant legislative continuance): In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382-83
(Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Walker for the fundamental tenets of
mandamus jurisprudence and relying upon a case decided after Prudential that relied
solely on pre-Prudentialprecedent, to grant mandamus conditionally to compel trial court
"to vacate its order disqualifying [one party's] counsel"); In re McKinney, 167 S.W.3d 833,
835 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on pre-Prudentialprecedent to
conditionally grant mandamus to compel enforcement of contractual arbitration
agreement); In re Reliant Energy, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 624, 626-27 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on two post-Prudentialcases that relied solely on prePrudential precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel a probate judge to
comply with the venue provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code); In re
Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 159 S.W.3d 627, 629 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (relying solely on probate law authority to deny mandamus relief); In re Terex
Corp., 159 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on two
post-Prudentialcases that relied solely on pre-Prudentialprecedent to conditionally grant
mandamus to compel a probate judge to comply with the venue provisions of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code); In re Wilson N. Jones Mem'l Hosp., 159 S.W.3d 629,
630 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on two post-Prudentialcases that
relied solely on pre-Prudentialprecedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel a
probate judge to comply with the venue provisions of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code); In re U.S. Silica Co., 157 S.W.3d 434, 438-39 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on pre-Prudentialprecedent to grant mandamus relief
conditionally "to resolve conflicting orders from two or more courts asserting jurisdiction
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The court has actually appeared to apply the balancing test in
only two cases since the court issued its Prudentialdecision.5 2 6 In
the first of these cases, In re Ford Motor Co., 5 2 7 the court was
faced with a trial court's denial of a motion for a legislative
continuance filed on behalf of an attorney representing a
defendant in a personal injury suit. 5 2 8 A petition for writ of
mandamus was denied by the court of appeals, and a petition
seeking such relief was then filed in the court. 5 2 9 The court, citing
the Prudentialbalancing language, began its analysis by reviewing
the law relating to legislative continuances to determine if the trial
court was under a duty to grant the continuance in this case.5 3 0
The court noted that if an attorney-legislator was retained more
than thirty days before the trial setting, the trial court had no
discretion to deny a properly requested motion for continuance
unless there was a constitutional exception. 5 3 t Specifically, the
over the same case"); In re Automated Collection Techs., Inc., 156 S.W.3d 557, 559-60
(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on the AIU case to grant mandamus
conditionally to compel enforcement of a valid forum-selection clause); In re Sanders, 153
S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (relying on pre-Prudential
precedent to grant mandamus conditionally to compel trial court to vacate order
disqualifying counsel for one of the parties); In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 652-53 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding) (citing neither Walker nor Prudential, but relying on prePrudential authority to grant mandamus conditionally to compel trial court to vacate
temporary restraining order in election funding case because there was no adequate
remedy at law).
526. See In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327, 334 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (applying the balancing test used in Prudential);In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d
315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (same). The court has also relied on
the underlying Prudential holding in another case involving a contractual jury waiver
provision. See In re Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. 2006) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (noting that the court merely stated that, "[i]n Prudential,we
concluded that mandamus was appropriate to enforce a valid contractual jury waiver").
527. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
528. Id. at 317. Section 30.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
generally provides a mandatory right to a continuance for an attorney representing a party
who is a legislator attending a legislative session. Id. at 317-18.
529. Id. at 317.
530. Id. at 317-18.
531. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d at 319. This exception was recognized by the
court in Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. 1977) (holding that a "'legislative
continuance [was] mandatory except in those cases in which the party opposing
continuance alleges that a substantial existing right will be defeated or abridged by
delay'). The court observed that several opinions of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and courts of appeals in Texas had written on the scope of this exception to the
otherwise mandatory legislative continuance. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d at 319.
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court noted that if the party opposing the continuance could show
at a hearing that a substantial existing right would be defeated by
the delay, then the continuance should be denied. 53 2 After
reviewing the record, the court determined that the plaintiff had
not carried her burden of showing that she had a substantial
existing right that was enforceable against Ford 5 3 3 that would be
delayed or defeated by a continuance, thus the trial court had no
discretion to deny the motion for continuance. 5 34 Then the court
briefly stated what it believed to be the benefits that could be
achieved by mandamus in this case; however, it did not attempt to
evaluate the detriments. In outlining the various benefits of the
legislative continuance, the court stated:
Without [a mandatory legislative continuance], a lawyer-legislator
could be forced to decide between fulfilling the duty owed to a client
and the duty owed to constituents to participate in a legislative
The consequences of that decision-possible
session.
nonparticipation in a legislative session-could not be remedied on
appeal. To give full effect to the Legislature's policy decision
regarding legislative continuances, we conclude that a party has no
adequate remedy by appeal when a trial court abuses its discretion
by denying a motion for legislative continuance.5 35
In effect, the court used one half of the balancing test to extol
public policy to announce the decision that there would never be
an adequate remedy by appeal once it is determined that the trial
court erred in granting the continuance. While refusing to address
the detriments of mandamus in this case, the court was implicitly
using the language of the new test as justification for its ad hoc
decision making.
In the second case purporting to use the balancing text, In re
Derzapf,5 3 6 the court conditionally issued a mandamus to compel

532. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d at 319.
533. The court noted that although relator might have a present right to access
medical care, such right was not enforceable against Ford as "[h]er claims against Ford
arise from alleged defects of a pick-up truck, not for improperly denying her access to
medical care." Id. at 321.
534. Id. (noting that what is required to satisfy the Waites exception is a substantial
impairment of a constitutional right).
535. In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (citing Prudentialat pages where the balancing test was located).
536. In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d 327 (Tex. 2007).
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a trial court to vacate a grandparent visitation order. 53 7 Following
the death of his wife, the relator had permitted his mother-in-law
and her second husband to care for his three children while he
coped with his work schedule. 5 38

As time progressed, the

relationship between the parties cooled, and eventually the
grandmother and her husband sought visitation. 5 39 The trial court
granted limited visitation rights and this mandamus proceeding
54 0
followed after the court of appeals denied mandamus relief.
The court initially determined that the trial court abused its
discretion in granting visitation, and then turned to the balancing
5 4 1 The court once again made no
test as set out in Prudential.
effort to perform the test, but merely recited that the trial court's
visitation ruling would divest the parent of possession of his
children without satisfying the statutory requirement of overcoming the presumption that being with the father was in the best
interest of the children. 54 2 Claiming that such "divestiture [was]
irremediable" the court concluded that mandamus relief was
appropriate. 5 43 The court performed no balancing test, but
merely recited the liturgy to achieve the result that it wanted in the
case. Unlike Prudentialor AIU, the right involved in this case had
already been recognized as fundamental and substantial,5 44 and
the appellate remedy was inadequate because the right to make
537. Id. at 334-35.
538. Id. at 329.
539. Id. at 329-30. Initially the grandmother and her husband sought custody of the
children, but later filed a motion for visitation. Id.
540. In re Derzapf, No. 2-06-235-CV, 2006 WL 2076529, *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
July 25, 2006 orig. proceeding).
541. In re Derzapf, 219 S.W.3d at 334 (holding that the grandparents had failed to
satisfy their burden of showing "that [the] denial of access would 'significantly impair' the
children's physical health or emotional well-being" as required by the Texas Family
Code).
542. Id.
543. Id. The court cited several cases; however, none were relevant to the issue of
balancing the advantages and disadvantages of mandamus relief. Id. at 34-35. The cited
cases dealt with the general rule that a parent was entitled to custody absent a finding of
being unfit. See, e.g., In re Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d 777, 778 (Tex. 2006) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (relying upon Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) for the
proposition that grandparent access could not be compelled by a court unless the parent
was unfit or the child would suffer physical or emotional effects by failing to see the
grandparent).
544. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72-73 (stating that the U.S. Constitution "does not
permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing
decisions simply because a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made").
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the child-rearing decisions was going to be lost by permitting the
grandparents' visitation rights. Unfortunately, even those justices
5 4 5 joined
that dissented in Prudential
in the per curiam decision.
This case would have been a great one to place mandamus
jurisprudence back on the traditional track by rejecting the
balancing test as unnecessary and contrary to Texas mandamus
jurisprudence.
Given the infrequency with which the court has relied upon this

new test, it is unclear what its overall ramifications are for the
future. However, it appears that, when necessary to reach the
result it wants, the court will use the new test to take jurisdiction
over cases and to supervise the incidental decisions of trial courts
without any additional legislative authority.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the court has continued to mention the traditional
requirements of mandamus jurisprudence since the Prudential
decision, the Prudential balancing test is the current binding
precedent for the determination of when an appellate court should
exercise its mandamus authority upon a finding of a clear abuse of
discretion.54 6 The Prudential decision has in fact substantially
545. Only Chief Justice Jefferson and Justice O'Neill remained on the court at this
time. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 141 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)
(Phillips, J., dissenting).
546. The Prudential court clearly articulated a principle to be used in all cases in
which a petition for writ of mandamus came before an appellate court. The court did not
address the question of the continued validity of its earlier decisions. It would have been
appropriate for the court to have stated in Prudentialthat it would continue to adhere to
its earlier decisions concerning the adequacy or inadequacy of the remedy by appeal under
certain factual scenarios. See, e.g., Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Tex.
1984) (acknowledging that the court would adhere to some of its earlier decisions
concerning the nature of the surface estate although it had articulated a new test for the
determination of what comprised the mineral estate). However, the court's continued
recitation of the Walker principles, along with its decisions relying upon pre-Prudential
precedent, strongly suggests that the new balancing test comes into play only when a new
factual scenario comes before an appellate court. In all such cases the Prudentialdecision
requires that the balancing test be applied. See generally Lubbock County v. Trammel's
Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex. 2002) (citations omitted) (asserting that
"[i]t is not the function of a court of appeals to abrogate or modify established precedent"
as "[t]hat function lies solely with [the Texas Supreme] Court"). The court in Swilley v.
McCain put the doctrine of stare decisis briefly:
As originally conceived and as generally applied, the doctrine of stare decisis
governs only the determination of questions of law and its observance does not
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altered one of the most time honored principles of mandamus
jurisprudence, and replaced it with a newly articulated standard
that leads to nothing short of ad hoc decision making. This change
has not only muddied the waters concerning when mandamus will
lie, but has also expanded the Texas Supreme Court's discretionary jurisdictional supervisory authority-and that of the courts
of appeals-over inferior courts without the need for any
legislative authorization. 547 These significant changes should be
depend upon identity of parties. After a principle, rule or proposition of law has been
squarely decided by the Supreme Court, or the highest court of the State having
jurisdiction of the particular case, the decision is accepted as a binding precedent by
the same court or other courts of lower rank when the very point is again presented in
a subsequent suit between different parties. As a general rule the determination of a
disputed issue of fact is not conclusive, under the doctrine of stare decisis, when the
same issue later arises in another case between persons who are strangers to the
record in the first suit.
Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964).
547. The Texas Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the absence of an
express constitutional or legislative grant. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.
1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding that the court has no authority to decide a
case absent a grant of jurisdiction in the constitution or state statutes). The Texas
Constitution confers mandamus jurisdiction upon the Texas Supreme Court "as may be
necessary to enforce its jurisdiction" and authorizes the legislature to confer additional
original jurisdiction on the supreme court to issue writs of mandamus. TEX. CONST. art.
V, § 3(a). In addition, the Texas Constitution confers appellate jurisdiction upon the
supreme court in certain matters and authorizes the legislature to confer additional
appellate jurisdiction on the supreme court. Id. The legislature has enacted legislation
pursuant to these grants of authority. Compare TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a)-(c)
(Vernon 2004) (defining the supreme court's writ jurisdiction), with id. § 22.001(a), (c)
(defining the supreme court's appellate jurisdiction). As a general rule, only final
judgments-those that dispose of all issues and parties-are subject to appeal in Texas.
See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001) ("The general rule [in
Texas], with a few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an appeal may be taken only from a
final judgment."); N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966)
("[The court has] steadfastly adhered through the years to the rule, with certain exceptions
... that an appeal may be prosecuted only from a final judgment and that to be final a
judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in a case."). Although there is a general
prohibition against interlocutory appeals in Texas, the legislature has adopted certain
limited exceptions to the final judgment rule to permit interlocutory appeals. See, e.g.,
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(1)-(11) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (outlining
exceptions to the general prohibition against interlocutory appeals such as a grant or
refusal of a temporary injunction). In fact, in recent years the legislature has increased the
number of such appeals. For example, in response to the supreme court's decision in
Wittig, where the court held that mandamus normally would not lie from a denial of a
special appearance, the legislature in 1997 created an interlocutory appeal for denials of
special appearance. Canadian Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 310 (Tex. 1994)
(orig. proceeding), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 1296, sec. 1. § 51.014(a)(7), 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4936, 4937 (Vernon)

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:3

of serious concern for anyone interested in the rule of law, the
doctrine of stare decisis, or the orderly progression of justice. 548
(current version codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon
1997 & Supp. 2006)); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon
Supp. 2006) (allowing appeal from an order granting or denying the special appearance of
a defendant under Rule 120a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, except in a suit
brought under the Family Code). At the present time there are eleven such exceptions
contained in section 51.014 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, although other
exceptions are scattered throughout the Texas statutes. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. ORGS. CODE
ANN. § 2.106(b) (Vernon 2006) (allowing interlocutory appeals from a trial court's denial
or failure to grant a motion for summary judgment based upon immunity for certain nonprofit corporations); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003 (Vernon Supp. 2006)
(authorizing an interlocutory appeal from trial court's determination of whether a plaintiff
has independently established proper venue in cases involving multiple plaintiffs). The
Legislature also determined that jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals is generally final
in the courts of appeals. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2006)
(stating that except as provided by this particular statute the judgment of the court of
appeals is conclusive in interlocutory appeals). Thus, the Texas Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals is limited. See TEX GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.225(c)(e) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (limiting jurisdiction of the supreme court in general to
interlocutory appeals in those cases where the justices on the courts of appeals have
disagreed on a question of law or where one court of appeals has held differently from a
prior decision of another court of appeals or the supreme court). Even in this area,
however, the legislature has moved to give limited additional jurisdiction to the supreme
court. For example, in 2003 the legislature expanded the supreme court's ability to hear
interlocutory appeals in cases involving conflicts between the various courts of appeals or
the supreme court. See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN §§ 22.001(e), 22.225(e) (Vernon
Supp. 2006) (stating that a conflict arises when "one court holds differently from another
when there is inconsistency in their respective decisions that should be clarified to remove
unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfairness to litigants"). Prior to this change the
supreme court had taken a rather narrow view of its conflicts jurisdiction. See, e.g., Collins
v. Ison-Newsome, 73 S.W.3d 178, 181 (Tex. 2001) ("Cases conflict for jurisdictional
purposes only if the conflict is upon the very question of law actually decided.").
548. See, e.g., Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 215 (Tex. 2001) ("Strong
policies support our practice of adhering to settled rules of law 'unless there exists the
strongest reasons for chang[e]."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). An early
Commission of Appeals opinion expressed the doctrine of stare decisis as follows:
[T]he doctrine of stare decisis, which as a matter of public policy and sound legal
administration requires the courts in the decision of cases to observe a proper respect
for the prior decisions of the highest court. While the rule is not unbending, and the
courts are not without power to depart from a prior ruling, or of course to overrule it,
where cogent reasons exist, and where the general interest will suffer less by such
departure, than from a strict adherence, yet a due regard for the stability of rights
acquired under the law as announced by the highest court of the state, to say nothing
of the propriety of uniformity of decision by that court, requires that when a question
of law has been definitely settled once it should remain the law unless there exists the
strongest reasons for changing it.... Concretely stated, the doctrine merely means
that the decisions of law made by the highest court of the state become the law of that
state.
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Benavides v. Garcia, 290 S.W. 739, 740-41 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, judgm't adopted)
(citation omitted).
More recently, the court stated a policy rationale for adhering to time honored
principles announced by the court:
Generally, we adhere to our precedents for reasons of efficiency, fairness, and
legitimacy. First, if we did not follow our own decisions, no issue could ever be
considered resolved. The potential volume of speculative relitigation under such
circumstances alone ought to persuade us that stare decisis is a sound policy.
Secondly, we should give due consideration to the settled expectations of litigants...
who have justifiably relied on the principles articulated in [earlier cases]. Finally,
under our form of government, the legitimacy of the judiciary rests in large part upon
a stable and predictable decision making process that differs dramatically from that
properly employed by the political branches of government.
Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. 1995) (citation omitted) ("'[Stare decisis]
permits society to presume that bedrock principlesare founded in the law ratherthan in the
proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional
system of government, both in appearance and in fact.'" (emphasis added) (alteration in
original) (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986))); see also Welch v. Tex.
Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1987) ("The rule of law
depend[s] in large part on adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis."). The legal system's
credibility lies in large part upon the twin principles of stability and predictability. See,
e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)
(explaining that the judicial system could not function if a judge "could not lay one's own
course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone
before him"); see also Wallace B. Jefferson, The State of The Judiciary in Texas,
PRESENTATION TO THE 80TH LEGISLATURE (2007) ("[W]hen the law does change, court
decisions evolve with that change in a principled and considered manner."); Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 13, 16 (stating that
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires continuity and a respect for
precedent).
However, one must always keep in mind the sage advice of Mr. Justice Holmes who
observed:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down
in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
However, his advice is not applicable to the requirement that there be an adequate
remedy to preclude the application of mandamus authority, as the basis for requiring the
relator to establish that the remedy by appeal is inadequate has been well articulated and
repeated over the years. There is no "blind imitation of the past." See, e.g., Bagg's Case,
77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278 (K.B. 1615) (stating that if there was no other remedy mandamus
should be granted "so that no wrong or injury, either public or private, can be done but
that it shall be (here) reformed or punished by due course of law"); Terrell v. Greene, 88
Tex. 539, 545-46, 31 S.W. 632, 634 (1895) (orig. proceeding) (stating that the alternative
remedy was inadequate to provide the enforcement of the specific right that the relator
was entitled); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding) (expressing a concern for "both public and private interests" when deciding
whether or nto to grant manduamus review).
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The Texas Supreme Court should not so cavalierly jettison over a
century of its own precedent-not to mention several centuries of
common law precedent-to achieve these obviously desired
results. 54 9 It is clear from reading the AIU and Prudential
decisions that the court attempted to justify the use of mandamus
to enforce contractual rights in situations other than arbitration
clauses where special circumstances could clearly justify such
use. 5 5 0 The repeated reliance upon Anglin, in both of these
decisions, suggests that the primary basis for the decisions was the
perceived loss of a right that could not be corrected on appeal. 1
Apparently, however, the court did not wish to assert openly that
these two contractual rights were substantial ones, whose loss, in
whole or in part, would trigger mandamus relief.5 52 Thus, the
Mandamus review of incidental, interlocutory rulings by the trial courts unduly
interferes with trial court proceedings, distracts appellate court attention to issues that are
unimportant both to the ultimate disposition of the case at hand and to the uniform
development of the law, and adds unproductively to the expense and delay of civil
litigation. These grounds are just as important today as they were when they were first
explained by the courts.
549. On the same day as the Prudential decision, the court, in AIU, held that an
appeal was not an adequate remedy for a trial court's failure to enforce a contractual
forum selection clause. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 120 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding). The court reached its decision without resort to or mention of the new
balancing test. Furthermore, the Prudentialcourt, although introducing the new balancing
test, applied the traditional mandamus jurisprudence in reaching its decision. In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 137-38 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
550. See In re Prudential,148 S.W.3d at 142 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (listing the
special circumstances influencing the choice of mandamus relief in cases covered by the
FAA); In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 123 (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (noting the special
circumstances in arbitration cases supporting an exception to the general rule that the
court would "not specifically enforce contractual rights by mandamus").
551. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 115-16 (noting that there is "no meaningful
distinction between [a] forum selection clause and [an] arbitration clause"); In re
Prudential,148 S.W.3d at 138-39 (noting the loss of the contractual right of arbitration
and non-jury trial if mandamus was not granted). Interestingly, the court did not refer to
any of the other cases holding the remedy by appeal inadequate if a party stood to lose a
substantial right. See, e.g., Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 842 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding) (stating that an appellate remedy was inadequate when "parties stand to lose
their substantial rights"); Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 368, 311 S.W.2d 648, 652 (1958)
(orig. proceeding) (citing Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1956)) (holding that
"interference [by way of mandamus was] justified only when parties st[oo]d to lose their
substantial rights").
552. The dissenting opinions both realized that the court was implicitly arguing that
these two contractual rights were substantial rights that would be lost absent mandamus
relief. In re Prudential,148 S.W.3d at 143 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (asserting that, in this
case, the party will not permanently lose a substantial right if mandamus relief is denied);
In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 124 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (asserting that, in this case,

2007]

GRANTING MANDAMUS RELIEF IN TEXAS

court filled its opinions with other arguments that, 5in5 3 and of

themselves, would never have justified mandamus relief.
In any event, the Prudentialdecision is binding on the courts of
this state and will have a significant impact upon the future of
mandamus jurisprudence. The court's alleged balancing of the
benefits versus the detriments of mandamus relief in a particular
situation is an abrogation of the court's responsibility to make
informed decisions on the basis of established legal principles and
precedents. Replacing this responsibility with a pseudo-scientific
calculation is nothing short of simple ad hoc decision making. The
result is that the court's mandamus jurisprudence resembles a
judicial comptrollers' office, forcing mandamus cases through a
sieve in which the detriments or costs of mandamus relief are
labeled in derogatory terms as rigid, simple, and formulaic, while
the benefits of such relief are labeled in positive terms as
"practical" or pragmatic and prudential.5 5 4 This ad hoc approach
is juxtaposed with the basic ideal of judicial reasoning as being a
rational application of neutral principles that have been well
documented over time and whose application inexorably leads to a
given result.5 5 5 While prior to the Prudential decision the court
the party will not suffer irreparable loss if mandamus relief is denied).
553. The Prudential court made references to: the preference for mandamus relief
rather than expansion of interlocutory appeals; the inconsistency between affording relief
to the denial of constitutional jury trial by mandamus while denying it for refusal to
enforce a contractual jury waiver; and the fact "that other courts have granted mandamus
relief to enforce contractual jury waivers."
In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 137-40.
(majority opinion). In AIU, the court made references to: harassing a party: "adding a
layer of expense ...to encourage a favorable settlement"; wasting of judicial resources;
and observing that other jurisdictions enforce forum selection clauses by mandamus or
interlocutory appeal. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d at 117-20. The Prudential court's
reference to the availability of mandamus to afford relief in the case of a denial of a
constitutional right to jury trial is misplaced. The case referred to by the court specifically
stated that "[blecause the denial of a [constitutional right to a] jury trial can be reviewed
by ordinary appeal, mandamus is generally not available to review such a ruling." Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (citations
omitted). In Gayle, the court held that, because of the special circumstances, the case was
properly before the court on mandamus review of a discovery order. Id. "[T]he interests
of judicial economy dictate that [the court] should also remedy the trial court's denial of
the right of jury trial by mandamus." Id.
554. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES viii (1985)
(observing that constitutional choices should be weighed as matters of principle and not as
instrumental calculations).
555. See, e.g., Zollie Steakley & Weldon U. Howell, Jr., Ruminations on Res Judicata,
28 Sw. L.J. 355, 362-63 (1974) (arguing that without any objective standards, each case
would be decided on abstract principles that would be inherently unpredictable,
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engrafted a few modest exceptions to the fundamental tenet of
mandamus-that the writ would not issue unless the remedy by
appeal was inadequate-the court never even intimated that it did
not understand the meaning of the word adequate. 55 6 It appears
as if the court has made the unilateral decision to circumvent the
legislative restrictions on its jurisdiction in the area of reviewing
trial courts' interlocutory orders and has made the conscious
"afford[ing] little basis for consistency"). Oliver Wendell Holmes once noted that the law
was a prediction of what judges would do. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law,
10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897). Thus, in some small way the law is indeterminate
because, although a judge generally will follow precedent, his decision will also be the
result of a large number of other factors. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 73 (1990) (mentioning, among others, factors such as
common sense, experience, and intuition). But precedent has an overall important role to
play in this process of prediction. One author has recently put it in these terms:
Ultimately, if law (in the sense of what judges do and say) is to have any effect outside
of the closed system of the courts, it is because other human beings will conform their
conduct to the decisions issued by judges. Further, except for the parties to a
particular case whose conduct will be directly influenced (often dictated) by the
judgment, human beings will conform their conduct to current decisions only if they
predict that future judges in future cases will follow them. Precedent becomes critical
not merely for legitimacy in terms of respect for judgments being enforced, but in the
broader sense that the power of the judiciary depends on an expectation that
precedents will be followed. While it is not necessary that precedents be invariably
followed, the power of the judiciary depends on them being usually followed.
Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOU. L. REV. 1143, 1209 (2006).
556. In fact, the obiter dicta in Cleveland fully explained the meaning of the word
adequate, while the Walker court had clearly explained when an alternative remedy was
inadequate. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 842 (quoting Iley, 311 S.W.2d at 652 and stating
that an appeal was inadequate and mandamus interference with a trial court's incidental

ruling "was justified only when parties stand to lose their substantial rights"); Cleveland v.
Ward, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068 (Tex. 1926) (orig. proceeding) (noting that a remedy was
adequate when it was "equally convenient, beneficial, and effective as mandamus"). Since
at least 1803, the United States Supreme Court had a rather clear picture of what was
meant by the specific legal remedy that would prevent the issuance of mandamus. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803) (noting that Marbury had the legal
right to obtain the office in question and nothing else would suffice); see also Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614-15 (1838) (explaining fully why
certain alternative remedies were not adequate in the case). The common law courts
never had a problem with understanding what was meant by the fact that the alternative
remedy had to be complete and effective in providing the injured party with the equivalent
of the legal right of which he had been deprived. See, e.g., The King v. Severn & Wye Ry.
Co., 196 Eng. Rep. 501, 503 (Q.B. 1819) (Holroyd, J. concurring) (noting that an
indictment and fine were not as equally effectual to compel the performance of the legal
duty and thus, mandamus would be granted); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2
COMMENTARIES *110 (explaining that mandamus would issue unless the other remedy
compelled the performance of the legal duty to which the party was entitled).
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decision to use mandamus as a general supervisory writ of trial
court decisions with which it is dissatisfied. 5 5 7
It is fairly obvious that over its history, the Texas Supreme
Court has "chafe[d] ' '5 5 8 at the restrictions that have been imposed

557. Unlike the federal courts, the Texas Supreme Court does not have any general
procedures available for reviewing interlocutory rulings of trial courts except in limited
statutory situations. The federal courts have various additional appellate methods of
reviewing interlocutory orders that could serve as a model for Texas. The certification
exception available in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are the most significant federal methods of obtaining interlocutory review of a
federal district court order. 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) (2000); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see, e.g.,
Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 185-99 (2001) (discussing the interpretative
doctrines, the certification exceptions, and category exceptions to the federal final
judgment rule); see also Ren6e Forinash McElhaney, Toward Permissive Appeal in Texas,
29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 729, 738-40 (1998) (discussing exceptions to the rule about final
judgement).
558. See Garza v. Garcia, 137 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Tex. 2004) (stating that some appellate
judges "chafe at restrictions on appellate review"). The Garza case involved the Texas
venue provision dealing with motions to transfer for the convenience of the parties. Id. at
38. The venue statute mandates that a trial court's decision on such a motion "is 'not
grounds for appeal or mandamus and is not reversible error."' Id. at 37; see also TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(c) (Vernon 2002) ("A court's ruling or decision to
grant or deny a transfer under Subsection (b) is not grounds for appeal or mandamus and
is not reversible error."). In Garza, the "defendant filed a motion [to transfer] asserting
both improper venue and" specifying grounds of inconvenience. Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 37.
"[T]he trial court granted [the motion] without specifying" any basis for the transfer. Id.
Following a final judgment in the case, the matter was appealed. The court of appeals
reversed the case asserting that the original trial court had proper venue over the case, and
that the trial court's granting the motion to transfer the case was reversible error. Garcia
v. Garza, 70 S.W.3d 362, 372 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002), rev'd, 137 S.W.3d 36 (Tex.
2004)). In reaching this decision, the court of appeals had determined that it could
consider the venue issue because the trial judge's order failed to specify that it was
transferring the case for the convenience of the parties; thus, the appellate court assumed
that the transfer was based on improper venue. Id. at 368. The Supreme Court of Texas
reversed the case. Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 40-41. The majority of the court followed strict
construction of the venue statute and held that because the motion sought a transfer for
the inconvenience of the parties-the order being silent-then the statute applied, and the
appellate court was not to hear an appeal on the venue issue. Chief Justice Phillips
dissented, arguing that although the literal language of the statute might lead to the result
of the court, in his opinion, the court could review the trial court's decision because
refusing to do so would undermine the essential purpose of the legislation. Id. at 42-45.
Chief Justice Phillip's admission that the language of the statute supported the majority's
decision should have been the end of the issue. The simple truth of the matter is that the
court is not a legislative body, and its jurisdiction is limited. It is up to the legislature to
address changes in the law, which it is clearly capable of doing. For example, in response
to the supreme court's decision in American Home Products Corp. v. Clark, 28 S.W.3d 92,
96 (Tex. 2000)-holding that an interlocutory appeal was not available from a trial court's
determination that venue was proper as to an intervening plaintiff-the legislature
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upon it by the Constitution and the legislature. In the area of
mandamus jurisprudence, the court has, from time to time,
developed different ways to circumvent the common law history
and precedents whenever it felt the need to exercise jurisdiction
over a case because of the egregious abuse of discretion by the
trial court. It is interesting that instead of addressing the real
issue-the abuse of discretion by trial courts in incorrectly
determining matters of law or misapplying the law to the

clarified its intent as to a broad scope of interlocutory appeals in cases involving venue
determinations of intervening plaintiffs. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 15.003(b) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (codifying the legislature's response). In the area of
mandamus relief, in response to the court's decision in Wittig where the court held that
mandamus normally would not lie from a denial of a special appearance, the legislature in
1997 created an interlocutory appeal for denials of special appearances. Canadian
Helicopters Ltd. v. Wittig, 876 S.W.2d 304, 310 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding), superseded
by statute on other grounds, Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1296, sec. 1,
§ 51.014(a)(7), 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4936, 4937 (Vernon) (current version codified at
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2006))
(codifying the legislature's response); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7)
(Vernon Supp. 2006) (codifying the legislature's response).
The present court's desire to circumvent the legislative limitations on its jurisdiction is
nothing new. In 1891, the Texas Constitution was amended creating intermediate
appellate courts in Texas but also limiting the supreme court's jurisdiction to questions of
law. TEX. CONST. art. V § 6; see, e.g., Betts v. Johnson, 96 Tex. 360, 362, 73 S.W. 4, 5
(1903) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that the purpose of the constitutional amendments in
1891 was to correct the evil of the then-present system so as to "carefully limit[] the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court"): Choate v. San Antonio & Aransas Pass Ry. Co., 91
Tex. 406, 409, 44 S.W.69, 69 (1898) (orig. proceeding) (stating that the new constitutional
provisions "restrict, in express terms, the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and to confine
it to questions of law"). Under this constitutional provision, the intermediate appellate
courts were given exclusive jurisdiction of factual sufficiency points of error. See City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005) (stating that points of error raising
"factual sufficiency [have] been the sole domain of the intermediate appellate courts ...
since 1891"). Notwithstanding this clear restriction prohibiting the court from factual
sufficiency review of trial court findings, the court found an ingenuous way to circumvent
this limitation. In the case of In re King's Estate, the supreme court held that it might
accept jurisdiction, notwithstanding the constitutional prohibition, to determine if a
correct legal standard was applied by the courts of appeals in reviewing a factual
sufficiency point of error. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664-66, 244 S.W.2d 660, 66162 (Tex. 1951) (per curiam). Since King's Estate, the supreme court has continued to
accept jurisdiction to determine whether the courts of appeals have utilized correct legal
principles in reviewing factual insufficiency points. See, e.g., Cropper v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988) (expanding the court's jurisdiction to review
intermediate court rulings on non-findings under the same standards as findings): Pool v.
Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629. 635 (Tex. 1986) (expanding the court's jurisdiction to not
only "determin[ing] if a correct [legal] standard [was used] by the intermediate courts,"
but determining if such court correctly applied the standard).
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facts 55 9 -the court focuses on the inadequacy of the legal remedy
as a way to address its concerns with what it sees as the injustice of
a particular situation. For, absent an abuse of discretion, there is
no need to inquire as to the adequacy of a legal remedy.
Apparently frustrated by being unable to affect the quality of the
state judiciary, the court has used its power much like the old
common law courts in a general supervisory role as a check and
balance of the injustice and the additional costs and delay caused
by clearly erroneous trial court decisions. While this might have
been possible in England as a result of the peremptory nature of
the writ and the power of the King's Bench as supervisor of
inferior courts and public officials, this has never been the case in
Texas. 5 6 0

The attempt to expand its jurisdiction with the new

balancing test is simply an usurpation of the prerogative of the
legislature to expand or contract the jurisdiction of the supreme
court. It is simply wrong; moreover, it sends the wrong message to
the trial bench and the Bar by placing mandamus at the level of an
interlocutory appeal.
If the court will not follow its own
precedents that have been in place for nearly 175 years, what
degree of predictability and advice can lawyers give clients? It
would probably be best if the Texas Supreme Court took to heart
the counsel of Oliver Wendell Holmes when he stated: "The
history of what the law has been is necessary to the knowledge of
5 61
what the law is."

After reflecting on the long history of mandamus jurisprudence,
the court should take the earliest opportunity to reverse the
Prudential decision and specifically reject the balancing test; it
should return to the tried and trusted traditional approach to
mandamus jurisprudence.
In our present culture of instant gratification, the thought of
delay or costs to achieve what one perceives as justice is generally
559. A trial court has no discretion to determine matters of law or to apply the law to
the facts incorrectly. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 437 (Tex. 1997)
(orig. proceeding) (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig.

proceeding)).
560. See, e.g., In re TXU Elec. Co., 67 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding)
(Phillips, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Texas Supreme Court's mandamus authority

"[was] not a general, supervisory power"); Comm'r of the Gen. Land Office
v. Smith, 5 Tex. 471, 478 (1849) (noting that, in Texas practice, the writ is not considered a

prerogative writ but is a private remedy).
561. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 37 (1881).
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not palpable. Most individuals want the wrong immediately
remedied without delay or additional cost. The Prudentialcourt
indulged this philosophy and, in so doing, abdicated its responsibility to decide cases in a reasoned and thoughtful manner.
While one can always applaud good intentions, the court's decision
shows an overly-aggressive pursuit to insert into mandamus
jurisprudence a new wrinkle for no logical reason other than to
satisfy its own desire for more control over incidental trial court
rulings. The old clich6 is probably an appropriate response to the
court's seemingly blind adherence to its good intention to achieve
the perceived right result in the case: The road to hell is paved
with good intentions. However, that is not the manner in which
the judicial system functions. The law, like Christianity, must take
the time to put faith and trust into the system and hope for a better
tomorrow.5 6 2

562. "Faith is the realization of what is hoped for and evidence of things not seen."
Hebrews 11:1 (RSV).

